Aid Selection: The Effects of Military and Economic Foreign Aid on Intrastate Paramilitary and Insurgent Organizations Across Essential Regime Typologies

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by

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Abstract

The provision of military and economic aid is a common prescription for political instability in recipient states. However, recipient states and the sources of their instability are not monolithic. This research attempts to determine the nuanced effects of specific aid provisions across varying regime types and observe their resultant impacts on paramilitary and insurgent organizations – two common sources of political and economic turmoil. Through the application of selectorate theory logic to regime-specific aid consumption preferences and constraints, this research hypothesizes that the impact that military and economic aid has on the endurance of paramilitary and insurgent groups will be dependent on the distinct regime types of recipient states. This research analyzes the interaction between aid and regime type using logistic regression models – holding arms transfers and economic development aid receipts as the primary independent variables and annual group endurance as the key dependent variables. This analysis finds that economic development aid elicits a statistically significant impact on democratic insurgencies and democratic paramilitaries. To evaluate the internal validity of these findings and uncover the nuanced selectorate forces at play, the research undertakes an additional series of case studies – analyzing the performance of insurgencies in Colombia and Peru and the performance and paramilitaries in Myanmar and Indonesia. The research finds that the impact of aid on democratic insurgencies largely depends on the winning coalition's decision to integrate rebellious peripheries into the winning coalition public goods. In autocracies, the winning coalition's reliance on paramilitaries appears dependent on the scale of threats presented to their coalition's tenure – as well as the leverage the recipients possess relative to their foreign benefactors.

Introduction

The provision of military and economic aid as a state strengthening prescription for intrastate political instability in developing states is a cornerstone of not only U.S. foreign policy, but also the foreign policy of other relatively prosperous states. Such benefactors see these forms of aid as a means to promote intrastate and regional stability while avoiding the deployment of their own military forces. The deployment of foreign military forces directly into an instance of compromised stability in the target state, with the aim of state-strengthening, is often conceptualized as a direct intervention. By contrast, the provision of resources and not a benefactor state's own military can be considered a form of *indirect* aid. This aid grants the recipient states the opportunity to retain their own sovereign discretion with respect to how the aid is consumed. A critical aspect this approach is that much of it is raw monetary disbursements or other resources with versatile applications. This research questions the unique impacts of both arms provision and the disbursement of economic development aid with respect to the cultivation of state capacity and intrastate stability.

With passive aid being a central regimen of state-strengthening foreign policy, it is also critical to recognize the consumption side of the equation. Aid utilization is highly dependent on the political environment of the recipient state. Elected leaders of democratic states consume aid differently than autocratic military dictators with wide latitude in choosing how to execute consumption. A democrat will need to spread the benefits of the aid among their constituents – an autocrat will only need to please a few select allies. Thus, the political characteristics of the recipient state's regime are central to any latent materializations of the aid's generation of stability. A central consideration of this research is analyzing how specific regime types consume aid, and how the results of consumption vary between them.

Finally, it is important to consider the sources of intrastate instability and how they might be uniquely impacted by aid across distinct regime types. This research specifically considers the performance of paramilitary and insurgent group actors in terms of durability. Conceptually, these groups are virtual opposites – yet their existences in a state are indicative of diminished state capacity. Paramilitaries reflect an anemic public security apparatus and a need for repression in their host-states. Insurgencies reflect the ability of a non-state group to directly challenge the authority of the incumbent government of their host-states. In both cases, the endurance of these groups serves as an indicator for intrastate instability. This research considers how aid uniquely impacts both group types.

With these three dimensions outlined, this research questions how arms transfers and economic development aid impacts the survival of non-state paramilitary and insurgent organizations in recipient states of varying regime type. To understand the relationships across these dimensions, the research begins with a theoretical overview of the political forces which determine aid consumption preferences across regimes – as well as the consumption implications for paramilitary and insurgent organizations. This overview informs hypotheses on the interaction between aid receipts, regime type, and group endurance responses. This is followed by a quantitative analysis on multinational data which tests the external validity of these hypotheses. Finally, the quantitative findings drive qualitative case studies on the internal validity of the results.

The Selectorate Theory and Foreign Aid

This research is guided heavily by the fundamental assumptions of the selectorate theory and its application to the leadership decision-making of foreign aid recipient states. Accordingly, selectorate politics are framed as following several principles. (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 255-259) The *selectorate* consists of people within a state who may have some input in deciding the

leadership of government. The *winning coalition* is a subset drawn of the selectorate who does provide this input. The goal of the winning coalition is to maximize their group benefits. At the same time, there are also individuals in a state who may coalesce to oppose the leader – including members of the winning coalition who are able to defect. In order for a leader to maintain his/her winning coalition and also mitigate the coalescence of an opposition, they must use their governmental authority to distribute private and/or public goods to the winning coalition. These payouts are dependant on the size of their winning coalition. In addition, leaders may also retain the leftover resources for their own benefit. The size of winning coalitions varies across states, although democracies generally have large winning coalitions (and a disproportionate demand for public goods), whereas autocracies have a narrow winning coalition (and a disproportionate demand for private goods). (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004, 365-368) It is essential for the leader to satisfy their winning coalition or else they will inevitably lose power. In a strictly domestic sense, the regular cost of satisfying the winning coalition and mitigating opposition is limited to domestic resources – for example, tax revenue and primary resource extraction rents. Leaders must consider costs of their present coalition, as well as their obligations for future payments which may change over time.

For developing states, balancing the costs of loyalty with domestic resources is not easy. Exogenous shocks to the system, such as a sharp drop in the price of primary resources or an economic downturn, can bankrupt a leader's ability to make a payout in the form of public and/or private goods. Fortunately for them, wealthier states (benefactors) may offer these incumbents foreign aid. This increases a leader's tenure by extending their ability to make loyalty payments and satisfy their winning coalition. The benefactor states involved do not disburse aid out of altruism. Much of the time, this aid is intended to generate geopolitical stability by reinforcing the

status quo in the recipient state. Aid may also be disbursed with strings attached (conditionalities) which serve to demand a policy concession in exchange. In practice, the Western capitalist democracies (and the USSR during the Cold War) are the primary benefactors for foreign aid. It is now a mainstream conditionality for foreign aid to be granted in exchange for human rights improvements and/or democratization. (Regan 1995, 614-616; Knack 2004, 252-253) However, aid may also be channeled into rent-seekers or may inspire conflict if it represents a prize to rivals of the incumbent government. Therefore, the intent of the benefactor with respect to the materializations of aid-affected objectives may be secondary to the micro-level political conditions within recipient states. (Regan 621-626; Knack 2004, 257-262) With this in mind, the selectorate theory's application to international foreign aid seems appropriate.

As a final key consideration of the selectorate theory, it is crucial to highlight that the micro-level institutional structure of a recipient state's regime type determines how much discretion a leader possesses to make payouts. To some degree, all leaders must compete for political latitude with other governmental actors in a state: legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, and even high ranking military figures. An autocrat is expected to have wide latitude in this regard, whereas an anocrat (a regime with both autocratic and democratic traits), and especially a democrat, is more institutionally constrained by micro-level institutions and actors. The level of institutionalization in states will further impact the fungibility of a leader's resources. Poor institutionalization in autocracies and anocracies means that there is generally more corruption across government, leading to higher levels of rent seeking behavior, a greater demand for private goods, and inhibited fungibility with regards to state-directed stimulation of economic growth and the maintenance of a strong military apparatus. Thus, the corresponding micro-level features of regime types bear a direct relationship to how effective foreign aid disbursements are at buying

loyalty and quelling dissent. Regardless of the system, all leaders are interested in buying the most tenure at the lowest cost. This point is extremely pertinent to how leaders across all regime types choose to allocate the resources they garner from foreign aid. With the fundamentals of the selectorate theory established, foreign aid disbursements can now be placed in the context of domestic instability and the existence of *paramilitaries* and *insurgencies* in recipient states of varying regime typologies.

Paramilitaries, Foreign Aid, and Regimes

Paramilitarism is a notoriously vague concept that lacks a uniform definition. After observing the most common characteristics throughout the literature, this research conceptualizes paramilitaries as "military-like, organized forces that are separate from the state military apparatus but bear informal ties to the incumbent government and which may be contracted as a means of combatting insurgent forces and/or repressing opposition to the government and/or status quo." Broad attempts at conceptualization relate to this conclusion; as do narrower case studies of regional paramilitarism. (Scobell and Hammit 1998, 220-224 ; Hristov 2010, 16-20; Dube and Naidu 2015, 251-252) Some of the most recent and significant research on paramilitaries emphasizes the necessity for a non-adversarial relationship between states and intrastate paramilitary groups – as well as some level of political cooperation. (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2016, 59-60)

It is critical to highlight the nature of paramilitary services in comparison to those of a regular state military. State militaries provide broad security as a public good or selective security to coalition allies as a private good. In both circumstances, large state militaries require greater bureaucratization; and therefore some degree of centralization with respect to the seat of government. This makes localized military action more expensive when it is further from the

military's logistical nexus. Paramilitaries, by contrast, are often localized to more diverse regions of the state. This is possible because they are not tied to the government and because their smaller size does not necessitate a logistical nexus in the most developed locations of a state. For this reason, paramilitaries have the unique ability to respond to more localized peripheral security issues – and sometimes at a lower cost than the state military. (Hristov 2010, 18; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2016, 60) Because paramilitaries are tangentially connected to the state, contracting them for repressive services may avoid the connection to the client of their repressive services – unlike state military repression which draws a clear line to the incumbent government. The leaders of the principal regime types will consider the costs and benefits of paramilitary services relative to their own state capacity and their method for garnering tenure.

Democratic leaders are reliant on the provision of public goods and the support of a large winning coalition for their tenure. The requirement that they dispense public goods efficiently means that effective public security is a focal point of their own militaries. Therefore, their greater investment in the logistical efficiency of their militaries should mean that responding to peripheral threats is more easily achieved. Moreover, because paramilitary security is localized, it is therefore a private good. Democratic leaders will tend not to contract out paramilitaries for security services because of this reason. With respect to repressive services, contracting paramilitaries for repression is irrational if it could damage their ability garner tenure through the public eye and their large winning coalitions. With respect to economic and military aid, democratic leaders should be expected to channel this investment into their existing military apparatus and non-repressive measures for reducing dissent – instead of contracting paramilitaries. As economic and military aid to democracies increases, paramilitary survival should be expected to decrease.

Anocrats are confronted with institutional weakness as a result of the mixed nature of their regimes. This means that there will be diminished state capacity due to higher levels of inefficiency, corruption, and rent-seeking across the governmental apparatuses – and this will certainly apply to the capabilities of the state military. Anocratic militaries will be more expensive to operate outside of their logistical nexus and they will be mediocre at providing both public and private security reliably. For this reason, the military's response to peripheral security threats will be extremely inefficient relative to the high cost. However, before an anocrat decides to contract a localized paramilitary to respond to peripheral threats, they will also consider the long-term payouts to these groups and how it may impact the long-term stability of their coalition. With respect to their selection of public and private goods, anocratic decision-making is expected to be quite mixed – like the nature of their regimes. The winning coalitions of these states frequently change their policy preferences so as to balance dynamic challenges to their authority. Sometimes, they may favor private goods and avoid repression. Other times, the opposite will be true. Because anocrats mix their strategies for securing tenure, their reliance on paramilitaries should fluctuate with the circumstances surrounding their coalitions stability. This makes a clear relationship between aid and paramilitary difficult to discern.

Finally, autocracies will have stronger militaries which are capable of responding to peripheral threats. This is because autocratic tenure generation is very reliant on the ability to carry out swift and effective responses to security threats and execute repression. Moreover, autocrats will be less concerned with the connection between repressive acts and the leadership – indeed their leaders are often pariahs. Thus, covert repression is less necessary – in fact, state terror might reinforce the leader's position. Autocrats will seek to strengthen the capabilities that are readily directly under their jurisdiction – and this means making private payouts to close allies and

maintaining a subservient military. Their devolution of repressive services to paramilitaries does not appear immediately rational if it requires broadening their coalition. As economic and military aid to autocracies increases, paramilitary survival should decrease.

The research formulates the following hypotheses on the interaction between regime type and aid with respect to the endurance of intrastate paramilitary groups:

Democratic States

H_1: Military and economic aid disbursements to democracies will result in decreasing paramilitary endurance.

Anocratic States

H_2^{Null}: Military and economic aid disbursements to anocracies with will not impact the endurance of paramilitary groups.

Autocratic States

H_3: Military and economic aid disbursements to autocracies will result in decreased paramilitary endurance.

Insurgencies, Foreign Aid, and Regimes

Insurgencies are fundamentally different from paramilitaries because they are a direct adversary of the state. Like paramilitarism, the research expects that regime type will also have an impact on a state's ability to combat insurgent organizations. It is important to note that, like paramilitaries, insurgencies lack a universal definition. Literature on the subject typically gives emphasis to the non-state nature of such groups, as well as their organization, tactics, and ability to challenge the authority of a government. San-Akca's conceptualization of *Non-State Armed Groups (NAG)*s presents this research with the most concise interpretation of insurgent groups – strongly informing the following conceptual definition of insurgencies. (San-Akca 2009, 589-591)

This research conceptualizes insurgencies as "a military-like, organized, and uniformed force of non-state actors that violently challenges the incumbent government and/or regime with the intent of capturing territory."

Along the lines of the selectorate theory, military and economic aid can also be expected to have unique impacts on insurgencies across regime types. There is a growing body of literature that focuses on the effectiveness of specific forms of interventions at curbing civil conflict. (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004, 257-267; Hegre 2004, 249-250) Much of this literature points out that equitable economic development is seen as a factor in raising the population's opportunity cost for joining an insurgency. The analysis performed by Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom (2004) found economic interventions to be statistically insignificant when it came to reducing civil conflict duration. However, this analysis did not seek to explore the interaction between aid and regime type to the extent of the present research. Logically, it would seem sensible within the confines of the selectorate theory that regime type should have a critical role in determining the consumption choices and consumption efficiency of military and economic aid receipts. This interaction should determine the aid's impact on the intrastate insurgent groups.

In democracies, such aid spurs the government's ability to provide public goods such as security and economic development programs. Because democracies are normally better equipped to dispense such goods due to the nature of their institutional integrity, it is more likely that aid in these regimes will materialize into improvements in the public's quality of life, the economy, and the quality of public security provided by the state military. In this respect, because aid channels are more efficient, economic and military aid is likely to reduce the incentive for potential dissidents to organize into an opposition coalition; as doing so would forfeit the benefits offered by the state. Summarily, economic and military aid in democracies raises the opportunity costs for

would-be insurgents. Moreover, the capacity for grievance redress in democracies carries the endogenous effect of increasing the opposition mobilization threshold outright. (Hendrix 2010, 276) If a greater volume of aid receipts necessitates improvements dispensation institutions, then aid could increase the institutional integrity of democracies further. The provision of economic and military aid to democracies should therefore result in decreased insurgent group survival.

Conversely, a lack of institutional development and constitutional methods of redress in anocracies should produce higher levels of corruption, rent seeking, and unrest. Due to these already high levels of inefficiency, aid inflows are unlikely to materialize into adequately distributed public and private goods; meaning that improvements to the general quality of life and security are unlikely to arise from aid disbursements to anocracies. Therefore, the opportunity costs for potential dissidents in anocracies should remain unchanged by aid inflows in anocratic states.

Autocracies are expected to channel their aid inflows into existing members of the narrow winning coalition and their security apparatus. Because insurgencies represent a specific security threat, autocrats are expected to use their aid to reinforce their narrow coalition through the provision of private goods while also ensuring that the repressive capabilities of the military are sufficient to combat the insurgency. Military and economic aid disbursements to autocracies should result in decreasing insurgent group survival.

The research formulates the following hypotheses on the interaction between regime type and aid with respect to the endurance of intrastate insurgent groups:

Democratic States

H_4: Military and economic aid disbursements to democracies will result in decreasing insurgent group endurance.

Anocratic States

H_5 Null: Military and economic aid disbursements to anocracies will not impact the survival of insurgent groups.

Autocratic States

H_6: Military and economic aid disbursements to autocracies will result in decreasing insurgent group endurance.

Quantitative Methodology:

To study the intersection between foreign aid receipts and insurgent and paramilitary group endurance across the principal regime types, the research assembles a dataset of states with developing economies and economies in transition with active groups between 1989 and 2012. Beginning in largely 1989 avoids the bipolarity of the Cold War and ending in 2012 is based on data availability constraints.[1] The research uses the 2012 World Economic Situation and Prospects report from the United Nations as the sampling frame for states with developing or transitioning economies. (Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 2012, 131-140) The research opts to exclude several states from the analysis. These exclusions are typically rooted in an unmanageable lack of data or extreme ambiguity regarding the incumbent governments of these states throughout the time range. Excluded states include Serbia/Yugoslavia, Lebanon, and Yemen. Ultimately, observations from 83 states are admitted into the final data set.

To sample insurgent groups throughout the time range, as well as activity observations, the research relies on three separate data sets. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset [Version 4-2016] records detailed observations of insurgent group activity from 1946-2015 and utilizes a

[1] The analysis originally employed a time frame of 1989-2014. However, the addition of CINC data reduces the functional time frame of the quantitative analysis to 2012. This reduction was noted after the full assembly of the qualitative analyses, and so the qualitative data collection and analysis still extends to 2014.

battle-death threshold of 25. (Gleditsch et al. 2002) The UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset [Version 1.4] screens for active insurgent and paramilitary groups carrying out violent activity within states. (Eck and Hultman 2007) This research constructs its dataset through reviewing both UCDP/PRIO datasets and then coding group activity dichotomously. For a group to be coded as active, it must operate under the UCDP/PRIO parameters for approximately a year. On these grounds, observations of military coups are excluded from the data set because their brevity precludes the analyses of long-term aid effects. In addition to the UCDP/PRIO data, the Non-State Armed Groups data-set (NAGs) [Version 04/2015] is also reviewed. This dataset is derived from the UCDP/PRIO data; however it gives a full timeframe for group activity through consulting government and media output beyond battle deaths. (San-Akca 2015; 2016) The operational definitions that these data sets employ are still quite similar. Like the UCDP/PRIO coding, this research codes the groups listed in NAGs as active or inactive during the full time frame of specified group activity. A proprietary *active* dummy variable is then coded by observing the similarities between the UCDP/PRIO and NAGs data. If discrepancies exist between the datasets, the research uses additional primary and secondary source observations of group resolve disagreements. Through this process, 222 distinct insurgent groups are identified. The research observes a total of 1,742 active years against a total of 4,056 inactive years.

For paramilitary groups, the available sampling frames are much sparser. The most complete available dataset is Carey's Pro-Government Militia Dataset (PGMD) [Version 1.1], which accommodates the full time frame used in this research. (2013) Carey's dataset operationalizes paramilitary organizations (or pro-government militias) as groups that are not in conflict with the incumbent government of the state they reside in. Furthermore, these groups were recognized as informally or formally cooperating with members of the incumbent government or

elite. Like the NAGs dataset, PGMD records the full threshold of group survival in most cases. In instances of missing termination dates, this research relies on outside news and government reports to resolve missing data. Like this research's coding of the UCDP/PRIO and NAGs datasets, groups are coded dichotomously as active or inactive across all group-years. Through PGMD's use as a frame, the research identifies 230 paramilitary groups across 2,205 active years and 3,827 inactive years. Ultimately, the coded observations for PRIO/UCDP, NAGs, and PGMD data all merged into a proprietary *active* dummy variable. Two additional dummy variables then signify whether a group is a paramilitary or an insurgency. Following the operational and conceptual definitions specified above, groups are either coded as a paramilitary or insurgency – never both.

Military aid and economic development aid data serve as the two primary independent variables used in this research. In order to study the effects of military aid disbursements, as well as attempt to capture resource-sharing between recipient states and paramilitary organizations, annual arms transfers valuations serve as the proxy for military aid. To this end, the research uses the *SIPRI Arms Transfers Database Importer/Exporter TIV Tables* as the data source. This dataset provides valuations on arms transfers receipts from 1960-2016 in millions of 1990 USD. The research takes valuations of arms receipts from selected recipient states and then converts them to 2017 USD using CPI-U. In total, the research records 3,564 affirmative data points and 4,133 missing observations from 1989-2012. In addition, because weapons are a durable good and that there may be a delay between a state's military use or resource sharing and the actual receipt of arms, the research constructs five lags for this variable extending up to a five-year delay from the base year of the initial observation. The research collects and assembles economic development aid data identically by using the World Bank's *net official development assistance and official aid*

received (current US$) indicator. These valuations are taken in 2017 USD. This data collection yields a total of 11,377 affirmative observations and only 453 missing data points.

In order to capture regime types, the research uses the Polity IV(2) index. (Marshall and Jaggers 2016) In order to target broad regime types, the research brackets the full 10:-10 spectrum into democracies, anocracies, and autocracies. It excludes the index's zero (0) observation because this codes for states in interregnum or anarchy. (Marshall and Jaggers, 17) This exclusion is made because an active government is crucial for the research's application of the selectorate theory – an identifiable government must be present in sampled states. The research codes for anocracies with a PolityIV(2) index of 5:-5, democracies with a 10:6, and autocracies with a -6:-10.

The research also records several economic control variables. Gross domestic product per capita (GDP/capita) serves as a measure of the wealth of a state's population. Given that poverty is associated with an increased probability for civil unrest, the control is appropriate. The research collects this data from the World Bank in 2017 USD. The research also accounts for the total natural resource rents as a percentage share of a state's GDP. (World Bank) This variable captures states' dependence on primary resource extraction – something that has been deemed significant to insurgent activity throughout literature on civil conflict; particularly by in the context of greed theory.

In terms of social control variables, the research uses the *corruption perceptions index*, assembled by Transparency International (TI), as a proxy measure for levels of corruption within states. TI's data records survey responses on corruption perceptions from 1995-2014, and the sample of states broadens over time. The previous theory section specified that corruption may have a direct impact on the level of paramilitary activity in states as well as general grievances. Due to inconsistencies in Transparency International's assembly of this data, this research

standardizes the index on a 10-point scale across all years; 10 being most transparent and 0 being most corrupt. The research also records state military expenditures independent of the arms transfers aid so that aid effects can be separated from the effects of broader military spending. The research retrieves military expenditures data from the Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) and converts these valuations to 2017 USD using CPI-U. (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) The research also records total state populations from the CINC dataset. Both CINC data components contained data up until 2012.

The research uses infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births as an additional proxy for the general quality of life within states. This data is extremely complete and is sourced from the World Bank. Finally, the research accounts for the level of ethnic fractionalization within states by utilizing Fearon's ethnic fractionalization index. This index of fractionalization measures "the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups." (Fearon 2003, 208) Heightened ethnic fractionalization may impact the mobilization capabilities of insurgencies and the amount of paramilitary repression required by states. These control variables are all inputted into the regression models as base-year observations. Appendices A-1 and A-2 contain Pearson correlations of all variables considered in the quantitative analysis.

Quantitative Analysis

To analyze the impact of aid receipts on paramilitary and insurgent survival, the research relies on logistic regression models. This accommodates the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. The research assembles regression models for democracies, anocracies, and autocracies configured along regime-specific dummy variables. The models are then split between paramilitary and insurgent groups along the group-specific dummy variables. In total, the research runs 36 logistic regression models. The initial round of models included all the aforementioned

control variables, however the substantial amount of missing data in the TI corruptions perceptions index resulted in a severe reduction of valid cases. As a result, the research culled this variable and re-ran the regressions. Despite removing this control, the findings are robust; no major changes in coefficient direction and significance are observed.[2]

Democratic States

H_1: Military and economic aid disbursements to democracies will result in decreasing paramilitary endurance.

The null hypothesis for the impact of military and economic aid disbursements on democratic paramilitarism cannot be rejected. Across all models, the effect of arms transfers remains statistically insignificant. Economic development aid achieves a statistically significant positive coefficient in the 5-year lag. The quantitative analysis does not lend support to the hypothesized inverse relationship specified above. Appendix A-3 displays the regression output for democratic paramilitaries.

H_4: Military and economic aid disbursements to democracies will result in decreasing insurgent group endurance.

The null hypothesis for H_4 can be cannot be rejected with respect to the impact of military aid in democratic insurgencies. The only instance where military aid appears statistically significant is in the base year at the .10 level. However, with respect to economic development aid, the null hypothesis can be firmly rejected. Across all models, economic development aid achieves a statistically significant positive coefficient at the .01 level. Interestingly, this direction runs contrary to the hypothesized relationship. Figure 1 displays the regression output for the 1 and 3-year lagged models.

[2] For regression model output which incorporates the TI corruption perceptions index control variable, see appendix A-9:10 (Democracies), A-11:12 (Anocracies), and A-13:14 (Autocracies).

Figure 1: Democratic Insurgencies, 1 and 3-Year Lags

Insurgencies	1 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD.	-6.1E-5	5.9E-5	4.7E-5	6.1E-5
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	***2.66E-4	1.08E-4	***4.06E-4	1.31E-4
GDP/capita	2.0E-6	2.0E-5	7.0E-6	2.0E-5
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	***-0.087	0.032	***-0.105	0.034
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	-1.9E-5	1.5E-5	-2.1E-5	1.4E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	***1.0E-6	3.99E-7	**8.73E-7	4.48E-7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	0.008	0.017	***-0.020	0.004
Ethnic Fractionalization	**-9.09	4.29	0.572	0.535
Constant	5.29	4.81	0.077	0.243
Percentage Correct				
Block 0:	52.9%	N: 1,041	53.3%	N: 968
Block 1:	57.2%		59.3T	
Improvement:	4.3		6.0	
*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)				

The finding leads to further questions on the selectorate forces at play. The research posited H_4 on the grounds that democratic winning coalitions dispense public goods to generate tenure. For individuals considering participation in an insurgency, the opportunity cost of joining is foregoing the benefits offered by the state. Directly opposing the government's authority through insurgency almost certainly means exclusion from these benefits. So, why, upon a regime's receipt of economic development aid (and the supposed increase in public goods receipts), would an individual forgo heightened public goods in favor of joining an insurgency? Logically, increased aid should have the potential to reduce grievances that might lead to insurgency membership, unless of course, the individual in question is somehow ineligible to receive aid. The next questions to follow are: do areas occupied by insurgents receive these public goods? And, do natural resource rents, the state population, and the standard of living (infant mortality rates) interact with the

economic development aid in a consequential way? The finding of a highly significant direct relationship certainly raises more questions – and these must be addressed through a narrowed look at the political situations in democratic states with insurgencies. A qualitative analysis of select democratic cases seeks to evaluate the internal validity of this finding. For the complete regression output on the endurance of democratic insurgencies, see appendix A-4.

Anocratic States

H_2^{Null}: Military and economic aid disbursements to anocracies with will not impact the endurance of paramilitary groups.

The null hypothesis (H_2) cannot be rejected broadly. Arms transfers do not exhibit a significant impact on the endurance of paramilitaries in any of the six models. Moreover, the direction of the coefficient changes from positive to negative at the 3-year lag and beyond. Economic development aid is significant and inversely related at the 3-year lag and beyond. This significance is achieved at the .10 level (3-year lag). .01 level (4-year lag) and .05 level (5-year lag). Recalling the formulation of the hypothesis, it was expected that anocratic political conditions would be too chaotic for a discernable relationship to emerge. With respect to goods dispensation, the research expected that the inefficiencies of anocratic regimes would overwhelm any clear relationship. The findings here seem tentative at best. Anocracies with larger coalitions may eschew paramilitary repression, while anocracies that employ a narrower coalition may utilize them to maintain plausible deniability when it comes to carrying out repression while avoiding human rights violations. However, the research does not stratify democratic-leaning and autocratic-leaning anocracies. Future research may seek to uncover these patterns more clearly. At present, the anocracies sampled in this model span the 5:-5 spectrum of the PolityIV(2) index. The homogeneity means that a broad rejection of the null hypothesis may incur a Type I error. So, the

analytical findings on the relationship between economic development aid and anocratic paramilitary endurance seem quite dubious. Appendix A-5 illustrates the full regression output for anocratic paramilitaries.

H_5^{Null}: Military and economic aid disbursements to anocracies will not impact the survival of insurgent groups.

The null hypothesis (H_5) cannot be rejected whatsoever. The regression models reveal no significant relationships for between either military or economic aid and anocratic insurgency endurance – and the direction of these coefficients are not stable across models. The research expected this finding on many of the same grounds specified for H_2^{Null}. The chaotic nature of anocracies, and their concomitant governmental inefficiencies, quite likely means that goods dispensation does not occur in a regular and effective manner. Accordingly, the expectation stands that insurgent participants will not have their incentives for mobilization altered by any meaningful change in their opportunity costs – in conjunction with aid provisions. Moreover, military inefficiencies may mean that arms transfers are not effective in an already inefficient state military apparatus. H_5^{Null}'s preservation does not come as much of a surprise. The only control variables which remain consistently significant and in the same direction are the state population and the level of ethnic fractionalization. Both of their directions fall within the norms of insurgency mobilization expectations – a larger population is associated with a higher propensity for insurgencies, and a more fractured population may lead to greater "common cause" mobilization difficulties for insurgent organizations; provided they are not ethnic in nature. Appendix A-6 illustrates the complete regression output for anocratic insurgencies.

Autocratic States

H_3: Military and economic aid disbursements to autocracies will result in decreased paramilitary endurance.

With respect to the endurance of paramilitaries in autocracies, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for arms transfers. Not only is it consistently insignificant, but the coefficient's direction changes in the 4 and 5-year lags. However, the null hypothesis is firmly rejected for economic development aid. Across all models, economic development aid bears an inverse and statistically significant relationship with paramilitary group endurance in autocracies. This finding is consistently achieved at the .01 level. The research formulated H_3 on the grounds that an increase in aid to autocratic regimes would result in the increased selectorate dispensation of private goods. It was expected that autocratic winning coalitions, who strive to maintain a narrow coalition, would direct this aid towards the reinforcement of their tenure. In terms of paramilitaries, the research expects autocratic winning coalitions to reduce their reliance on paramilitaries and enhance their own enforcement capabilities through their increased resources following foreign aid receipts. Interestingly, the quantitative findings may be more nuanced than this original theorization, given that it was economic development aid that achieved consistent significance; and that there is also high significance and consistent relationships expressed by state military expenditure, GDP/capita, and infant mortality rate control variables. Figure 2 depicts the regression output for the 1 and 3-year lags.

Figure 2: Autocratic Paramilitaries, 1 and 3-Year Lags

Paramilitaries	1 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD.	-2.65E-4	2.13E-4	-1.0E-5	2.55E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	***-0.001	2.94E-4	***-0.001	3.56E-4
GDP/capita	***-4.2E-4	9.8E-5	***-0.001	3.56E-4
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	*-0.025	0.013	**-0.039	0.017
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	***2.51E-4	4.8E-5	***3.18E-4	6.70E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	-2.0E-6	2.0E-6	*-4.0E-6	2.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	***-0.018	0.005	***-0.019	0.006
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.828	0.695	0.006	0.908
Constant	***2.667	0.552	***2.616	0.688
Percentage Correct				
Block 0:	60.5%	N: 547	57.3%	N: 433
Block 1:	81.9%		83.1%	
Improvement:	21.4		25.8	
*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)				

If economic aid relates to diminished paramilitary endurance, then it may be that the winning coalition strengthens its position through private goods dispensation – the implication is that the coalitions generate tenure through cultivating loyalty via pecuniary rewards rather than through the enhancement of its own governmental repressive capabilities. Indeed, the immediate intersection between economic aid receipts and the improvement of the state military apparatus is unclear. This position is strengthened by the fact that state military expenditures bear a positive relationship with paramilitary endurance – implying some form of collusion or resource sharing. Unless economic development aid is reappropriated for military purposes (something which development aid conditionalities often seek to preclude), then the economic aid relationship does not make immediate sense from a repression standpoint. Loyalty payouts via private goods seems

more likely – thereby increasing loyalty and reducing the immediate need for paramilitary repression.

Both infant mortality and GDP/capita bear an inverse relationship with paramilitary endurance. However, these relationships imply opposite interactions. Increased infant mortality implies poor living conditions, reduced access to public health services, and greater living-standards grievances. Yet, reduced paramilitarism is the consequence of heightened infant mortality. It could be that increased infant mortality also implies less dissent, as the populace is conditioned to low living standards already – or that increased infant mortality has some other inverse impact on the level of repression needed by paramilitaries. Alternatively, this could be a mere coincidence due to broader international conditions – worldwide infant mortality rates have fallen generally. (World Health Organization) Yet, there is no indication that paramilitarism exhibits the same widespread trend. It seems quite plausible that this relationship is the result of widespread infant mortality reductions interacting with far more dynamic paramilitary endurance. Comparatively, the coefficient expressed in GDP/capita is more immediately logical. As economic conditions improve, dissent falls, and the need for paramilitary repression does so as well. This is especially sensible given that poverty is a frequent indicator of civil unrest.

The research's finding that economic development aid bears a consistently significant and inverse relationship certainly brings about more questions. What are the winning coalitions using this aid for? What role do conditionalities play in their aid consumption choices? And, how does the inverse effect of economic aid fare against the competing direct relationship observed between state military expenditures and paramilitary endurance? These are all questions which the quantitative analysis alone cannot answer. Accordingly, a qualitative look at sampled autocracies

is needed to evaluate the internal validity of these findings. Appendix A-7 illustrates the complete regression output for autocratic paramilitaries.

H_6: Military and economic aid disbursements to autocracies will result in decreasing insurgent group endurance.

The null hypothesis for autocratic insurgencies cannot be rejected. In all models, arms transfers and economic development aid remain statistically insignificant. Accordingly, the quantitative analysis does not lend support to H_6. The direction of the implied relationships are also not stable. Appendix A-8 illustrates the full regression output for democratic insurgencies.

Quantitative Conclusions

The research finds strong quantitative linkages between the level of economic development aid and group endurance with respect to democratic insurgencies and autocratic paramilitaries. Across all models, arms transfers remain quite statistically insignificant. One explanation for this finding stems from the heightened amount of missing data observed in arms transfers – missing data may stem from its genuine lack of availability or from the fact that arms are not received during a given year. In this data collection process, it was quite difficult to differentiate between these two possibilities. However, the most likely reason for the lack of statistical significance observed in arms transfers stems from the variable's high level of correlation with the NMC variables recording recipient state military expenditures and state populations. Conversely, data on economic development aid receipts was quite complete and did not feature the same degree of correlation with other control variables.

In democracies and autocracies, several of the controls also exhibited statistically significant relationships with group endurance. For democracies, the direct relationship raises questions on the dispensation of public goods at the winning coalition's discretion. Do areas

affected by insurgencies receive the economic improvements associated with development aid – are the opportunity costs for insurgent mobilization altered? The question brings attention to the role that aid conditionalities and the dynamics of selectorate decision-making play in the dispensation of these aid-related public goods. Population levels and infant mortality rates may also play a role in aid's impact on democratic insurgencies. For autocracies, economic development aid bore a statistically significant inverse relationship with paramilitary endurance. Again, there are further questions to address – specifically on the role of aid conditionalities and the winning coalition's actual consumption decisions for economic development aid. The role that state military expenditures play, as well as the condition of the economy, are also important intersections to consider.

Apart from these significant findings, many of the models did not yield highly significant and stable relationships between aid and paramilitary/insurgency endurance. This was especially true for the models on anocratic group endurance. Future research may consider alternative ways to study these regimes – indeed a previous attempt to model them split democratic-leaning and autocratic-leaning anocracies rather than analyzing the full 5:-5 PolityIV(2) spectrum. However, the chaotic nature of anocracies should not be discounted. These mixed-regimes are notorious for their political instability. This instability may also lead to the inconsistent allocation of already variable aid receipts. In terms of an enduring and substantive impact on group performance, the chaos of anocracies makes detecting a stable relationship via regression extremely difficult.

Having found significant and stable relationships for democratic insurgencies and autocratic paramilitaries, the research now turns to a qualitative analysis. Case studies on these permutations of the model are assembled to assess the internal validity of the quantitative findings.

Democratic Case Study

The democratic qualitative analysis draws its cases from a sample of 38 instances of democracy across 31 states. The average duration of democracy across regimes is 14.03 years, with a standard deviation of 8.63 years. A survey of this sample (conducted while blind to the primary independent variables) reveals several instances where similar states exhibit divergent dependent variable outcomes on the endurance of their insurgent groups. While also considering sample representativeness, the democratic qualitative analysis opts for a method of similarity framework. This research selects Colombia and Peru as the two cases to be analyzed. In this respect, both exhibit similar levels of economic development and GDP/capita growth rates, similar levels of cultural division, and both states possess an expansive and rugged periphery. However, Colombia's insurgencies endure throughout the democracy whereas Peru's are ultimately defeated.

Across the 1989-2014 period, Colombia experienced democracy for a full 26 years. Peru's duration is a total 17 years. An apparent weakness of this case selection through the method of similarity framework is that Colombia's democracy is contiguous whereas Peru's is not. Peru exhibits a fairly-strong democracy in Polity IV terms (avg. 7.7) from 1989-1991. The state then swings into anocracy until it makes a return to strong democracy (9) in 2001. Given this issue, the research considers the performance of Colombia over the 2001-2014 period as well. Reconfiguring the method of similarity to this period of time, there are still striking similarities between the two states across the vast majority of controls; as the analysis will demonstrate. On top of this, there is a difference in dependent variable outcomes among the leftist insurgencies in both states. On these grounds, the opportunity for a comparative analysis cannot be ignored. Accordingly, the research will consider Peru primarily through the duration of its second period of Democracy from 2001-2014. From this point, statistics referencing Peru refer specifically to its regime during this period.

Concerning insurgencies in Colombia and Peru, divergent outcomes are observed in the endurance of their leftist insurgencies. In Colombia, both the National Liberation Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) survive throughout the entire 1989-2014 period. This gives the regime an average endurance of 2 active groups across the regime's 26-year span. Peru's Sendero Luminso (SL) is active from 2001 to 2010 – though it had been active from 1989 as well. Averaging across Peru's 2001-2014 democratic regime, the average group activity is 0.71. Compared to the sample, both states are representative ($\bar{x}$: 1.72 , $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 1.17).

The cases' controls exhibit similarity. The average GDP/capita across Colombia and Peru's democratic periods are $3,577.13 and 4,059.81 respectively. In terms of growth rates, their figures are again similar (μ: 8.65%, μ: 9.76%). Economically, these figures are again representative of the population (GDP/capita: $\bar{x}$: $2,972.21, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: $4,089.03)(Growth: $\bar{x}$: 7.66%, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 5.82%). However, a notable divergence between the two states is observed in the variance of their growth rates. Colombia experience larger swings in its GDP/capita growth rates over the course of its democracy than Peru. The variance of their rates are 170.26 and 48.69 respectively ($\bar{x}$: 138.04, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 265.19). As a percentage of GDP, both states also exhibit a modest reliance on resource extraction rents (μ: 4.93, μ: 7.95); and both are representative of the sample ($\bar{x}$: 6.39, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 9.57). Both states also exhibit very similar levels of corruption (μ: 3.43, μ: 3.65). These figures are representative of the sample as well ($\bar{x}$: 3.10, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 0.87). The states do exhibit notably different levels of military expenditures – something that clearly pertains to the endurance of insurgencies via state capacity. Colombia's military expenditures average $4.087 billion USD whereas Peru's average $1.411 billion. In terms of the sample, both do fall within the sample's distribution ($\bar{x}$: $3,702.33, $\sigma\bar{x}$: $8,836.98). Both states exhibit similar population growth rates – though Colombia's is higher at 1.82% as opposed to Peru's 1.18% ($\bar{x}$: 0.94%, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 2.33%). Both states exhibit similar average infant mortality rates

at 20.93 and 18.81 respectively ($\bar{x}$: 42.55, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 30.47). Finally, in terms of their cultural division and ethnic fractionalization, Fearon's metrics exhibit mixed similarity. (2003) Peru's measure of salient cultural divisions is significantly higher than Colombia's at 0.506 versus 0.020 ($\bar{x}$: 0.363, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 0.176).[3] However, their measures of ethnic fractionalization (derived from ethnolinguistic fractionalization) are both quite low. Colombia's is 0.66 and Peru's is 0.64 ($\bar{x}$: 0.525, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 0.186). Finally, the variance of their ethnic group populations as proportions of their total populations are 0.035 and 0.042 respectively; there is less inter-group parity in both states ($\bar{x}$: 0.088, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 0.076).[4] Recognizing that military expenditures, economic fluctuations, and cultural diversity are three areas of difference among the states, the following case studies recognize that these factors may influence insurgency endurance beyond the receipt of economic development aid.

The Case of Colombia

Both of Colombia's primary insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC/FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), emerged in response to a civil conflict occurring between 1948 and 1960 known as *La Violencia*. Economic and political disarray characterizes this event; by some estimates the Colombian government killed a minimum of 200,000 dissidents during the period. (Franz 2016, 566) The FARC proliferated as a group of leftist guerrillas following the government's bombing of its Marquetalia compound in 1964. (Gutiérrez Sanín 2004, 263) The group officially organized under its present name in 1966; originally consisting of only 350 guerrillas. (Stanford University, 2015) The ELN emerged at around the same period as a group of Cuban revolution-inspired Marxist and Catholic rebels; it

[3] Fearon's cultural fractionalization measure accounts for the cultural resemblance of groups with in a country, proportional to their relative populations. This measure is derived from distances between cultural language trees. (211-212) Note that Cultural Fractionalization is not entered into the quantitative analysis.

[4] As an added measure of the level of ethnic parity within states, the research considers the variance of intrastate group proportions of the population. This variable is not entered into the quantitative analysis.

originally consisted of 200 members (however 135 were killed during an initial Government offensive). (Gutiérrez Sanín, 263; Stanford University 2015). Despite rather humble beginnings in terms of membership, both groups persisted until beyond the 2014 terminal horizon of this research. By 2003, estimates placed FARC membership at between 18,000-20,000 and the ELN at approximately 6,000 members. (Gutiérrez Sanín, 264-265) In order to sustain themselves, both groups adopted formal organizational structures and various means to finance their insurgencies – especially through rents associated with coca cultivation, processing, and transportation during the 80s and 90s. The intersection of the FARC and ELN's involvement with both extreme leftist ideologies and illicit drug markets played a very significant role in shaping the nature of the Colombian government's foreign aid receipts.

In terms of aid inflows accompanying the endurance of these groups, US counter-narcotics policy consistently played a dominate role in shaping the conditionalities that the Colombian government faced. This is especially true during the 1980s and 1990s. Over the duration of the 1989 to 2014 period, aid generally expanded – except for notable contractions in 1993 and 1994. It is important to highlight that much of the inflows actually took the form of military aid – something that the World Bank's *Net ODA and Official Aid Received* does not account for. However, as discussed in the quantitative analysis, arms transfers alone proved to be statistically insignificant in the cross-national analysis. Though this qualitative analysis will primarily question the internal validity of the statistically significant economic development aid finding, the role of arms transfers cannot be ignored in the case of Colombia. In fact, the case study suggests that much of the ineffectiveness of economic development aid in impacting insurgent endurance stems from its interaction with military aid disbursements and conditionalities.

Finally, to understand the nature of the FARC and ELN's endurance fully, it is necessary to consider their organizational resilience through the frameworks of competing theories of civil conflict, as well as a selectorate framework. This research concurs strongly with Gutiérrez Sanín's finding that both greed and grievance explanations on the endurance of Colombia's principal insurgent groups suffer from severe shortcomings. Rather than persistent greed or grievance driving the endurance of the FARC and ELN, selectorate explanations offer valuable insight on their organizational longevity. Geographically stratified data on the standards of living in FARC and ELN occupied areas reveals that these regions have only gradually received the benefits of public goods – the primary selectorate payout of democratic regimes. On this ground, the endurance of the FARC and ELN in the periphery may be the result of the periphery's nonessential status in the selectorate. The heightened impoverishment in these areas is partially due to their lack of formal integration into the state – their exclusion from equal public goods dispensation could indeed be a rational selectorate choice made by the leadership if these areas are not essential for its tenure.

To appreciate the effect of Colombian foreign aid on its insurgencies, the following case study begins with an explanation into the evolution and organizational structures of these groups from their founding in the mid-60s to their relative positions as of 2014. This section is married with a consideration of competing selectorate and civil conflict explanations on the groups' ability to endure. The study then considers the trends in foreign aid and conditionalities over the same period in conjunction with the evolution of these groups. This section also incorporates an analysis of the Government's selectorate decision making throughout the endurance of the FARC and ELN.

The Evolution of the FARC & ELN: History and Factors of Endurance

As previously noted, both the FARC and ELN emerged following Colombia's *La Violencia* period of civil conflict and formally arranged themselves under their present names during the mid-1960s. The FARC established its primary spheres of influence in Colombia's North-West, along the border of Panama, and later in Colombia's South – their Southern position was especially solidified from 1999-2002 following the Pastrana Administration's concession of a demilitarized zone during his failed attempt to negotiate peace with the group. (Marks 2011, 43-44) The ELN originated in Colombia's North-East along the border of Venezuela. It should be highlighted that the rugged terrain of Colombia in these areas also played a role in the inability of the state to adequately exercise authority over these areas. Figure 3 illustrates the spheres of influence possessed by these groups.

Figure 3: Insurgent Group Spheres of Influence

Source: Marks, Thomas A. "A Model of Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Colombia (2002-2006) vs FARC, " 44.

In terms of the ideological roots of these groups, the FARC primarily emerged as a campesino or peasant-based organization. Their major grievances are stated as having to do with the inequitable land distribution of Colombia, the lack of available social services in the periphery, as well as the political repression its constituents faced during *La Violencia* and during the 1980s when the government and its paramilitaries attempted to eradicate members of the FARC's political front, the Patriotic Union (UP) party. (Shifter 1999, 15; Franz 2016, 566) The exact level of dedication that the FARC has towards its ideology is something that is contested by much of the literature. The organization has tended to avoid setting strict time horizons in its ideology-based agenda; this pragmatism exists alongside the group's impressive ability to collect substantial rents from kidnappings and the narcotics industry.

The ELN operates similarly to the FARC with several distinctions. The group was founded primarily by university students and Catholic priests who espoused a Marxist-Leninist ideology. (Stanford University 2015) The ELN's ideological goals appear to center more around a fundamental regime change than specific policy agendas. The ELN is the second-largest insurgency after the FARC. Gutiérrez Sanín points out that the FARC dropped much of its communist hardline ideology after the fall of the Soviet Union – but that this ideology has largely persisted in the ELN; something he attributes to the higher degree of organizational success displayed by the FARC. (263) The ELN also is known for carrying out internal purges and exhibiting more disarray. Finally, the ELN's secondary position is due to it suffering more disastrous defeats against the military. That said, the ELN's proficient ability to capture rents is something that leads many observers to find that profit overrides ideology. Like the FARC, the ELN engaged heavily in narcotics trafficking. However, unlike the FARC, the ELN appears to have focused primarily on drawing ransoms from the state's oil rents – often engaging in attacks

against the extraction industry to draw later payouts. (Stanford University 2015; Offstein 2007, 996-997)

Accordingly, the groups' ideological agendas and their proclivity to extract substantial illicit rents leads to a greed versus grievance debate in terms of the endurance that both exhibit. Certainly, both groups have drawn fortunes from their rent-seeking behavior; and this is an obvious factor in their capacity to endure. When faced with opportunities to strike ceasefires with the Colombian government, both groups have also opted to draw out the process and ultimately defect from agreements set before 2014. The idea of drawing out the conflict in order to elongate the period of rent extraction (in essence maximizing profits) is fundamental to the greed theory explanation of insurgency duration. However, there are notable factors that undermine this position from a basic rational-choice perspective. As Gutiérrez Sanín points out, the organizational norms of both groups provide little incentive for members to join out of a desire for plunder. The FARC itself does not pay its soldiers or cadres on any regular basis; and the ELN only pays a small fraction of its members. (268) Joining either group also means burning one's bridges for a return to civilian life. Both groups further prohibit looting after or during their operations – and taxing local citizenry generally means funding the larger organization; not enriching the individual. Despite little prospect of pecuniary rewards, neither groups has exhibited endemic desertion. As Gutiérrez Sanín rightly points out, if plunder were the aim of potential members, they would fare much better participating in one of Colombia's paramilitaries or criminal organizations. Coupled with the fact that their institutional norms are rigorously indoctrinated in new recruits, these facts detract from the validity of the greed-based explanation.

On a grievance level, there appears to be room for criticism as well. Though both groups express significant ideological qualms with the ruling regime and a desire to fight for the rural

peasant or prole, the frequent human rights abuses perpetrated by both groups against civilians would seem to detract from their credibility as morally justified revolutionaries. Moreover, it's worth considering the trends in grievance displayed over time. As Davies lays out in the theory, a grievance fueled revolution is more likely following a sudden reversal between temporally conditioned expectations of reality and the state of present conditions – emphasis on the notion that conditions improved at some rate prior to the reversal. (Davies 6, 1962) Colombia's GDP/capita improved regularly on average over the 1989-2014 period (despite exhibiting a variance higher than sampled democracies throughout the same period), and its infant mortality has regularly declined. Few if any sharp reversals are seen in these indicators. Looking to the periphery specifically (where the insurgent constituencies reside), it is notable that the FARC worked to establish a good rapport with peasant coca cultivators (there is mutual interest in ensuring the maximum productivity of this economy). The government's historical inability to penetrate the periphery and ameliorate conditions is certainly a grievance factor to consider – however it might imply conditions here were a constant. The real room for grievance might exist in the government's aerial fumigation efforts which have significantly worsened peripheral conditions across several sudden intensifications of the policy. The research considers this point more when looking at foreign aid receipts.

This research posits that a selectorate explanation offers the strongest insight into group endurance. Under a selectorate framework, we expect that the level of integration into the state positively corresponds to the level of public goods received and, consequentially, heightened standards of living. As a proxy for living standards, the research considers the percentage of a department's population living below the state's poverty-line; as well as those living in situations

of extreme poverty as defined by the state.[5] The research expects that departments under FARC and ELN control would have heightened levels of poverty. Percentage point reductions in the poverty and extreme poverty rates serve as the proxy for the winning coalitions efforts at integration. Historical data reveals that the departments of Anioquía, Chocó, Caquetá, and Meta have harbored FARC insurgents throughout the course of the group's insurgency. Figure 4 and 5 depict the percentage of the population living in poverty and extreme poverty within these departments. Note that data for 2007 and 2008 is not recorded – it is excluded from the 2013 Colombian Department of Statistics (DANE) data used in this research. (15-16)



Source: National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). "Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad 2012, por Departamentos."

While the DANE report does not account for all departments that harbored FARC insurgents, this in itself may be notable – a lack of statistical information may further reflect the lack of integration that these peripheral departments have.

[5] Colombia's sub-national political units are designated as "departments." These are somewhat analogous to "states" in the United States.



Source: National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). "Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad 2012, por Departamentos."

In both statistics, it is clear that enduring poverty reduction is minimal. Figures 6 and 7 display the same statistical data for departments that the ELN has historically occupied: Bolívar, Norte de Santander, Santander, Boyacá, and again Antioquia.



Source: National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). "Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad 2012, por Departamentos."



Source: National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). "Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad 2012, por Departamentos."

The DANE statistics do a better job at capturing departments historically associated with the ELN. In these, a clearer reduction in the poverty rate and extreme poverty rate is observed. Relative to the sampled departments who are not historically associated with insurgent occupation, FARC occupied departments exhibit lower poverty reduction rates in between all but two years.[6] Interestingly, the ELN departments generally exhibit poverty reduction changes higher than those of the un-occupied departments – and perhaps the greater integration of these departments reflects the relative weakness of the ELN compared to the FARC. Following the selectorate framework, the state-integration of FARC-occupied departments appears anemic. It should be expected that economic aid disbursements to these areas should also be anemic – this aid represents another

[6] See appendix A-15:16 for complete statistics on poverty and extreme poverty levels, as well as rate percentage point changes across the FARC and ELN occupied departments, historically unoccupied departments, department sample averages, and DANE state inferential averages.

public good whose receipt should be captured in percentage point changes of the population living in poverty or extreme poverty.

Summing up the theoretical explanations, both groups certainly work to institutionalize their ideologies, and that they have relied extensively on rent-seeking to enable their organizational longevity and resilience. In terms of their performance over time, the FARC generally expended in strength – however the height of their power followed the Colombian government's destruction of both the Medellín and Cali cocaine cartels. Upon the destruction of the cartels, the FARC worked extensively to establish control over the narcotics economy. It primarily did so in its northern and southern spheres of influence. Its ability to capture these freshly-available rents, conjoined with President Pastrana's concession of a demilitarized zone and diminished government military expenditures during the 90s, allowed the FARC to reach its peak strength around 1995. The group's capabilities then contracted after a series of military and tactical defeats during the renewed military offensive undertaken by President Uribe in the 2000s. Under Uribe's 2003 *Democratic Security Defense Policy*, the government worked to systematically restore a state presence in areas previously held by the FARC. The government did this by garrisoning its own forces in these areas – as well as through extensive cooperation with paramilitary units. (Marks, 49-50) By the end of Uribe's tenure in 2010, the FARC found itself in a weaker position having lost territory, manpower, and much of its claim on narcotics rents. It is estimated that between 2002-2008, the Colombian army's strategy cut FARC offensive capabilities by 70%. (Haddick 2011, 87) Still, the capacity of the FARC to endure over the course of this period certainly played a role in the government being willing to renew peace talks in 2013. (Stanford University 2015) Through the selectorate framework and analysis, the level of state-integration achieved in FARC-occupied departments is still questionable. While the state may have forced out the FARC through

a military strategy, social and economic integration is not immediately reflected in the living-standards of peripheral departments. On these grounds, the FARC's continued endurance makes sense. A lack of formal integration allows the FARC to continue its occupation through appealing to its base – historically isolated campesinos. Given that the FARC has at times sought to function as a parallel state, the lack of formal integration achieved in these departments makes its endurance capabilities even more sensible.

Comparatively, the ELN generally fared worse than the FARC. Not only did it fail to negotiate its own demilitarized zone, but it also lost ground during government offensives conducted under Uribe's tenure. Because of its relatively weaker position, the government may have denied the ELN admission to peace talks as its organizational capacity was deemed so low. (Stanford University 2015) Moreover, if greater formal integration was achieved in historically ELN-occupied departments, then its diminished capabilities are not an enigma. Along the lines of the original hypotheses, it was expected that increased economic aid (and generally public goods receipt) would reduce insurgent endurance. The ELN's anemic performance may very well reflect this reality. Still, the ELN demonstrated the capacity to continue its attacks on oil companies in the periphery between 2012 and 2013. Despite enduring past 2014, the ELN's capacity is unquestionably lower than that of the FARC.

Colombia: Government, Aid Conditionalities, and Impacts on Endurance

Over the course of the 1989-2014 period, economic development receipts to Colombia trended upwards. Averaging across this time, they increase at a rate of 21.88% with notable declines in 1993 and 1994. As highlighted earlier, military aid and arms transfers also expand. Looking specifically at arms transfers, this aid contracts between 1994-1995 and again between 1998-1999. The supply of arms is far more volatile than economic development aid – but on net

its change rate is significantly larger at 58.95%. This becomes significant in the context of military aid's externalities and its impact on the insurgent groups.

Throughout the FARC and ELN's existence, the United States has been the primary aid benefactor to Colombia. Though these groups did not take over the narcotics economy until the late 1980s and 1990s, US aid incorporated anti-narcotics conditionalities in response to increased outflows of cocaine from Colombia to the United States prior to their involvement. As Shifter highlights, "U.S. Colombia policy has been nearly indistinguishable from U.S. antinarcotics policy" since the mid-1980s. (Shifter 1999, 18) In 1994, the newly elected administration of Ernesto Samper credibly colluded with members of the Cali cartel through taking political donations from their top leadership. (Peceny and Durnan 2006, 104) The implication of such a donation was that the Samper Administration and the Cali cartel would cooperate to control the coca economy. However, the revelation that Samper and the Cartel might collaborate, despite the strict policies of the United States, put immense pressure on the Colombian government to follow the anti-narcotics conditionalities of its primary benefactor. In 1995, the Clinton administration failed to certify Colombia as an aid recipient, resulting in an approximate 70% cut in US aid disbursements. (Peceny and Durnan, 105-106) The Clinton administration officially decertified Colombia in both 1996 and 1997 as well. As a response, the Samper administration worked to dismantle the Cali cartel. With the Medellín cartel already defunct by 1990, the destruction of Cali liberated narcotics rents for new seekers. Simultaneously, neighboring Peru worked to effectively drive much of its coca economy out of its boundaries in 1994 – most of it ballooning into Colombia. The trajectory of this was directly into FARC territories. As Peceny and Durnan highlight, "By the mid-1990s, the growth of Colombian coca production was providing jobs to hundreds of thousands of peasants, a trend that irreconcilably conflicted with the Samper

government's need to appease the U.S. government's calls for aerial eradication." (109) Through a selectorate framework, Clinton's decertification dramatically impacted Colombia. In 1994, arms transfers declined by 38.24%. In 1995, they declined by 16.67%. Economic development aid declined by 63.52% in 1993 and by 10.59% in 1994. It is clear that the Samper administration faced massive cuts in its aid receipts directly out of the dissatisfaction of its chief benefactor. As a result, the FARC, and to a lesser extent the ELN, were able to achieve profound growth in the wake of a liberated narcotics economy and the diminished foreign support of the Colombian government.

Following the Samper administration, the Pastrana administration generally took a harder stance on counter-narcotics in order to appease the United States. Pastrana increased Colombia's aerial fumigation efforts along the lines of U.S. conditionalities. However, his concession of a demilitarized zone preceding FARC negotiations certainly undermined the government's ability to combat the group later on. Indeed, the soft stance taken by Pastrana coincided with the FARC's surge in organizational capacity around 1995. In 1999, the Pastrana administration launched Plan Colombia in conjunction with the Bush administration. (Peceny and Durnan, 110) This significantly increased aid flows into Colombia. By 2001, arms transfers increased by 360% and economic aid increased by 105.35%. However, it is important to highlight that much of the aid at this time went into additional counter-narcotics measures. Economic development aid did not significantly improve conditions in FARC-occupied territories either – as reflected in the consideration of poverty rates. In fact, the destruction of the coca economy, and more broadly the periphery's agriculture, due to aerial fumigation more likely emboldened support for the FARC and ELN. Rather than the military launching a 'capture and hold' strategy at this phase, paramilitarism instead saw a tremendous increase in peripheral activities during this phase.

(Peceny and Durnan, 112) In selectorate terms, the Pastrana administration did not seek to integrate the periphery into the winning coalition at this phase – his actions served to satisfy U.S. conditionalities and reduce coca cultivation levels.

It was not until President Uribe's election in 2002 that the government engaged in regular 'capture and hold' strategies in the periphery; done primarily under the auspices of Uribe's *Plan Patriota* in 2003. (Franz, 572) While Uribe is also generally noted as being cooperative towards the anti-insurgent paramilitaries, his administration further launched a demobilization program in 2004. From 2004 to 2006, Uribe continued aerial fumigation alongside military offensives by the government. The negative externalities of this fumigation are identified as increased unemployment, poverty, and displacement of those in the affected regions – again, regions which the FARC and ELN primarily controlled. Yet, Franz notes that Colombian drug production only decreased by approximately 14% during this period of intense eradication efforts (though 70% of Plan Colombia and US aid was delegated towards such efforts). (Franz, 581) As a credit to Uribe, though his plan's efforts to eradicate cultivation over this period are viewed as ineffective, the organizational capacities of the FARC and ELN certainly took a blow due to the disruption of the narcotics sector and direct military engagements with their insurgents. Human rights violations on the part of government forces and paramilitaries also surged during this period. Ultimately, neither cultivation nor the insurgent groups were completely eradicated.

Aid Effects & Group Performance

Returning to the evaluation of the quantitative conclusion, the cross-national finding exhibited a positive relationship between aid allocations and organizational endurance. Certainly, in the case of Colombia, it can be observed that at the time of lowest foreign support during the early 1990s, the FARC and ELN dramatically increased in strength. This is largely because as the

Medellín and Cali cocaine oligopoly was destroyed, the Colombian government did not refocus its state-reinforcement agenda on the actual insurgent groups. Rather, disarray during the Samper administration and a poorly planned concession by the Pastrana administration allowed the FARC to accelerate (and the ELN to a lesser degree). Arms transfers reached their peak in 2001 at approximately 516 million USD. Economic development aid increased somewhat erratically but trended upwards as well. Despite these disbursement, support for the FARC and ELN in the periphery remained adequate for the organizations to persist. Accordingly, the observation that economic aid bears a positive relationship to insurgent group endurance is not outright refuted by the Colombian case.

However, the nature of this finding is still nuanced. Literature suggests that a grievance-based argument for the persistence of this civil conflict seems more appropriate than the greed-based argument. Not only did the FARC and ELN lose much of their grasp on the narcotics economy under the Uribe administration, but the economic benefits their members derived did not appear to be particularly lucrative. By contrast, both groups derived substantial support from civilians participating in the coca economy itself. Given the mainstay aerial fumigation campaigns that the government favored over the course of the study, and that increased arms transfers are associated with an increase in the intensity of these campaigns, the grievance explanation offers a unique insight. As the government expanded its counter-narcotics efforts, it raised dissatisfaction among the FARC's principal constituents. This is factor that Gutiérrez Sanín especially highlights:

> "The state acted in the border of the agrarian frontier as an occupation force, giving credibility to the discourse of self-defense. On the other hand, people who feel that even in case of passive behavior they are exposed to big dangers are natural risk takers, and those who have observed the potential benefits in terms of collective action of severe rule enforcement may accept harsh treatment and may want to be bound by an external regulator

> if lacking faith in thin their capacity of self restraint. They make good recruits, in short. (277)

Though the FARC and ELN imposed taxes on their civilian clients in the narcotics trade, and also treated them poorly on numerous occasions, the fact that their capacity for economic well-being (and more generally their ability to produce on a subsistence level) was threatened by both government policy and its externalities made them favor the lesser of two evils: alignment with the FARC and ELN. Summarily, the government's eradication efforts may have driven segments of the periphery into closer alignment with the insurgent groups – and it certainly threatened their economic well-being.

On the impact of economic aid, a fundamental assumption made in the original hypothesis was that democracies would disburse public benefits associated with its receipt to the populace in an equitable fashion, thereby raising the opportunity cost of participating in the insurgency. The quantitative findings presented a direct relationship which ran opposed to the inversely related hypothesis. However, this case demonstrates a clear reason why a direct relationship might be observed. The simple fact is that the government struggled to penetrate the periphery and engage the groups directly for much of the case. When they did, the selectorate consideration posits that the leadership did not make a substantial effort to formally integrate the expanded selectorate into the winning coalition. Economic development aid did not reach the civilians who may have had their incentives altered by its benefits. In the selectorate framework, the government did not dispense public goods in exchange for their integration. Moreover, the conditionalities imposed by U.S. aid put an extreme emphasis on government choices which directly hurt the economic situation of civilians in the periphery. It seems that the effect of arms transfers ran against the hypothesized effect of economic development aid – and that the economic development aid never reached those who the hypothesis assumed would be the pivotal factor in undermining the

insurgency's support. The heightened improvements in un-occupied departments and ELN departments suggests that the government's winning coalition chose to integrate different areas. Aid only benefited those already incorporated into the state's winning coalition – or those who it sought to incorporate. In the context of such a geographical stratification, the high negative externalities of the aid consumption played directly into the socialist narrative that both the FARC and ELN espouse. As FARC-occupied departments appear to have received the least amount of public goods, the FARC's endurance is unsurprising. Even those who disliked the FARC and ELN may not have seen opposition to their rule as a viable option – if the state's overtures to integrate them were too myopic or altogether nonexistent, opposition to the insurgencies would have been completely futile.

The Case of Peru

Peru's primary insurgent group, the Sendero Luminoso (SL) emerged in 1980 following a ten-year period of organization in the Peruvian sierra near Ayacucho.[7] The SL emerged initially as a group comprised of university students from the Universidad Nacional de San Cristobal de Huamanga who mobilized over the course of the previous decade. The original leader of the organization, Abimael Guzmán, had been a professor at the university. Ideologically, the organization espoused Maoist principles and grievances stemming from the economic and social isolation of the sierra periphery. Weinstein argues that the SL took advantage of existing social capital (the indoctrinated students) to further mobilize surrounding peasant communities in the sierra. (Weinstein 2007, 117) Originally claiming 500 members by 1981, the SL comprised

[7] Note that the SL was not Peru's only insurgency during the 1980s and 90s. The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) also endured from 1982-1997 – at which time Peru existed primarily in a state of anocracy. However, since this case study is most concerned about events which transpired during Peru's second period of democracy [2001-2014], the MRTA is largely ignored. The MRTA experienced significantly less success holding territory than the SL and is most known for carrying out terrorist attacks.

approximately 3,000 insurgents at its peak strength in 1990. (Weinstein, 117; InSight Crime 2015) The Peruvian government nearly defeated the SL in 1992 after capturing Guzmán. However, the state's mismanagement of the security situation following the group's decapitation allowed it to crop back up in the periphery. The SL managed to achieve active endurance under UCDP-PRIO's records until 2010. Though it attempted to enter peace agreements periodically since 2003, the group's leader Jose Flores (or "Comrade Artemio") declared the SL's insurgent movement "defeated" in a 2011 interview. (Castillo 2011) During its period of activity, the SL adopted a formal organizational structure; however, one that devolved significant decision-making power to localized insurgent cells. (Weinstein, 150-151) While a central committee made assessments of organizational process and formed broad strategies, local cells maintained considerable latitude in the execution of these strategies. As a result of this devolution, the cell operating in Peru's coca cultivating region (The regional committee in Alto Huallaga: SL-CRH) eventually broke off from the organization's Maoist objectives and focused more on rent collection. (Weinstein, 155) Broadly, narcotics rents provided the SL (and especially the SL-CRH) with a substantial portion of its revenue. However, the more ideological portion of the SL retained its ability to mobilize primarily out of its social appeal in the sierra – especially near Ayacucho. (Weinstein, 278; McClintock 2001, 85)

Focusing more specifically on disbursements made from 2001 to 2014, Net ODA and Official Aid received exhibits regular expansions over the period. Military aid expanded regularly until 2007 and then became more erratic.According to a 2008 report, US economic development aid comprised 48% of disbursements; though Japanese and European donors make up a significant portion as well. (Alasino 2008, 3) Unlike Colombia, neither aid type contained rigid coca eradication conditionalities – particularly aerial fumigation. While the areas where the

SL and SL-CRH exist are historically the most underdeveloped and most poorly integrated in the entire state, like FARC and ELN territories, geographically stratified data on the standard of living exhibit improvements preceding the eventual contraction of Peruvian insurgent activities. Much like Colombia, these improvements lagged far behind other more integrated areas of the state. The delay here gives some credence to the selectorate interaction proposed in the Colombian case. Improvements are taken as a proxy for the level of state integration; and economic development aid is assumed to be part of this poverty reduction. On these grounds, theoretical explanations of civil conflict certainly offer insight to the SL and SL-CRH's endurance – though a selectorate framework seems especially appropriate.

The Peruvian case follows the same structure as its Colombian counterpart. The study begins with a historical overview of the SL from its inception, followed by theoretical explanations for its endurance and termination. The study then considers trends in foreign aid and its intersection with group endurance.

The Evolution of the Sendero Luminoso: History and Factors of Endurance

The SL's emergence of a group dominated by students followed a decade of mobilization at the National University of San Cristobal of Huamanga; which was reopened in 1959. McClintock points out that union organizations and leftist activists were quite rare in the periphery before then. (71) The domination of the sierra's agricultural sector by several large haciendas allowed the economic elite to preempt this sort of action by locals. Upon the University's reopening, local enrollment increased and a path of formal indoctrination arose. Ayacucho residents comprised approximately 70% of the university's students. A recession hit Peru in 1975, and with the new university degrees not particularly marketable, student grievance became especially high. In the wake of agrarian reforms popularly supported by the Velasco government

during the 1960s, socialistic policies certainly characterized the political dialogue at the time as well. McClintock highlights that Velasco tried to mobilize the peasantry into agrarian political entities but failed to do so effectively. (74) Several other grass-roots organizations succeeded in mobilizing peasants throughout the 1970s. Simultaneously, leftists captured control over the University of Huamanga's council and increasingly proselytized the principles of the SL. By the time of the SL's official initiation of insurgent activities, the sierra possessed substantial social capital for the group's utilization.

As highlighted in the introduction, rent-seeking also played a large part in the group's resilience beyond available social capital. This was especially true for the SL-CRH. Increased human rights violations by both the SL and the Peruvian government past 1982 eventually contributed to a steady erosion in their popular support beyond Ayacucho. Weinstein highlights that the both factions employed violence against civilians in rebel-held areas to deter defection to the government-controlled areas, especially in the South towards Apurímac and Ene River Valleys. (278-280) At this time, government reach into the periphery remained quite limited – and so SL coercion would have left rural peasants with few alternatives for cooperation. With their constituents (coerced or not) concentrated in the periphery, the SL grew to rely heavily on taxes from local coca cultivators, as well as rents from direct involvement in the narcotics trade.

The disadvantage of relying on narcotics while eroding popular support was that the government could respond to the group in a more direct manner. The Fujimori administration's choice to shoot down narcotics-transport aircrafts in the sierra is widely credited with the SL's near-defeat in the 1990s. (Peceny and Durnan, 106; Felbab-Brown 2005, 117) Notably, Fujimori halted widespread aerial fumigation in favor of this more targeted approach. Through this interruption of the narcotics supply chain, the sierra peasantry did not directly suffer negative

externalities associated with aerial eradication efforts as they did in Colombia. Instead, the SL was forced to maintain their allegiance through force.

The decline of the group over the 1990s is also heavily attributed to the improvement of the government's intelligence and enforcement apparatus – particularly with the development of *rondas campesinas*, or local paramilitary units. These units proved very effective at infiltrating SL territories throughout the 1990s; especially areas in which the more ideologically-driven faction of the SL dominated. Having been fueled by a windfall of narcotics-tax rents, the SL opted to launch an offensive against Lima between 1989 and 1990. So, the government's ability to effectively infiltrate the group's bastion as it launched this extended offensive significantly contributed to its temporary downfall. "An intelligence operation that led to the capture of Guzman in 1992 and his order to his troops to surrender, combined with extensive amnesties for guerrillas who turned themselves in, laid the basis for the elimination of the guerrilla movement." (Felbab-Brown, 119) Following this defeat, the government considered the SL to be broadly defeated; it posed only a very minor threat to the Peruvian state. The government rolled back many of its security measures – including its large-scale sponsorship of local paramilitaries. (Burgoyne 2011, 100)

The SL's actual persistence until 2010 stems from several factors – and these can be evaluated through theoretical explanations of civil conflict. At one level, the state certainly relaxed its enforcement efforts following the capture of Guzman and the surrender of the SL. However, it did not significantly reduce the available narcotics rents that could be captured. Indeed, part of Fujimori's policy during the 1990s was to take a lax position on coca eradication efforts so as to not cause inordinate grievances among the rural civilians who also relied extensively on the economic benefits of cultivation. As Colombian coca production expanded, the market price in

Peru was driven down to the point where crop substitution became viable as well. Even so, coca's economic attractiveness was not eliminated. To this day, Peru is the second largest exporter of coca in Latin America. According to Weinstein, the SL-CRH shifted further towards and economically motivated organization past 2001 – focusing its attention on cultivation and profiteering. (281-282) They did persist as an organization, but with greater separation from the SL's central committee. Their efforts became entirely focused on cultivation efforts, and they became more analogous to a criminal organization or mafia. The SL-CRH also created more economic incentives to draw members – though they largely ceased large-scale insurgent activities. The SL-CRH's institutional norms which prohibited individual economic rewards eroded as the group became more involved in the coca trade. Initially, a greed theory explanation seems appropriate for the SL-CRH. However, the glaring contradiction is that the group almost entirely ceased its insurgency. It proved more profitable for them to remain isolated and in control of their niche narcotics market than engage in direct confrontation with the state.

From a grievance framework, the contraction of SL activities also might seem sensible. Recalling that the organization originally proliferated after a sharp downturn in the economic situation, it is important to note that Peru's broad economic situation remained relatively stable over the 2001-2014 period. While growth rates have slowed occasionally, no major contractions in GDP/capita are observed on an annual basis. The national infant mortality rate has also declined. These indicators suggest that the level of grievance declined over the period of democracy. No apparent sharp reversals are observed – no major cues to a renewed insurgency are seen. In this sense, diminished grievance would predict the contraction of the insurgency. Land reform during the decades after 1981 also sought to directly address some of the SL's stated grievances. The

issue is that SL activities did not contract below significant levels until 2010 – long after relative stability is observed.

The SL's endurance can certainly be explained through a selectorate framework. Following the group's defeat in the 90s, the Peruvian government largely failed to ameliorate living standards in the Peruvian sierra and amazon. As Burgoyne notes, "despite the lessons of the 1980s and 1990s, in Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Apurimac, the average income remains from 60 to 89 percent below the poverty line." (101) The failure of the government to integrate the periphery into the winning coalition at this time stands in contrast to the apparent integration achieved in the year's preceding the SL's 2010 collapse. Following continuing integration of the periphery, the SL has not reemerged as it did during its previous defeat. So, the level of integration achieved in the periphery seems to play a determinant role in the endurance of the SL. To illustrate this, consider the percentage of the population living in poverty or extreme poverty in the sierra and amazon – the major regions of SL and SL-CRH activity. This data, from Peru's national statistics institute, illustrates clear reductions in the poverty and extreme poverty rates – this trend reflects greater integration of the periphery into the state and the continued contraction of insurgent activities. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate these trends.



Source: Instituto Nacional De Estadistica E Informatica (INEI). "Población en situación de pobreza, según ámbitos geográficos." https://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/sociales/. (April 13, 2018)



Source: Instituto Nacional De Estadistica E Informatica (INEI). "Población en situación de pobreza extrema, ámbitos geográficos." https://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/sociales/. (April 13, 2018)

Comparably, poverty and extreme poverty rate reductions in the sierra and amazon (as well as their rural subsets) consistently exceed the reductions made along Peru's historically integrated coastal region (as well as its rural subset).[8] From a selectorate perspective, the heightened reductions in poverty and extreme poverty in the historically isolated periphery signal increased efforts at integration. Given the SL and SL-CRH's contraction past 2010 in the wake of such reductions, a selectorate explanation offers insight into the reduced grievances in the periphery and diminished insurgent group mobilization capabilities.

Summarily, the contraction of SL activities can be explained through a selectorate framework. Recalling that the organization originally proliferated after a sharp downturn in the economic situation, Peru's broad economic situation has also remained relatively stable over the 2001-2014 period; no sharp reversals are seen in the economic and social indicators. Considering the regional data, it may be that the overall level of grievance and civilian incentives to participate in insurgencies declined in the wake of improved conditions – brought about by the state. Prior to the 2000s, peripheral conditions remained miserable. As no apparent sharp reversals are observed, no major cues to a renewed insurgency are immediately apparent. The selectorate explanation ties in well with the grievance-based consideration. As the periphery becomes more integrated with the state, fewer opportunities for a grievance-motivated insurgency arise. In the democratic period, the selectorate consideration offers sound logic as to why the SL's activities contracted around 2010. The contraction of SL activities stands in contrast to the conditions overserved in Colombia, where the same metrics do not exhibit similarly clear levels of integration.

[8] See appendix A-17:18 for complete statistics on the poverty and extreme poverty rates in Peru.

Government, Aid Conditionalities, and Impacts on Endurance

We now look specifically at the implementation of government policies alongside foreign aid receipts over the 2001-2014 period. While significant disparities between the periphery and the integrated coast remain, there are notable improvements which contribute to the contraction of insurgent activity. It is important to highlight that unlike Colombia, United States' aid to Colombia did not carry the same conditionalities – such as demands for aerial fumigation. This was especially true during the Fujimori era preceding the 2001-2014 democracy. (Felbab-Brown, 117) Human rights and pro-democracy conditionalities also do not appear to have had a significant impact on Peruvian aid during the Fujimori era. As McClintock notes, "the U.S. government decided not to risk the demise of its new cooperation with Peru on free-market reform, security issues, and narcotics-control to maintain high democratic standards in the hemisphere." (4) Rather, the more consequential factor in Peruvian aid receipts appears to be debt-servicing on development loans. The Fujimori government developed a good track-record in this respect. In the 1990s, Fujimori initiated market liberalization programs following negotiations with the U.S. and Japan. (8-9) By 1997, Peru garnered a reputation as one of the most favorable creditors in the Andean region. Unlike Columbia, whose economic situation appears quite tumultuous over the 1989-2014 period, Peru's remained quite stable.

The major caveat with foreign aid and insurgent activity is the fact that much of the Peruvian development assistance did not reach the periphery until well after the SL's initial defeat. As highlighted earlier, this contributed to the group's resurgence prior to 2010. Throughout much of the democratic period, "rural and indigenous people [remained] largely excluded from the benefits of economic growth." (Alasino, 13) Though aid inflows historically increased, Alasino rightly identifies that the exclusion of the periphery from its benefits is a significant contributor to

enduring social unrest. If aid did not reach the periphery and conditions remained consistently miserable, then we should expect the positive relationship that the quantitative analysis observed. Not only would conditions in the periphery remain poor and grievances high, but a sense of relative deprivation might also emerge. This could fuel increased insurgent mobilization in response to aid inflows being selectively distributed. Unlike Colombia, Peru's increased attention to the periphery before 2010 lead to reduced incentives for insurgent activity. And indeed, improving conditions and increased aid during the late-democratic period correspond to contracted insurgent activities. In Peru, the impact of aid on the SL's endurance seems directly contingent on the government's inclination to integrate the periphery.

Democratic Conclusions

Upon reviewing both cases, the selectorate framework on insurgent group endurance with respect to the periphery's level of integration offers substantial validity to the quantitative finding that economic development aid receipts possess a positive relationship with insurgent group endurance in most instances. The direction of this relationship appears to stem from the fact that incumbent governments are slow to integrate rebellious peripheries into the state. Poor and un-integrated peripheries offer substantial mobilization capabilities to the insurgent groups that reside in them. In Colombia and Peru, the study found that the relative impoverishment and squalor of these peripheries lead to grievances on the social and economic disparities among the populace. Consequently, leftist organizations who could blame the integrated elite found traction for insurgency in these areas.

In the case of Peru, the study observed that improving conditions – and indeed substantial improvements relative to the integrated part of the country – resulted in contracted insurgent activities. The selectorate implication is that the dispensation of public goods payouts to these

regions raised the opportunity cost for participation in insurgencies as grievances were addressed. This interaction corresponds to the original hypothesis of an inverse relationship between aid disbursements and insurgent endurance. So, the observed direction of the relationship is directly contingent upon the democratic winning coalition's decision to integrate the periphery and dispense public goods.

In Colombia, FARC territories did not exhibit a clear indication of integration into the democratic winning coalition. Impoverishment remained quite high and exhibited only modest reductions. In ELN territories, greater reductions are observed. On this note, the ELN continually suffered from greater mobilization difficulties compared to the FARC. From a selectorate standpoint, the greater integration of ELN territories may imply higher civilian opportunity costs for joining the insurgency – especially one which offers minimal pecuniary gains for the individual. Broadly, it makes sense that the FARC and ELN insurgencies continued to endure given that the territories they occupied remained less integrated and therefore more excluded from public goods dispensation. The opportunity cost remained low. This interaction is especially true when the insurgencies act as a safeguard for the economic rents that the periphery may offer – particularly illicit narcotics cultivation and processing. Despite aid increasing, its benefits were not felt strongly in these areas.

Of course, the Colombian case features an added layer of complexity in that the conditionalities imposed by U.S. assistance (specifically aerial counter-narcotics fumigation) directly exposed the peripheral populace to negative externalities – primarily the decimation of agriculture. In Peru, the government did not have to deal with such conditionalities. It actively refrained from aerial fumigation in favor of more targeted counter-narcotics strategies that minimized the peripheral population's exposure to negative externalities.

In sum, the democratic case offers significant internal validity to the quantitative finding. However, the direction of the relationship is still the result of the interaction with selectorate politics. In the instance where the periphery was actively integrated into the winning coalition, public good dispensation effectively reduced insurgent mobilization capabilities – illustrated in the contraction of insurgent activities following large poverty reduction in the periphery. Note that government integration efforts in both cases took place before the insurgent groups were defeated. The issue of integration efforts does not seem to stem from the government's fear that newly allocated resources might fall into rebel control. Resource scarcity also does not appear to be driving integration – the cases both saw regular cycles in their economic performance and aid receipts which do not appear to align directly with integration efforts. Rather, the selectorate considerations in the case seem to indicate that it is the leadership's political incentives which lead to integration. If the leadership did not need the periphery's political support, then there was not incentive for integration.

Autocratic Case Study

The autocratic analysis draws its cases from a sample of 38 instances of autocracy across 35 states.[9] Like in the democratic selection, an initial consideration is choosing cases which are representative of the entire sample. This task is quite difficult given that the average duration of an autocratic regime in the sample is 6.95 years with a standard deviation of 6.99. Because of the limited autocratic regime endurance across the sample, many cases lack a substantial amount of data for analysis. This problem is compounded when missing data becomes a factor. Therefore,

[9] Operationally, regimes must be contiguous for averaging across the regimes' duration to be appropriate. In instances of noncontiguous autocracy (Iran in 1989-1996; 2004-2014, and Afghanistan in 1989-1991; 1996-2000), separate observations of autocracy are recorded. Constant variable observations across these regimes are only entered once into cross-regime averages (Fearon's ethnic fragmentation variables are not distinguished annually).

the research first opts to prioritize the data availability of potential cases over their representativeness of the entire sample.

A survey of the sample (conducted while blind to the primary independent variables) reveals several instances where cases can align in a methods of difference framework. To still preserve some level of case representativeness, cases with profound idiosyncrasies were avoided. For instance, while Rwanda's autocratic regime yields a high data availability, no other cases in the sample experienced a genocide of the same degree. Attempting to balance sample representativeness with data quality, and the ability to utilize a Mill's method framework, this research selects Myanmar (Burma) and Indonesia as the two cases for qualitative analysis. In this respect, the control conditions make the method of difference the ideal framework for analysis.

Within the 1989-2014 time-frame observed in this research, Myanmar experienced autocracy from 1989-2010 (22 years) and Indonesia experienced autocracy from 1989-1997 (9 years). A clear initial criticism of this selection is on the duration of autocracy in both states. Indeed, Myanmar's autocracy duration is impressive by the sample's standards themselves ($\bar{x}$: 6.99, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 9). Two facts help in justifying this decision. One is that the sample includes a high frequency of short-duration autocracies across a bimodal distribution. Selecting a short-duration autocracy would incur data availability issues. Selecting a longer-duration autocracy yields far more data to consider in the analysis. Moreover, at 9 years, Indonesia falls on the larger end of duration as well. Opting for longer duration selections expands the potential for analysis, despite some loss of sample representativeness.

Concerning paramilitarism in both states, the second argument in defense of Myanmar's selection is that Indonesia yields a frequency of group activity that is relatively similar. Myanmar experienced an average of 3.63 paramilitaries across its period of autocracy, and Indonesia

experienced an average of 5.88. Compared to the entire sample, Myanmar and Indonesia experienced higher levels of activity ($\bar{x}$: 1.31, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 1.38). Again, this selection appears to prioritize data quantity over population representativeness. However, there is a strong reason to suspect that the level of activity recorded across states is biased downwards. In her coding, Carey sometimes collapses paramilitary groups into broader categorizations. (2013) This is true in Myanmar where individual civilian militias sponsored by the state military are grouped and coded under a single "People's Militia." Her data similarly collapses groups in Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and other states with generic group identifications. While Indonesia and Myanmar seem to have relatively high levels of activity, it is very likely that sample's figures exhibit a downwards bias. Strikingly, the best reason to support Myanmar and Indonesia in a method of difference framework is that both states embark on a policy of institutionalized paramilitary expansion over their period of autocracy – despite otherwise different control conditions.

Continuing to the other controls, Myanmar and Indonesia differ in several. Throughout its duration, Myanmar is poor by Indonesia's standards. The average GDP/capita across their autocratic periods are $385.71 and $821.74 respectively. A more appropriate measure of economic activity are normally distributed growth rates. Here, Myanmar exhibited fantastic growth (20.43%) while Indonesia's was 9.35%. By the sample's standards, Myanmar's growth rate is also high ($\bar{x}$: 3.88%, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 10.10%). Yet, the level of variance in GDP/cap. growth rates makes Myanmar's economic performance (668.16) seem more representative with respect to the economic fluctuations of the sample ($\bar{x}$: 433.91, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 523.17). By contrast, Indonesia's growth rate variance is far more confined at 59.07. Myanmar's reliance on primary resource extraction as a percentage of GDP is higher than Indonesia's (μ: 9.15%; μ: 7.16%), and neither are outliers by the sample's standards ($\bar{x}$: 15.14%, $\sigma_{\bar{x}:}$ 13.65%). Myanmar's infant mortality rate is also somewhat higher than

Indonesia's (μ: 66.6, μ: 55.2) and both are in the norm of the sample ($\bar{x}$: 83.54, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 43.58). Some of the sharpest differences between these states lie in their cultural/ethnic fragmentation. Fearon records a cultural division index score of 0.419 for Myanmar and 0.522 for Indonesia – meaning that cultural divisions in Indonesia are more pronounced. (2003)

These scores are also representative of the sample ($\bar{x}$: 0.383, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 0.205). Fearon's ethnic fractionalization metric highlights that ethnolinguistic fractionalization in Myanmar (0.52) is far less pronounced than in Indonesia (0.27). Again, both achieve sample representativeness ($\bar{x}$: 0.60, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 0.27). Finally, we may also consider the distribution of the country population across salient ethnic groups through the variance of group populations as proportions of the entire population. In this respect, Myanmar features more domination by a few large groups (0.046) whereas Indonesia experiences more intergroup parity (0.015). By the sample's standards, both are representative ($\bar{x}$: 0.085, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 0.120). Finally, Indonesia's population is far larger than Myanmar's. Averaging across the duration of the autocracy, Myanmar's population was 46.8 million while Indonesia's was 188.2 million. The two states differ in notable respects across many control variables.

In several instances, their controls still do exhibit similarity. Both are Asian states – though Indonesia is a series of over 17,000 islands. Both are rated as quite corrupt according to TI (Myanmar: 1.6, Indonesia: 2.4); though both fell within the norm of the sample ($\bar{x}$: 2.63, $\sigma_{\bar{x}}$: 0.82). Both also exhibit high levels of military expenditures (Myanmar: 3163.84, Indonesia 2941.11). Their population growth rates are again very similar (Myanmar: 1.22%, Indonesia 1.38%), though Indonesia's population is far larger in raw terms. Finally, the average military expenditures of both states are relatively similar. Myanmar's military budget averaged 3.16 billion while Indonesia's averaged 2.94 billion. In per capita terms, Myanmar's average expenditures are slightly larger than those of Indonesia over the 1966-1997 period where both states function as autocracies ($13.96

and $10.94 respectively). Of these controls, similarity in military expenditures draws the most attention given that it is included in the quantitative model and exhibits a positive and significant relationship with paramilitary endurance. In order to differentiate the impact of military expenditures, special attention is paid to the trends in this variable throughout the following case studies.

The Case of Myanmar (Burma)

Myanmar's (Burma's) history in terms of its regime, its government, and political elite's reliance on paramilitaries, and its inflows of economic development aid can be divided into three periods.[10] This first is the period of British colonial rule before and up to 1948, and then from independence and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in 1948 to the end of democratic rule in 1962. Following this is the period of General Ne Win's caretaker government from 1958-1960 and then his military rule from 1962 to 1988. The final period, and the one of greatest interest to this research, is the reestablishment of a military junta in 1988 to the end of autocracy in 2010. Throughout all four periods, those in power, as well as their policies, have changed. Paramilitarism has generally expanded in prevalence; save a notable contraction in 1973. Foreign aid receipts also fluctuate over this time period – as has the general state of Myanmar's (Burma's) economy.

Colonial Rule and Parliamentary Democracy (1930s-1962)

British colonial rule in Burma lasted from 1824 to 1948. Upon its conquest, the British integrated Burma into its Indian Empire and the colony was administered by these colonial officials (Central Intelligence Agency). The British then separated colonial administration in 1937. For much of Burma's colonial history, its development surpassed much of Asia. In this respect,

[10] Before 1989, Myanmar was otherwise known as Burma. The state's name did not change until a military junta changed it in 1989 following General Ne Win's expulsion from power. This research will refer to the present state as Burma before 1989 and Myanmar afterwards.

"Burma thrived as a colony, becoming the world's largest exporter of rice on the eve of World War II and producing many of Asia's most respected civil servants, doctors, and other professionals" (Reiffel and Fox 2013, A-1). However, much of this development was lost as the Japanese and British fought over the territory during World War II. With respect to paramilitarism in Burma during this time, the contracting of private militias by provincial strongmen, religious organizations, and Burmese nationalist leaders dates back as far as the 1930s (Buchanan 2016, 6). The British colonial governors also employed private security forces in response to ethnic tensions in Karen-dominated areas between 1945 and 1948. Burmese nationalists secured independence from Britain in 1948, and paramilitarism expanded following the establishment of a parliamentary democracy.

The primary reason for the expansion of paramilitaries after 1948 stemmed from the proliferation of Communist and ethnic insurgencies throughout Burma's periphery. In this respect, Burma's early democracy is characterized as highly factional and exclusive towards non-Bamar ethnicities. The end of the Chinese civil war in 1949 compounded Burma's peripheral threats as the defeated Republican Army crossed into Burma to avoid the victorious Red Army (Buchannan, 7). In the immediate post-independence period, the Burmese government authorized the establishment of pro-government militias to defend against these security concerns. The feeble government found it difficult to control these paramilitary forces and banned them in 1955. Reflecting the division between the national government and the provincial rulers, local leaders continued the establish "Volunteer Defense Forces" in ethnic Shan and Kachin villages in Burma's north. Finally, the *Tatmadaw* (State military) established the Directorate of National Guard Forces in 1956 to coordinate and train militias. Accordingly, the military oversaw village defense forces and used them as levies in counter-insurgency operations (7). Interestingly, the establishment of

this Directorate coincided with a 9.18% drop in Burma's military expenditures from 1954 to 1955. The Tatmadaw's move to institutionalize paramilitarism could have come as the result of constrained resources during heightened security concerns. Ultimately, Burma's parliamentary democracy and military took multiple steps to institutionalize paramilitaries during this period.

In terms of aid, the World Bank issued its first development loan to Burma in 1956; and the United Nations established itself in Burma following independence in 1948. However, official development aid disbursements from the OECD to Myanmar are not recorded until 1967. Throughout the entire post-1948 period, Japan is considered Myanmar's (Burma's) largest source of foreign aid (Reiffel and Fox, 46). The first inflows of Japanese foreign aid to Burma began in 1955 with reparations stipulated in their 1954 post-WWII peace treaty. These reparations totaled approximately $200 million to be paid out over 10 years (Edström 2009, 18-19). The agreement further stipulated annual disbursements of $5 million to be used in joint projects. However, the historical progression of Burma's parliamentary democracy suggests that this aid did relatively little to bolster the government's position – whether or not disbursements had any linkages to increased paramilitarism throughout the democratic period. The regime collapsed in 1958 due to political turmoil.

In this year, Burma's government fell under military control with the notion the Tatmadaw could better stabilize the country. The Communist Party of Burma, as well as militarized ethnic groups, continued to wage an insurgency throughout the state. Moreover, the democratic government (even with the help of economic development aid) failed to improve conditions generally. In 1960, elections reestablished civilian governance. General Ne Win then upended this in 1962 with a military coup, and Burma entered into autocracy. From a selectorate perspective, it is clear that the government lacked the resources to secure its position during this period.

Moreover, the factional nature of the parliamentary democracy created a particularly unstable winning coalition. The expansion of paramilitarism during this time is not surprising. It proved a cost-effective way to expand security.

General Ne Win's Autocratic Rule (1962-1988)

General Ne Win entered into autocracy during a time of heightened security threats. By the early 1960s, ethno-nationalist insurgencies represented a growing concern; coupled with the ongoing communist insurgency. As a response, the Ne Win government expanded its use of community-based militias. Buchannan cites that, an estimated 35,000 rural villagers were drafted into communal militias by the mid-1980s "as part of the regime's national counter-insurgency strategy" (9). These forces existed under the direct oversight and were armed by the Tatmadaw. Apart from communal defense forces, the government specifically contracted paramilitaries for anti-insurgent operations – these groups were the *Ka Kwe Ye* and *Ta Ka Sa Pha*.[11] Buchannan's review of Myanmar's (Burma's) paramilitary history further highlights 1964 as one of the most important years for the institutionalization of paramilitaries. In this year, the Tatmadaw adopted the military doctrine of People's War. The Tatmadaw directly constructed and administered strategic villages in peripheral areas outside of the government's reach. "Local Tatmadaw commanders then formed militias in these villages" (10; Myoe 2016). This doctrine is carried out through 2010. By 1973, the Directorate of Public Relations and People's Militias was established to oversee these paramilitaries; replacing the previously established Directorate of National Guard Forces. In the same year, the Tatmadaw undertook a reversal in its militia system by ordering the

[11] Note that the Ka Kwe Ye are one of the groups entered into the quantitative analysis. The literature assumes that this is a broad categorization for pro-government paramilitaries. Carey records the Ka Kwe Ye as emerging in 1996 as the remnants of the Mong Tai Army. Conversely, People's Militias are recorded and are coded as active throughout the entire 1989-2010 period.

disarming and disbanding of 23 Ka Kwe Ye groups. By the mid-1970s, paramilitarism seems to have contracted in Burma.

With respect to aid during this period, a critical intersection with paramilitarism is on the issue of paramilitary funding. The civilian defense and anti-insurgent paramilitaries receive some funding and arms from the state itself, however they are decentralized to the point where they must raise their own revenue to varying degrees. The principal means of doing this are through capturing rents from local taxation, the running of legitimate businesses, as well as through the cultivation of opium. As paramilitarism expanded, groups became especially involved in opium cultivation (Kramer 2016, 4). As is discussed in further detail, curbing the narcotics exports from Myanmar (Burma) is a conditionality occasionally attached to some foreign aid the state receives – Buchannan highlights that this was especially true during the 1970s. (2016, 11)

In the context of ODA data, official development assistance (beginning in 1967) underwent frequent fluctuations throughout the duration of Ne Win's tenure. After 1962, the U.S.'s aid mission was expelled from Burma. Literature notes that foreign aid picked up in the 1970s (Reiffel and Fox). However, aid disbursements took another large blow in 1988 following the government's crackdown on dissidents – the U.S. most notably ceased its aid operations in Burma. The literature indicates that the most aggressive period of paramilitary expansion occurs in the years where ODA is comparatively lower (1967-1973). After 1973, the government and Tatmadaw attempted to check the expansion of paramilitaries due to both counter-narcotics conditionalities and the increase power of these groups generally.

Bearing in mind that military expenditures may also play a role in paramilitary endurance, these expanded steadily by an average of 2.19% annually over the 1962-1988 period. Recalling that the Tatmadaw also curbed paramilitarism during the mid-late 1970s out of concerns for their

growing power, the data illustrates that military expenditures were relatively low during this time. Alone, military expenditures during this period are not very telling given their fairly constant growth rate. However, if paramilitary growth outstripped the military's management capacity, the lower levels of military expenditures would certainly have limited their ability to respond if paramilitaries became unmanageable. On this note, military expenditures per capita are flat over the mid-1960s to mid-1970s. So, the increased power of paramilitaries relative to the state military during this time appears to be an added incentive for the government to curb their usage.

As shown in Figure 10, ODA and development assistance outstripped military expenditures during the latter half of Ne Win's tenure.



Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators. "Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$)." https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD (March 5, 2017); Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett, ed. *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48. [NMC v5]. (July 21, 2017).

The fact that foreign aid, some of it attached to counter-narcotics conditionalities, coincided with decreased paramilitarism during this time can be seen in the data. In raw monetary terms, foreign aid inflows may have exerted a larger effect on paramilitary policy than the military expenditures themselves. From a selectorate perspective, Ne Win conceding some paramilitary sponsorship for relatively large aid flows is an excellent example of conditionalities shaping policy through a

leader's desire to maximize their payout capacity (assuming that much of this aid was indeed channeled through the government directly). Considering the literature an data for this period, there certainly seems to be some evidence of economic aid exhibiting an inverse effect on paramilitary endurance.

Ultimately, the Ne Win period ends in 1988 when a military junta removed him from power. His tenure exhibits some of the most significant expansions of paramilitarism. Despite attempts by the government to curb this after 1973, paramilitaries became more entrenched in Burma's periphery. Returning to selectorate politics, the consolidation of power under Ne Win's autocratic rule seems again to have less to do with regime coding and more to do with the relative state capacity of the time. Up until 1973, the government's expanded use of paramilitaries was dictated largely by their inability to respond to peripheral security issues. However, the contraction of paramilitarism after 1973 clearly shows that Ne Win and his winning coalition had direct concerns over their ability to retain governance. Aid expectations do appear to align with the historical development during this period. However, the contraction of paramilitarism probably has more to do with conditionalities attached to this aid, as well as the inclination of the government to consolidate its power through formal means. Ultimately, Ne Win still lost the support of his winning coalition and it replaced him with a new Tatmadaw figurehead in 1988.

Than Shwe and Thein Sein Autocratic Rule (1988-2010)

In 1988, a military junta ousted Ne Win and renamed the state Myanmar. Though the junta organized elections for 1990, it nullified them after the opposition party (the National League for Democracy) won 80% of the legislative seats. General Than Shwe became the military leader of Myanmar in 1992 and worked to consolidate his power in the regime. During his consolidation period, internal dissent was not tolerated. However, his government did pass a new constitution in

2008 and held elections in 2010. General Thein Sein, considered a reformer, then took over and the country transitioned to anocracy in 2011.

This period also saw major developments in the state's use of paramilitaries. In 1989, the Communist Party of Burma's insurgency is defeated. The government refocused its counter-insurgency efforts onto the ethnic armed groups and began negotiating ceasefire agreements with many. Under these unwritten agreements, ethnic armed groups would negotiate individually with the Tatmadaw. In exchange for being placed under the Tatmadaw's oversight, ceasefire groups retained their organization and, in some cases, their arms. In this respect, the level of integration into the state varies. (Buchannan, 24-28) Ethnic armed organizations which transformed into border guard forces retained their arms and are integrated into the Tatmadaw's command structure. It must be highlighted that the principal goal of the state in creating border guard forces is to undermine the previous non-state authority in these groups. (Oo 2014, 11-13) Under this arrangement, border guard forces do receive arms and supplies from the Tatmadaw – though they still engage in their own rent-seeking activities and are not formally a part of the military nor the civilian militias. Non-integrated militias retain greater autonomy than border guard forces, and assistance from the state varies widely.

Arriving at the point of this research's formal data collection, a consideration of sampled paramilitary groups can be offered. From 1989-2010 five paramilitary groups are sampled. These include the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Ka Kwe Ye [Mong Tai Army splinter militias], People's Militias [Carey's collapsed civilian militia coding], the Swan Ar Shin, and the paramilitary branch of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Of these, the People's Militias are coded as active through the entire 1989-2010 period. The DKBA signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1994 and then splintered into 11 border guard forces.

(Buchannan, 18; Carey 2013) In 2003, the Tatmadaw sponsored the Swan Ar Shin as a civilian paramilitary designed to target political dissidents. (Carey 2013; Human Rights Watch 2008, 247-248) It also sponsored the creation of USDA paramilitaries for much the same purpose in 1993. Broadly, the purpose of these groups has been to strengthen the ruling coalition's position. Ceasefire border guard groups (like the DKBA) allow the Tatmadaw to stop ongoing insurgencies and placate their former members with private benefits such as arms and the ability to capture peripheral rents in a non-adversarial setting. Pro-government paramilitaries like the Swan Ar Shin and USDA serve to counter civilian dissidents. Note that from 1989-2009, forty armed groups reached ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw. By 2009, 25 ceasefires held, 5 groups transformed into border guard forces, and 15 transformed into people's militias. (Oo, 12-13).

In terms of aid flows throughout this time, they often reflect fluctuating levels of government repression. This trend agrees with this research's discussion of repression's impact on aid disbursements. Brutal repression may lead donors to cut off disbursements. The ODA data illustrates substantial drops in aid flows following the 1988 transition to autocracy. Aid also falls during the mid-90s as Than Shwe employed civilian paramilitaries and the Tatmadaw to counter dissidents. Aid doesn't exhibit another profound jump until 2008, when assistance increased following Cyclone Nargis. (Reiffel and Fox, A-5) This trend is depicted blow in figure 11.



Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators. "Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$)." https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD (March 5, 2017); Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett, ed. *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48. [NMC v5]. (July 21, 2017).

Over the same period, military expenditures generally expand alongside the creation of new paramilitary organizations. This finding agrees with the broad quantitative conclusion that military expenditures are positively related to paramilitary endurance. It is very difficult to separate the impact of military expenditures from the impact of economic development aid on paramilitaries here. Yes, aid did contract in the early-90s as paramilitarism increased in the mid-90s. This phenomenon is in agreement with the negative relationship observed across lagged models. However, increased military expenditures during the same time appears to compound the increase in paramilitarism. Later into the 2000s as military expenditures increase, paramilitarism continues to persist – despite a simultaneous increase in aid.

Overall, the case of Myanmar's paramilitary response seems to come down to state capacity and the relative size of economic development aid versus military aid. Myanmar (Burma) continually exhibited a preference for paramilitary expansion across most of the case's timeline. The only instance where paramilitaries decreased in concert with aid provisions was during the

1970s when anti-narcotics conditionalities led the government to crack down on the illegal activities of paramilitary rent-seekers. Here, the possible negative impact of aid on paramilitarism seems spurious to the conditionalities imposed by benefactors. However, the fact that aid during this episode outstripped the state's military expenditures can be contextualized through the selectorate theory's application on aid. Ne Win would have felt a strong incentive to comply with conditionalities given that foreign aid constituted a very substantial part of his government's resources. Moreover, the rapid expansion of paramilitaries was already perceived as a threat by Ne Win and his coalition. Still, a continual link between the Tatmadaw and paramilitaries is observed throughout the timeline. The military absolutely shares resources with paramilitaries – and so a positive relationship between military expenditures and paramilitarism seems to be strongly supported by this case study. For Myanmar, the negative impact of aid on paramilitary endurance is most supported during the 1970s. Otherwise, increased military expenditures and the capacity of the Tatmadaw to exercise their authority seems to be the stronger causal link.

The Case of Indonesia

In terms of its regime and employment of paramilitaries, Indonesia's history can similarly be divided into three periods. The first is the period of Dutch colonial rule prior to 1942, the Japanese occupation from March 1942 to August 1945, and then the interim years of contested independence where the Netherlands attempted to reassert its extraterritorial authority. The next period, which can generally be classified as the transition towards autocracy, is the return to a parliamentary democracy until the imposition of Sukarno's de facto autocracy under *guided democracy* in 1957 until the end of his rule in 1967. The final period is the New Order autocracy under Suharto from 1967 until 1997 (where Polity codes a transition into anocracy in 1998). Despite generally possessing a stronger state capacity and receiving more economic development

aid than Myanmar (Burma), as well as generally outperforming it economically, Indonesia similarly sees an expansion of paramilitarism over the duration of this case study.

Colonial Rule, Japanese Occupation, and Independence (Pre 1942-1949)

Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia began in the early 17th century until its interruption by the Japanese invasion in 1942. During the colonial period, Indonesia served the Dutch extensively as an exporter of raw agricultural and mineral resources. From 1830 to 1870, the Dutch employed a cultivation system in which individual settlements were taxed in-kind through resource quotas allocated specifically for exportation to the Netherlands. (Luiten van Zanden and Marks 2012, 46-47) Prior to the imposition of this system, Java (the center of the colony) primarily produced rice. The system thereafter prioritized the cultivation of cash-crops such as coffee and sugar during its use. The system was ultimately repealed in 1870. By 1914, much of the Indonesia's exports transitioned towards primary resources such as tin, petroleum and rubber. (85) In other words, the economy became less dominated by agriculture and infrastructure for primary resource extraction was established. While this created as system in which economic activity was often organized on a village-level basis, larger scale administration of Indonesia rested almost exclusively in the authority of Dutch overseers. (72) In connection to the institutionalization of paramilitarism across Indonesia, the top-down nature of Dutch colonial rule allowed local strongmen to carry out political authority at the village level. As is seen in the later development of paramilitaries after 1945, village-based militias persisted as major power-brokers in the vacuum following the Japanese surrender.

The Japanese annexation certainly played an integral role in the development of these forces – as well as the post-1945 claim of Indonesian sovereignty. Prior to 1942, the Dutch colonial administration heavily restricted the integration of Indonesians into politics and the military.

Conversely, the Japanese directly cultivated an assortment of indigenous paramilitaries – "the Japanese organized various military groups like the defenders of the fatherland (PETA), pioneer front, Seinendan, Keibodan, Heiho, and Boie […] these groups were led by local leaders." (Robinson 2001, 283; Wiranatakasuma 2000, 7) "The Japanese managed to recruit and mobilize tens of thousands of young men and women into paramilitary organizations" (Robinson, 288) Though militia groups existed prior to annexation, and indeed during Dutch colonial rule, the Japanese work to formalize their organization created a paramilitary infrastructure which became a key aspect of the political environment after 1945. Moreover, the Japanese also worked with Sukarno and the nationalists to assemble the 1945 Indonesian constitution. (Vu 2007, 41) The Japanese deliberately excluded Muslim and communist factions from this process. However, the first government later called for the establishment of political parties and re-enfranchised these groups. As Vu notes, the rapid establishment of these groups led to the proliferation of highly personalistic factions. Increased the factional nature of the first parliamentary system. Broadly, in contrast to the Dutch, the Japanese worked to institutionalize multiple aspects of post-1945 Indonesian political society; particularly paramilitarism and Sukarno and the nationalists' claim to authority.

With the Japanese surrender in 1945, the power struggle in Indonesia now lied primarily between the Dutch and an assortment of Indonesian factions – principally Sukarno and the nationalists (supported by many militia groups), as well as a communist faction. The predecessor to Indonesia's modern state military, the People's Security Agency (BKR), formed as a conglomerate of paramilitary organizations in August of 1945. (Wiranatakasuma, 10-11) Carrying forward the notion of institutionalized paramilitarism, the BKR itself was not a "state military" but remained highly autonomous. The Republic of Indonesian Armed Forces (TKR) succeeded the

BKR and appointed its own commander-in-chief in November of 1945: Colonel Sudirman, the ex-PETA commander. Affirming the autonomy of the TKR at this stage, President Sukarno did not formally appoint Sudirman as commander-in-chief until December. Meanwhile, the weakness of Indonesia's declared national government at this stage allowed local governments and paramilitary organizations to persist over the course of the independence struggle. (Vu, 42)

Throughout the duration of this pre-1949 period, foreign aid to Indonesia, particularly with respect to economic development aid, does not appear to be existent. No doubt, this is due to the shear fact that the Netherlands and Indonesia exercised some semblance of extraterritorial authority over the territory through this entire time frame. The imposition of the cultivation system did see an increase in Dutch investment towards Indonesian transport infrastructure projects – and the period after saw increased exports of primary resources which would have required extraction infrastructure investment as well. (Luiten van Zanden and Marks, 51) However, direct economic development disbursements are not seen during this period.

The broad significance of Indonesia's political development during this period lies primarily in the fact that localized militia power structures endured through the pre-1942 period and were then formalized by the Japanese during their occupation. The same paramilitary groups established by the Japanese continued to be directly involved in the Indonesian nationalist movement following 1945 – indeed, the ex-PETA commander became the head of the quasi-autonomous Indonesian armed forces. Moreover, the rapid formation of political parties after the establishment of the 1945 constitution also encouraged greater factionalism after independence. An early example of the frictions caused by factionalism is the 1948 Madiun affair in which a communist faction attempted to overthrow the nationalist government in a failed coup. Enduring

militias and personalistic political parties further enhanced the factional nature of Indonesia's political climate following 1949.

Parliamentary Democracy to Sukarno's Autocracy (1949-1965)

The ultimate failure of the parliamentary system is rooted in its rampant political factionalism – something that severely inhibited Indonesian state-capacity during this period. The parliament included multiple Muslim parties, the nationalists, the communists, the still largely autonomous military, as well as an assortment of ethnic minority and regional groups. (Vu, 43) Despite taking the form of a parliamentary democracy, the regime also functioned more along the lines of a dysfunctional anocracy or interregnum from 1949 to 1957; the Polity2 index averages a 0.22 over this period. (Marshall and Jaggers, Polity IV) Indeed, dysfunction is the symptom which ultimately motivated Sukarno to impose a system of guided democracy in 1957; ultimately concentrating power in himself and the military.

The events spanning the course of Sukarno's tenure are quite chaotic. To simplify them, it is useful to apply a selectorate framework and recognize that Sukarno generally attempted to solidify his winning coalition around the nationalists and military for the first half of his tenure – and then sensing distrust from the military in the latter half, attempted to appeal to leftist factions (particularly the Communist Party of Indonesia). While the early establishment of parliamentary democracy is characterized as factional, Sukarno effectively amassed a relatively large winning coalition; supported by a large patronage network. (Vu, 45) Of the factions within his coalition, the communists (PKI) grew their share of power through large increases in membership throughout the country. The military generally increased in power through the experience of the independence struggle; combatting both the Dutch and communist rebellions throughout this period. (Wiranatakasuma, 18)

Tensions grew between Sukarno and the military between 1952 and 1955 as communist elements increasingly penetrated the military bureaucracy. In 1953, Kusuma Sumantri, a leftist sympathizer, became minister of defense through a government appointment. In 1955, the government appointed a fairly low seniority officer to the position of chief of staff; angering higher-level military leadership. Sukarno's imposition of martial law in 1957 allowed military officers to directly enter politics; though by this time the PKI had already attained most of the political clout among the parties. (20) As a response, the military worked to incorporate local paramilitaries into its sphere. It had deployed these units effectively against militant Muslim groups since 1948, and the growing rift with Sukarno necessitated that the military secure its position through expanding its use of paramilitary forces in the periphery. (Robinson, 289; Vu, 45) On October 5, 1965, a communist element connected to the PKI attempted a coup. The failure of this attempt gave the military the political grounds to depose Sukarno and also wipe out the PKI. One of General Suharto's first acts upon succeeding Sukarno was to deploy the military and paramilitaries alike against the communists in a wholesale politicide. (Wiranatakasuma, 21; Vu, 45; Robinson, 290)

Thus, in terms of paramilitaries, the existence of these groups over the 1949-1965 period persisted quite significantly. Not only were they contracted regularly by political factions during the early period of the parliamentary democracy, but they formed a key component of the Military's strategy to outmaneuver the communists and Sukarno. Recognizing the ability of paramilitaries to serve as political enforcers in the periphery, the military continued to employ their use in both enforcement and military operations capacities following the establishment of Suharto's autocracy post-1965. As Robinson notes, "Whereas before 1965 state authorities had

had only limited success in harnessing the power of the militias, after the coup virtually all militia groups were drawn tightly under the army's authority." (290)

Over the course of this period, foreign aid inflows to Indonesia appear to be relatively modest compared to later contributions received under Suharto's regime. A major factor in this is that Sukarno's socialist leanings brought him closer to states within the Soviet sphere; whereas the West remained quite alienated. From 1951 to 1961, Indonesia received approximately 176 million dollars in loans from Soviet Bloc states. (Yazid, 256). There is no immediate indication of conditionalities attached to these disbursements, though it should be noted that Sukarno received greater economic and political support from the Soviet Bloc as he brought the PKI closer into his winning coalition. Broadly, Sukarno's political decisions isolated Indonesia from Western donors throughout his tenure. In 1965, Sukarno went so far as to declare Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations while proclaiming "go to hell with your aid;" signifying his breach with the Western capitalist democracies (Faudy 2015, 1352; Schulte Nordholt 1995, 129) Overall, evidence suggests that Indonesian economic development aid receipts over this period remained low. Simultaneously, paramilitarism expanded. This does not lead to a confirmation of selectorate hypotheses. The historical progression during this stage leads to the conclusion that Sukarno and the military actively incorporated pre-existing paramilitary organizations into their coalitions – not due to a decline in aid, but due to their ready availability as political resources following Japan's withdrawal.

The state of Indonesia's economy and military expenditures can also be noted during this stage. Sukarno's economic policy is largely considered to be poor. "Between 1959 and 1965, GDP grew on average by only 1.8% annually[…] lower than the population growth, which was 2.2% annually." (Fuady, 1352) Moreover, Sukarno nationalized many of the state's major economic

sectors following independence while also carrying out interventions on prices, production, and distribution. This further dissuaded foreign investment. Military expenditures generally rose in the period up until 1957. However, cuts to military expenditures occurred in 1962 (-32.7%) and 1963 (-20.4%). This decline corresponds to the growing rift between Sukarno and the military – as well as the military's expanded use of paramilitary forces. With declines in both economic activity and the resources delegated to the military during the late years of Sukarno's rule, it is not surprising that his popularity waned sharply leading up to the coup.

Suharto's Autocracy (1965-1997)

Opposite of Sukarno, Suharto's tenure is generally credited for its relative stability following his introduction of the New Order regime. Economic performance and aid inflows both increased substantially during his tenure. The government's reliance on paramilitary forces also increases periodically – especially during the late-New Order period as Suharto annexed West Papua, East Timor, and Aceh. However, the New Order, particularly the military, continued to keep organized paramilitaries throughout the periphery during the entirety of Suharto's tenure. These paramilitary units served in an enforcement capacity by default. At times, the military used them as supplementary forces during operations.

From 1965 onwards, the New Order's employment of paramilitaries cannot be understated. "Under army guidance, after 1965 militias and paramilitary forces were also increasingly deployed to carry out a range of 'dirty tricks' and covert operations, including assassination, torture, public execution, decapitation, and rape, as mechanisms of political control." (Robinson, 291) During the 1975 invasion of East Timor, paramilitaries were employed as a preliminary force in two capacities: first as a source of intel, second to carry out public violence and create a plausible excuse for an Indonesian military intervention. (293) Following the invasion of Indonesian forces,

paramilitaries were then employed as a complement to Indonesia's offensive, as well as a force to carry out the enforcement of Indonesia's political claim. Paramilitaries were employed in a strikingly similar capacity during Indonesia's move to secure control over Aceh in 1989. These paramilitaries underwent formal training and organization, facilitated through both the Indonesian military and the intelligence apparatus. Forces, depending on their classification, were then also armed by the military. By 1982, approximately 31,000 paramilitary personnel served in a local enforcement capacity across Indonesia, while another 6,700 served as irregular complements to the military. (298-299).

Arriving at the point of this research's formal data collect, sampled paramilitaries can now be highlighted in their historical contexts. Of the seven groups sampled, five are active throughout the entire period of autocracy (1989-1997). These include Halilintar, Makikit, Pemuda Pancasila, Team Saka, and Wanra. Of these groups, Halilintar and Makikit are noted by Carey as serving Indonesian interests during the invasion of East Timor and serving in an enforcement capacity thereafter; they were founded in 1975 and 1976 respectively. (2013) Makikit functioned as a smaller elite unit, whereas Halilintar appears to be a larger levy force. Team Saka also served as an elite unit tasked with assisting in military operations in East Timor after 1983. Again, this group transitioned to an enforcement group following the annexation of the territory. Wanra functioned as a pro-integration militia in both East Timor and Aceh after 1987. Finally, the Pemuda Pancasila formed the earliest (1959) and served as a pro-military faction designed to counter the communist influence during the Sukarno period. It remained active as a pro-Suharto/Golkar faction afterwards. The remaining two groups, Ninjas and Gada Paksi, both formed afterwards, in 1991 and 1997 respectively. Ninjas formed to serve primarily as an elite complement to the military in East Timor, as well as a pro-government death squad in both East Timor and Java. (Carey 2013;

Robinson, 311) Gada Paksi functioned in a very similar capacity in both East Timor and Aceh. The commonality between these groups is that all received some variety of military training and equipment from the state, and that all(with the exception of the Pemuda Pancasila) formed out of the state's and military's needs for operational support and enforcement during and after the annexations.

Considering the flows of economic development assistance during this time, disbursements average an 11.01% rate of increase over the 1969-1997 period. In terms of percentage changes, notable drops occur in 1979 (-2.46% from 1978) and 1983 (-12.11% from 1983). Annual aid receipts also experienced a period of consecutive percentage declines from 1985 to 1987. The cumulative percentage drop over this period was -15.81% from 1984. In terms of *percentage point* declines, aid receipts fell most precipitously in 1975 with a percentage point drop of -39.43 from 1974's 54.55% increase (from 1973). Economic development aid also experienced a series of percentage point declines during the late years of Suharto's tenure after 1992. The trend in raw Net ODA and Official Aid Received between 1968-1997 is depicted below in Figure 12.



Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators. "Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$)." https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD (March 5, 2017)

In historical context, these fluctuations in aid make sense. Suharto attracted the gratitude of the Western donor community following Indonesia's departure from Sukarno's sympathetic stance towards the Soviet Bloc. With this, alongside Suharto's immediate purge of communist elements throughout the regime and military, "[t]he Western world, especially the USA, applauded the anti-communist attitude of the new regime." (Nordholt, 131) Part of the reason Indonesia's aid did not drop in terms of *percentage changes* following the brutal invasion of East Timor in 1975 was because Indonesia continued to be viewed as an anti-communist bastion in Southeast Asia – despite the relatively large *percentage point* decline in the annual disbursement rate. In fact, the U.S. and Australia put great weight on this factor when sanctioning the Indonesian annexation. (132) Even as greater concerns for human rights violations emerged in the 80s and 90s, aid flows to Indonesia appear relatively resilient compared to Myanmar (Burma). An excellent example of Suharto facilitating this resilience can be seen in the 1991 Dili massacre. Though the event generated significant rebuke from the international community, Suharto convinced many donors that the massacre was perpetrated exclusively by rogue elements within the military – namely paramilitary forces. As a result, aid does not fall after this event. The only instance where raw disbursements drop precipitously follows 1992 as conditionalities regarding human rights actually become prominent among the Indonesian donor community – and as cold war bipolarity no longer shields Indonesia from the consequences of such abuses. (142-143). Suharto's response to such conditionalities (specifically those imposed by aid from the Netherlands) was to outright reject them. In March of 1992, Suharto effectively broke off aid relations with the Netherlands. (154-155)

Considering that paramilitarism reliably expanded under Suharto's tenure, and that aid disbursements also generally expanded (though at uneven rates in percentage point terms), it is useful to consider what other resources Suharto could dispense to support his winning coalition. Prior to 1978, the literature highlights that Suharto generally attracted the support of both civilians and the military. (Wiranatakasuma, 33) Indeed, this period saw economic growth outpace that of his predecessor, as well as continued increases in the state's military expenditures. The average GDP/capita growth rate during the 1968-1978 period is 19.84%; and the average growth rate in military expenditures over the same period is 36.85%. In terms of selectorate "payouts," continuous economic growth and expansions to the military budget reflect Suharto's ability to retain his winning coalition throughout this period. Note, as a reflection of his military's repressive capabilities, military expenditures per capita also increase by an average of 33.84% annually between 1968 and 1978. The simultaneous expansion of paramilitaries over this period, alongside the expansion of other indicators on the coalition's stability, indicate that paramilitaries functioned as a complement to other regime capabilities under Suharto's period of strongest coalition integrity. These findings contradict the inverse relationship reported in the quantitative analysis with respect to GDP/capita and economic development aid receipts. Positively related military expenditures could be the overriding force in this instance.

Opposite of the 1966-1978 period of Suharto's firm rule, the period from mid-1978 to the mid-1980s is characterized by a growing rift between the Suharto and the populace/military; after which Suharto's support wanes more sharply. On the military, career personnel grew increasingly concerned with Suharto's inclination to oversee their budget directly or through civilian bureaucrats. (Wiranatakasuma, 40) Suharto, sensing the growing rift between himself and the military, opted to draw Muslim groups closer into his coalition. This accompanied a wave of

patronage-based appointments throughout his governing party (Golkar), the bureaucracy, and the military. (42-43) Suharto also transferred major industries previously under the jurisdiction of the military (primarily the military industrial complex and the petroleum industry) to hardline loyalists after 1989. (45) Finally, Suharto deregulated many state monopolies over the same period and allowed loyal oligarchs to secure them. (49) The military ultimately deposed Suharto in 1998 following a violent clash with university students. Significantly for this research, the regime transitioned to anocracy in 1998 (along the lines of the Polity operational definition of regimes). So, trends in paramilitarism are only analyzed up until 1997.

Across the entire 1979-1997 period, paramilitarism remained prevalent in Indonesia – though only two of the groups entered into the quantitative analysis proliferated during this period; the rest proliferated before 1979 and endured past 1997. In terms of aid flows, a more modest 6.37% annual growth rate is achieved. A series of declines occurs during the mid-1980s, as well as a steady decline in percentage point changes. Military expenditures, GDP/capita, and military expenditures per capita experience similar modest growth rates. With Suharto's move to incorporate Muslim groups into his winning coalition, it is notable that economic aid provided him with fewer payouts to offer. In selectorate terms, the greater significance lies in the fact that both the military and much of the populace remained dissatisfied with Suharto. This gave Suharto multiple incentives to rely on paramilitaries as Golkar enforcers – the most appropriate example being the proliferation of Gada Paksi in 1997.

Summarily, the case of Indonesia's paramilitary response appears to come down more on selectorate factors beyond economic development aid. The level of loyalty *within* the coalition appears to be the causal link to paramilitary endurance. Recall that even though paramilitaries proliferated during Indonesian annexation efforts, these groups persisted due to either

Sukarno/Suharto's or the military's demand for political enforcement – especially in peripheries such as Aceh and East Timor. Conditionalities appear to have played a very insignificant role in their endurance, as the broader political climate during the cold war shielded Suharto's aid from political backlashes. In other instances, Sukarno and Suharto opted to simply reject the imposition of such conditionalities. At no point during this case study does economic development aid exhibit a plausible direct impact on the endurance of paramilitaries.

Autocratic Conclusions

After reviewing both cases, there is a lack of broad support for the quantitative finding that economic development aid receipts possess a negative relationship with paramilitary endurance. The only instance where this sort of relationship is clearly reflected is the receipt of aid by Myanmar in 1970 – which included anti-narcotics conditionalities. It seems that selectorate forces in terms of the leader balancing the winning coalition's stability against interior and exterior threats played a more determinant role. In addition, the available resources leadership possessed also represents a significant factor - especially with respect to their receptiveness towards aid conditionalities.

Reflecting on Myanmar's 1970 contraction of paramilitarism, it appears Ne Win opted to reduce paramilitarism for several reasons. One clear reason likely accepted aid and its counter-narcotics conditionalities with because it comprised a very significant portion of his regime's resources at the time – even outstripping its military expenditures. The substitution of resources to avoid conditionalities was not a viable option for Ne Win at this point. The second incentive to curb paramilitarism is rooted in the relative increase in power of these groups. With a significant portion of his ability to make payouts contingent on the acceptance of anti-narcotics conditionalities, as well as the fact that largely autonomous paramilitaries threatened his political

capacity, it is obvious that Ne Win felt a very strong selectorate incentive to reinforce the integrity of his winning coalition through the reduction of state-sanctioned paramilitaries. The conditionalities which essentially demanded a check on paramilitaries complemented Ne Win's internal political incentives to reign in these groups.

By contrast, neither Sukarno nor Suharto experienced similar incentives to curb paramilitarism. Setting aside Sukarno, whose decision to reject Western aid comes largely down to nationalistic impulse, Suharto possessed substantially more resources for selectorate dispensation at the time of his 1992 rejection of human-rights-based aid conditionalities. Suharto's military budget grew over this time; alongside growth in Indonesia's GDP/capita. Moreover, the Indonesian military possessed far more control over paramilitaries than the Tatmadaw in Myanmar (Burma). Indonesia groups relied far more on government support than their counterparts in Myanmar (Burma). Many groups arose directly out of the Indonesian military's planning as well (compared to sanctioned paramilitarism functioning more like a political conciliation towards potential rivals in Myanmar). Unlike Ne Win and Than Shwe, Suharto possessed ample resources to counter rivals of the state and maintain his coalition throughout the majority of his tenure. His ultimate undoing was not caused by his inability to control external forces – rather, it was the military's defection from his winning coalition after his policies left it deeply dissatisfied post-1978.

On the note of selectorate politics, significant differences in leader insecurity are apparent as well. Most of the time, Myanmar's autocratic leaders made decisions to counter forces external to their winning coalition. Whether it was combatting communists, the Chinese Republicans, or ethnic armed groups, paramilitary policies were generally directed to counter forces beyond rivalries among players within the "nuclear" winning coalition (i.e. the leader and his inner allies).

By contrast, Indonesian leaders contracted paramilitaries largely to secure their position relative to other players within the nuclear winning coalition. The military did so throughout Indonesia's autocracy – and Suharto expanded Golkar's sponsorship of paramilitaries as the military threatened his position (he also integrated Muslim armed groups during the late years of his tenure). Sukarno did so as well through allowing communist units to militarize. On a fundamental level, the nature of the selectorate rivalries in Myanmar (Burma) and Indonesia are qualitatively different to this effect.

Accordingly, the incentives their leaders incurred upon aid receipt with respect to paramilitarism were different. Unlike Myanmar, where an inverse relationship between aid and paramilitary endurance is seen in the 1970s (resulting from a relative disadvantage against external actors), a consistent direct relationship is implied in the Indonesian study (though the magnitude of this is still in question). As aid and other factors of the leader's tenure increase in Indonesia, paramilitaries simultaneously increased to counter the relative gains of internal forces apart from resistance to annexation. Indonesian paramilitaries provided an ends towards the coalition members' internal advantages. Myanmar's provided an ends towards the winning coalition's position relative to external threats.

It should be highlighted that these nuances of selectorate politics are not captured by the Polity score used to operationalize winning coalition sizes. This seems to be a major reason as to why the quantitative assertion of an inverse relationship finds relatively little internal validity in these case studies. Aggregation of autocratic political environments under sometimes ambiguous Polity values produces an aggregate measure of the impact that aid has on paramilitaries. Because of this operationalization, internal validity is lost. Bueno de Mesquita had noted that Polity IV could serve as a relatively good proxy for winning coalition size. (2007) Unfortunately, Polity IV

reveals very little about how selectorate politics actually function within the narrower coalitions of autocratic states. The nuances of internal versus external selectorate rivalries is something that is completely neglected by the quantitative research presented here – and unfortunately, it seems like a variable that would be quite difficult to index or proxy.

Summarily, the autocratic case study casts significant doubt on the internal validity of the quantitative analysis's assertion of an inverse relationship between economic aid receipts and paramilitary endurance. Though Myanmar and Indonesia appear to be valid choices for a method of difference analysis (history shows their political, social, and economic experiences are generally quite different), the nature of their similar expansions of state-sponsored paramilitarism cannot be explained through economic development aid alone. Like aid, military expenditures also do not reliably dictate the endurance of paramilitaries. The case study exhibited that the fiscal insecurity of the military, as well as the budget of the military relative to other winning coalition members, can both lead to increased paramilitarism. The distinct selectorate rivalries in both states appear to be the more valid causal link – as well as their ability to substitute resources and negate the impact conditionalities have on paramilitary sponsorship.

Discussion

Taking the selectorate theory as its central framework, this research proposed that regime types would play an integral role in how military and economic aid impacts the endurance of intrastate paramilitary and insurgent groups in recipient states. The attempt to model this through logistic regressions presented significant relationships between aid and the endurance of insurgencies in democracies, as well as paramilitaries in autocracies. For democratic insurgencies, the quantitative analysis observed a direct relationship between economic development aid and endurance. For autocratic paramilitaries, it observed a consistent inverse relationship between

economic development aid receipts and endurance. An additional qualitative look at these relationships revealed several nuanced findings for both regime types.

In democratic states, the quantitative conclusion found a good deal of internal validity. However, rather than the aid alone impacting insurgent endurance, it is contingent on the leader's decision to integrate rebellious peripheries into the selectorate and/or winning coalition – thereby allowing them to receive public goods. In Colombia, insurgent groups persisted in much of the periphery as they were not integrated. Moreover, the Colombian government's acceptance of counter-narcotics conditionalities entailed aerial fumigation efforts which exposed the peripheral population to significant negative externalities. In Peru, integration efforts are observed preceding and following the contraction of SL activities. After the SL's previous defeat in the 1990s, the leadership did not work to integrate the periphery – and so the SL's had traction to reemerge later. Given that the expectation with economic development aid was that it would entail public goods disbursements, thereby altering the opportunity costs of potential insurgents, the actual effect of aid is contingent upon its provision. Since this occurs at the leader's discretion, integration of the periphery seems to be the key factor. Incentives for integration may certainly vary – the broad conclusion is that integration seems crucial for reducing insurgency endurance. So, the direct relationship overserved may generally indicate that the areas where insurgencies reside in democracies are often poorly integrated into the state – and that the level of integration is a factor in democratic insurgency endurance.

In autocratic states, the quantitative conclusion did not find broad internal validity. Rather, the cases of Myanmar (Burma) and Indonesia suggest that an inverse relationship may only be observed when certain political factors come into play. An initial consideration here is the role that conditionalities play relative to paramilitaries. In 1970s Myanmar, paramilitary contraction

followed the government's acceptance of counter-narcotics conditionalities; their paramilitaries were heavily involved in opium cultivation. Human rights conditionalities also targeted paramilitarism in 1990s Indonesia. The added layer of complexity deals with the government's propensity to make aid-contingent policy concessions. For 1970s Myanmar, economic development aid comprised a very large part of the leader's available resources – even outstripping its military expenditures. Moreover, Ne Win and the Tatmadaw were concerned about the increasing power of relatively autonomous paramilitaries. The alignment of conditionalities and security concerns with the fact that the government had few resources beyond aid appears to have allowed for the inverse relationship to be realized. By contrast, Indonesia did not experience an inverse relationship between aid and paramilitary endurance throughout the duration of its autocracy. Suharto rejected aid receipts when human rights conditionalities were attached. One clear reason he did this was that aid comprised a far smaller portion of his available resources. In addition, Indonesia's winning coalition possessed far more control over its paramilitaries than Myanmar (Burma). And so, the role that aid plays in this relationship seems quite contingent on the leader and winning coalitions incentives – as well alternative resources available for the leader. Of course, the nature of selectorate rivalries also plays into this. Myanmar focused on balancing external threats with paramilitaries – sometimes even using allowing former adversaries to convert to paramilitaries. Indonesia used paramilitaries largely to balance competing factions within the winning coalition. The realization complicates the nature of the quantitative conclusion further.

It is noted that the research failed to generate determine significant relationships between aid and endurance in anocratic states – as well as for democratic paramilitaries and autocratic insurgencies. The anocracy issue probably stems from the chaotic nature of these regimes. Substantial variation in how consume aid certainly confuses the regression approach – on top of

substantial variation already existing in the receipts themselves. With respect to democratic paramilitaries and autocratic insurgencies, it is unclear where the lack of a relationship stems from – the qualitative analysis did not extend to these permutations of the model. Selectorate forces might be at play. Autocracies generally refrain from broadening their winning coalitions – and quelling an insurgency through goods distribution certainly requires doing this. Democracy generally avoid the use of paramilitaries altogether.

Some of the research's shortcomings certainly stem from data issues. For one, the use of a dichotomous dependent variable on group endurance is certainly a crude way to measure the impact of continuous aid receipts. A continuous dependent variable would be optimal – however finding credible and large records on paramilitary and insurgency membership (as one potential proxy for strength) is an extremely difficult endeavor. The use of dichotomous coding seemed to be the most accurate way of gauging annual group endurance. In addition, capturing military aid proved to be extremely difficult. The use of SIPRI's arms transfers data incurred a large amount of missing data. In addition, it accounts for transfers and not other forms of military assistance such as training.

This analysis also leads to several questions for future research. A clear question is on the determinants of democratic winning coalition integration. While this research identifies integration of the periphery as a key factor in democratic insurgency endurance, it does not propose or analyze specific determinants of leadership decision-making on this issue. Certainly, if aid were directed specifically towards reducing the endurance of democratic insurgencies, then the ideal policy would account for these incentives. Future research may also determine how to better measure the endurance of insurgent and paramilitary groups themselves. Of all the data sources used in identifying groups, only Carey's PGDM offers estimations on group membership. A more

complete data assembly on group membership over time could serve as a tremendous asset for the study of group endurance.

Summarily, the analysis undertaken by this research offers its strongest insight on the endurance of democratic insurgencies. Here, the quantitative analysis finds clear internal validity in the qualitative examination. Integration of the rebel-occupied periphery plays a very integral role in impacting the endurance of democratic insurgences – and indeed, ensuring the long-term stability of these regions. The relationship observed in this research offers valuable insight into the field of civil conflict and foreign aid. More broadly, the research serves as an affirmation on the selectorate theory's validity with respect to analyzing the impact of aid in recipient states – as well as the endurance of paramilitary and insurgent organizations.

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Pearson Correlations – Paramilitary Groups
(*. Correlation significant at .05 level, **. Correlation significant at .01 level) 2-tailed

Variable Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	Active Dummy Variable	Polity IV(2) Index	Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	Economic Development Aid Disbursements, millions, 2017 USD	GDP/capita	Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)	Corruption Perceptions Index	Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	Recipient State Population, thousands	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Ethnic Fractionalization
Active Dummy Variable	1 6032	*-.028 .036 5766	**.116 .000 4051	.022 .088 5774	**.077 .000 5705	**.054 .000 5705	*-.040 .016 3595	**.129 .000 5098	**.146 .000 5494	**-.090 .000 5954	**-.071 .000 5954
Polity IV(2) Index	*-.028 .036 5766	1 5766	**.144 .000 3915	**.113 .000 5554	**.168 .000 5470	**-.281 .000 5470	**.316 .000 3449	**.069 .000 4948	**.169 .000 5273	**-.350 .000 5688	**-.157 .000 5716
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	**.116 .000 4051	**.144 .000 3915	1 4051	**.110 .000 3844	**.044 .006 3949	**-.130 .000 3949	**.130 .000 2684	**.564 .000 3559	**.684 .000 3665	.001 .956 4018	**.055 .000 4033
Economic Development Aid Disbursements, millions, 2017 USD	.022 .088 5774	**.113 .000 5554	**.110 .000 3844	1 5774	**-.068 .000 5473	**.119 .000 5473	**-.221 .000 3395	**.113 .000 4928	**.191 .000 5322	**-.043 .001 5696	**.109 .000 5711
GDP/capita	**.077 .000 5705	**.168 .000 5470	**.044 .006 3949	**-.068 .000 5473	1 5705	*-.027 .039 5075	**.522 .000 3577	**.216 .000 4861	**-.072 .000 5192	**-.424 .000 5627	**-.236 .000 5627
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)	**-.054 .000 5705	**-.281 .000 5470	**-.130 .000 3949	**.199 .000 5473	*-.027 .039 5705	1 5705	**-.231 .000 3577	-.027 .060 4861	**-.152 .000 5192	**.390 .000 5627	**.431 .000 5627
Corruption Perceptions Index	*-.040 .016 3595	**.316 .000 3449	**.130 .000 2684	**-.221 .000 3395	**.522 .000 3577	**-.231 .000 3577	1 3595	**.073 .000 2925	-.009 .599 3112	**-.436 .000 3559	**-.134 .000 3580
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	**.129 .000 5098	**.069 .000 4948	**.564 .000 3559	**.113 .000 4928	**.216 .000 4861	-.027 .060 4861	**.073 .000 2925	1 5098	**.426 .000 5098	**-.230 .000 5035	**-.137 .000 5076
Recipient State Population, thousands	**-.146 .000 5494	**.169 .000 5273	**.684 .000 3665	**.191 .000 5322	**-.072 .000 5192	**-.152 .000 5192	-.009 .599 3112	**.426 .000 5098	1 5494	**.118 .000 5422	**.243 .000 5374
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	**-.090 .000 5954	**-.350 .000 5688	.001 .956 4018	**-.043 .001 5696	**-.424 .000 5627	**.390 .000 5627	**-.436 .000 3559	**-.230 .000 5035	**-.051 .000 5422	1 5954	**.401 .000 5824
Ethnic Fractionalization	**-.071 .000 5954	**-.157 .000 5716	**.055 .000 4033	**.109 .000 5711	**-.236 .000 5627	**-.431 .000 5627	**-.134 .000 5627	**-.137 .000 5076	**.118 .000 5422	**.401 .000 5876	1 5954

Pearson Correlations – Insurgent Groups
(*. Correlation significant at .05 level, **. Correlation significant at .01 level) 2-tailed

Variable Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	Active Dummy Variable	Polity IV(2) Index	Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	Economic Development Aid Disbursements, millions, 2017 USD	GDP/capita	Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)	Corruption Perceptions Index	Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	Recipient State Population, thousands	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Ethnic Fractionalization
Active Dummy Variable	1 5798	**.050 .000 5613	**.081 .000 3646	**.107 .000 5603	**.112 .000 5203	**-.069 .000 5203	**.129 .000 3085	**.114 .000 4761	**.142 .000 5165	**-.117 .000 5694	**-.092 .000 5772
Polity IV(2) Index	**.050 .000 5613	1 5613	**.370 .000 3544	**.288 .000 5458	**.211 .000 5055	**-.281 .000 5055	**.375 .000 5055	**.235 .000 4694	**.357 .000 5030	**-.207 .000 5509	.004 .760 5587
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	**.081 .000 3646	**.370 .000 3544	1 3646	**.207 .000 3518	.013 .441 3405	**-.247 .000 3405	**.192 .000 2250	**.655 .000 3084	**.756 .000 3221	**-.051 .002 3602	**.136 .000 3644
Economic Development Aid Disbursements, millions, 2017 USD	**.107 .000 5603	**.288 .000 5458	**.207 .000 3518	1 5603	.006 .647 5033	**.110 .000 5033	**-.074 .000 2950	**.243 .000 4645	**.246 .000 5038	**-.169 .000 5499	**.095 .000 5577
GDP/capita	**.112 .000 5203	**.211 .000 5055	.013 .441 3405	.006 .674 5033	1 5203	**-.128 .000 5203	**.721 .000 3009	**.222 .000 4360	**-.087 .000 4599	**-.365 .000 5099	**-.181 .000 5177
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)	**-.069 .000 5203	**-.281 .000 5055	**-.247 .000 3405	**.110 .000 5033	**-.128 .000 5203	1 5203	**-.354 .000 3009	**-.131 .000 4360	**-.199 .000 4599	**.163 .000 5099	**.368 .000 5177
Corruption Perceptions Index	**.129 .000 3085	**.375 .000 2980	**.192 .000 2250	**-.074 .000 2950	**.721 .000 3009	**-.354 .000 3009	1 3085	**.250 .000 2386	**.097 .000 2555	**-.426 .000 3037	**-.3180 .000 3077
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	**.114 .000 4761	**.235 .000 .4694	**.665 .000 3084	**.243 .000 4645	**.222 .000 4360	**-.131 .000 4360	**.250 .000 2386	1 4761	**.575 .000 4761	**-.313 .000 4677	**-.077 .000 4761
Recipient State Population, thousands	**.142 .000 5165	**.356 .000 5030	**.756 .000 3221	**.246 .000 5030	**-.087 .000 4599	**-.199 .000 4599	**.097 .000 2555	**.575 .000 4761	1 5165	**-.089 .000 5069	**.155 .000 5141
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	**-.117 .000 5694	**-.207 .000 5509	**-.051 .002 3602	**-.169 .000 5499	**-.365 .000 5099	**.163 .000 5099	**-.426 .000 3037	**-.313 .000 4677	**-.089 .000 5069	1 5694	**.366 .000 5668
Ethnic Fractionalization	**-.092 .000 5772	.004 .760 5587	**.136 .000 3644	**.095 .000 5577	**-.181 .000 5177	**.368 .000 5177	**.180 .000 3077	**-.077 .000 4761	**.155 .000 5141	**.366 .000 5668	1 5772

Democratic Paramilitaries

Paramilitaries	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	-5.6E-5	6.6E-5	-7.0E-5	6.9E-5	-1.09E-4	7.1E-5	-6.4E-5	7.4E-5	-4.1E-5	7.6E-5	6.3E-5	8.0E-5
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	7.1E-5	9.1E-5	-3.2E-5	9.7E-5	1.00E-5	1.08E-4	1.28E-4	1.14E-4	1.1E-4	1.13E-4	***3.17E-4	1.16E-4
GDP/capita	8.0E-6	2.6E-5	-4.0E-6	2.5E-6	9.0E-6	2.5E-5	2.5E-5	2.5E-5	3.3E-5	2.5E-5	*4.0E-5	2.4E-5
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	***-0.059	0.021	***-0.072	0.021	***-0.088	0.023	***-0.088	0.024	***-0.076	0.024	***-0.091	0.024
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	-1.0E-6	1.7E-5	-5.0E-6	1.7E-5	-1.0E-5	1.7E-5	-2.1E-5	1.7E-5	-2.7E-5	1.7E-5	**-4.1E-5	1.8E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	***2.0E-6	4.07E-7	***2.0E-6	4.16E-7	***2.00E-6	4.34E-7	***3.00E-6	4.53E-7	***3.00E-6	4.67E-7	***3.00E-6	4.89E-7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	0.001	0.004	8.0E-5	0.004	-0.001	0.004	-0.005	0.004	-0.003	0.004	-0.006	0.004
Ethnic Fractionalization	***-1.306	0.347	***-1.109	0.346	***-0.911	0.353	***-1.073	0.368	***-0.990	0.377	**-0.775	0.384
Constant	0.139	0.194	0.155	0.194	0.036	0.197	0.048	0.203	-0.098	0.205	-0.250	0.211
Percentage Correct		N: 1,599		N: 1,598		N: 1,562		N: 1,529		N: 1,485		N: 1,456
Block 0:	59.8%		60.2%		60.8%		61.7%		61.7%		62.0%	
Block 1:	66.9%		66.7%		66.8%		67.5%		67.3%		69.0%	
Improvement:	7.1		6.5		6.0		5.8		5.6		7.0	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Democratic Insurgencies

Insurgencies	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	*-9.1E-5	5.5E-5	-6.1E-5	5.9E-5	5.89E-7	5.9E-5	4.7E-5	6.1E-5	4.0E-5	6.1E-5	4.5E-5	6.3E-5
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	**2.52E-4	1.08E-4	***2.66E-4	1.08E-4	***3.51E-4	1.22E-4	***4.06E-4	1.31E-4	***4.68E-4	4.40E-4	***0.001	1.5E-4
GDP/capita	-7.0E-6	2.0E-5	2.0E-6	2.0E-5	-1.4E5	2.0E-5	7.0E-6	2.0E-5	4.0E-6	1.9E-5	1.2E-5	1.9E-5
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	-0.075	0.033	***-0.087	0.032	***-0.123	0.035	***-0.105	0.034	*-0.059	0.033	**-0.073	0.036
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	-1.5E-5	1.5E-5	-1.9E-5	1.5E-5	-2.0E-5	1.4E-5	-2.1E-5	1.4E-5	-1.5E-5	1.5E-5	7.69E-7	1.6E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	***1.0E-6	3.95E-7	***1.0E-6	3.99E-7	**9.09E-7	4.21E-7	**8.73E-7	4.48E-7	6.55E-7	4.61E-7	1.54E-7	4.98E-7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	***-0.017	0.004	0.008	0.017	***-0.020	0.004	***-0.020	0.004	***-0.016	0.004	***-0.019	0.005
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.411	0.508	**-9.09	4.29	0.688	0.523	0.572	0.535	0.432	0.537	0.711	0.561
Constant	0.232	0.233	5.29	4.81	0.203	0.239	0.077	0.243	-0.199	0.246	-0.305	0.261
Percentage Correct												
Block 0:	52.9%	N: 1,059	52.9%	N: 1,041	53.2%	N: 1,015	53.3%	N: 986	52.7%	N: 940	52.3%	N: 891
Block 1:	57.1%		57.2%		58.5%		59.3%		60.0%		61.2%	
Improvement:	4.2		4.3		5.3		6.0		7.3		8.9	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Anocratic Paramilitaries

Paramilitaries	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	1.73E-4	1.81E-4	2.18E-4	2.04E-4	1.24E-4	2.34E-4	-3.9E-5	2.39E-4	-3.3E-5	2.13E-4	-1.80E-5	2.36E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	-6.0E-5	6.5E-5	-5.1E-5	6.4E-5	-7.3E-5	5.4E-5	*-9.5E-5	4.9E-5	***-1.17E-4	4.8E-5	**-7.5E-5	3.5E-5
GDP/capita	-6.0E-5	7.8E-5	-7.6E-5	7.9E-5	-3.8E-5	7.2E-5	-6.3E-5	7.3E-5	-6.9E-5	7.4E-5	-7.4E-5	7.8E-5
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	4.30E-4	0.007	-0.002	0.007	-0.002	0.007	0.006	0.007	**0.014	0.007	0.012	0.008
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	4.0E-6	2.1E-5	3.0E-6	3.1E-5	2.0E-6	1.0E-5	3.0E-6	1.2E-5	3.0E-6	1.3E-5	1.0E-6	1.5E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	-9.96E-7	1.0E-6	-2.0E-6	1.0E-6	-1.0E-6	1.0E-6	-1.0E-6	1.0E-6	-1.62E-7	1.0E-6	-2.46E-7	1.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	**-0.008	0.003	*-0.006	0.003	-0.005	0.003	-0.005	0.004	*-0.006	0.003	-0.006	0.004
Ethnic Fractionalization	*-0.687	0.396	0.402	0.403	0.054	0.409	-0.067	0.412	-0.390	0.412	-0.457	0.422
Constant	0.024	0.276	0.186	0.279	0.054	0.409	0.390	0.293	0.456	0.299	0.500	0.314
Percentage Correct		N: 885		N: 879		N: 860		N: 824		N: 812		N: 766
Block 0:	53.7%		52.9%		53.4%		52.7%		53.6%		53.5%	
Block 1:	54.1%		54.5%		55.2%		54.5%		56.0%		55.1%	
Improvement:	0.4		1.6		1.8		1.8		2.4		1.6	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Anocratic Insurgencies

Insurgencies	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	1.67E-4	1.74E-4	7.0E-5	1.9E-4	-2.62E-4	2.30E-4	-3.49E-4	2.33E-4	-1.62E-4	2.09E-4	-9.90E-5	2.27E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	5.0E-6	8.7E-5	-5.0E-5	9.0E-5	-9.0E-6	6.0E-5	4.0E-6	5.5E-5	4.0E-6	5.3E-5	4.0E-6	3.4E-5
GDP/capita	7.0E-6	1.0E-4	2.8E-5	1.02E-4	3.0E-5	8.7E-5	5.0E-5	8.8E-5	1.7E-5	9.0E-5	8.0E-6	9.3E-5
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	0.009	0.006	0.010	0.007	*0.012	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.012	0.007
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	-2.2E-5	3.2E-5	-2.3E-5	4.2E-5	8.71E-7	1.4E-5	3.0E-6	1.7E-5	3.0E-6	1.9E-5	-4.81E-7	2.1E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	**4.0E-6	2.0E-6	***6.0E-6	2.0E-6	***7.0E-6	2.0E-6	***7.0E-6	2.0E-6	***6.0E-6	2.0E-6	***6.0E-6	2.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.004	-4.71E-4	0.004	3.42E-4	0.004	-2.99E-4	0.004	-0.003	0.004
Ethnic Fractionalization	***-1.117	0.368	***-1.104	0.372	***-1.100	0.379	***-1.098	0.381	***-1.170	0.382	***-1.096	0.399
Constant	*-0.541	0.297	*-0.537	0.301	*-0.563	0.299	-0.510	0.306	-0.393	0.318	-0.444	0.388
Percentage Correct		N: 921		N: 887		N: 885		N: 844		N: 822		N: 781
Block 0:	67.6%		67.9%		68.4%		67.8%		67.8%		68.6%	
Block 1:	68.1%		67.9%		68.4%		67.8%		67.8%		68.6%	
Improvement:	0.5		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Autocratic Paramilitaries

Paramilitaries	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	-2.44E-4	1.83E-4	-2.65E-4	2.13E-4	-9.1E-5	2.28E-4	-1.0E-5	2.55E-4	4.84E-4	3.65E-4	3.41E-4	3.66E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	***-0.001	2.36E-4	***-0.001	2.94E-4	***-0.001	3.36E-4	***-0.001	3.56E-4	***-0.001	3.91E-4	***-0.002	0.001
GDP/capita	***-3.69E-4	8.4E-5	***-4.2E-4	9.8E-5	***-0.001	1.4E-4	***-0.001	3.56E-4	***-0.001	-1.72E-4	***-0.001	1.84E-4
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	-0.012	0.011	*-0.025	0.013	-0.023	0.017	**-0.039	0.017	-0.026	-0.020	-0.025	0.028
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	***2.18E-4	4.1E-5	***2.51E-4	4.8E-5	***3.11E-4	6.2E-5	***3.18E-4	6.70E-5	***3.16E-4	7.2E-5	***3.29E-4	7.60E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	-2.0E-6	1.0E-6	-2.0E-6	2.0E-6	**-5.0E-6	2.0E-6	*-4.0E-6	2.0E-6	*-5.0E-6	3.0E-5	-3.0E-6	6.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	***-0.017	0.004	***-0.018	0.005	***-0.023	0.828	***-0.019	0.006	***-0.028	0.007	***-0.035	0.008
Ethnic Fractionalization	**-1.297	0.603	-0.828	0.695	-0.844	0.828	0.006	0.908	0.005	1.097	0.958	1.492
Constant	***2.237	0.513	***2.667	0.552	***3.052	0.654	***2.616	0.688	***2.750	0.776	**2.359	0.944
Percentage Correct		N: 619		N: 547		N: 471		N: 433		N: 377		N: 323
Block 0:	63.2%		60.5%		58.6%		57.3%		55.4%		54.2%	
Block 1:	80.1%		81.9%		82.6%		83.1%		84.1%		85.4%	
Improvement:	16.9		21.4		24.0		25.8		28.7		31.2	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Autocratic Insurgencies

Insurgencies	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	1.13E-4	1.66E-4	5.7E-5	1.7E-4	4.50E-5	1.82E-4	6.50E-5	1.87E-4	-1.1E-5	2.1E-4	-1.27E-4	2.24E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	-1.7E-4	1.73E-4	-1.44E-4	1.72E-4	1.90E-5	1.64E-4	5.20E-5	1.58E-4	4.20E-5	1.66E-4	1.40E-5	1.80E-4
GDP/capita	4.8E-5	6.3E-5	-5.6E-5	6.6E-5	-8.5E-5	8.9E-5	-1.15E-4	9.2E-5	-7.2E-5	9.5E-5	-1.03E-4	1.00E-4
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	***-0.028	0.011	**-0.029	0.012	*-0.023	0.012	-0.014	0.012	-0.020	0.013	-0.018	0.015
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	1.0E-6	2.3E-5	2.0E-6	2.4E-5	1.2E-5	2.4E-5	1.30E-5	2.5E-5	-2.0E-6	2.5E-5	2.3E-5	2.6E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	-1.0E-6	1.0E-6	-1.0E-6	1.0E-6	-2.0E-6	1.0E-6	-2.0E-6	1.0E-6	--2.0E-6	1.0E-6	-2.0E-6	1.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	***-0.009	0.004	***-0.010	0.004	-0.005	0.005	-0.007	-0.005	-0.005	0.006	-0.009	0.006
Ethnic Fractionalization	**1.126	0.563	*0.962	0.584	***1.408	0.663	1.006	0.696	0.826	0.779	0.799	0.854
Constant	-0.194	0.388	-0.049	0.419	-0.621	0.511	-0.405	0.521	-0.363	0.779	-0.192	0.618
Percentage Correct		N: 571		N: 524		N: 452		N: 426		N: 395		N: 371
Block 0:	67.6%		67.6%		66.2%		65.7%		66.1%		67.4%	
Block 1:	67.6%		67.6%		66.4%		65.7%		66.1%		64.4%	
Improvement:	0.0		0.0		0.4		0.0		0.0		0.0	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Democratic Paramilitaries – Corruption Perceptions Index Control

Paramilitaries	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	-1.3E-5	9.5E-5	5.2E-5	1.03E-4	-8.90E-7	1.02E-4	9.40E-5	1.02E-4	8.5E-5	9.8E-5	1.13E-4	9.50E-5
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	1.32E-4	1.05E-4	-4.9E-5	1.12E-4	-1.18E-4	1.23E-4	1.9E-5	1.27E-4	-4.5E-5	1.25E-4	*2.04E-4	1.23E4
GDP/capita	4.9E-5	3.4E-5	*5.8E-5	3.3E-5	**6.4E-5	3.2E-5	***9.5E-5	3.2E-5	***9.1E-5	3.0E-5	***9.2E-5	2.9E-5
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	***-0.070	0.025	***-0.078	0.025	***-0.082	0.025	***-0.088	0.027	***-0.081	0.026	***-0.089	0.027
Corruption Perceptions Index	*-0.165	0.097	**-0.241	0.094	**-0.246	0.096	***-0.362	0.102	***-0.319	0.098	***-0.282	0.097
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	**-4.2E-5	2.1E-5	**-4.5E-5	2.1E-5	*-3.9E-5	2.1E-5	**-5.0E-5	2.0E-5	**-4.8E-5	2.0E-5	**-4.8E-5	2.0E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	***3.00E-6	5.11E-7	***3.00E-6	5.03E-7	***3.00E-6	5.01E-7	***3.00E-6	5.06E-7	***3.00E-6	5.01E-7	***3.0E-6	5.07E-7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	-3.96E-4	0.005	-1.12E-4	0.005	0.002	0.005	-0.005	0.006	-3.92E-4	0.005	-0.003	0.005
Ethnic Fractionalization	***-1.293	0.420	***-1.119	0.408	**-0.992	0.402	***-1.180	0.415	***-1.080	0.417	**-1.005	0.412
Constant	0.377	0.344	**0.687	0.341	*0.629	0.351	***1.050	0.374	**0.807	0.358	0.563	0.358
Percentage Correct		N: 1,287		N: 1,324		N: 1,327		N: 1,336		N: 1,335		N: 1,348
Block 0:	62.4%		61.9%		61.6%		62.2%		61.6%		61.6%	
Block 1:	70.2%		68.6%		68.3%		68.7%		68.2%		68.3%	
Improvement:	7.8		6.7		6.7		6.5		6.6		6.7	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Democratic Insurgencies – Corruption Perceptions Index Control

Insurgencies	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	-4.2E-5	7.5E-5	-3.4E-5	8.9E-5	2.2E-5	9.4E-5	4.9E-5	9.7E-5	-2.1E-5	9.3E-5	3.1E-5	8.4E-5
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	***4.11E-4	1.36E-4	**3.20E-4	1.29E-4	***4.57E-4	1.48E-4	***0.001	1.57E-4	***0.001	1.58E-4	***0.001	1.62E-4
GDP/capita	-4.5E-5	3.9E-5	-1.7E-5	3.5E-5	-4.0E-5	3.4E-5	-4.0E-6	3.1E-5	-6.0E-6	2.7E-6	-6.0E-6	2.6E-5
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	**-0.091	0.039	***-0.096	0.037	***-0.108	0.038	***-0.115	0.038	**-0.071	0.035	*-0.067	0.037
Corruption Perceptions Index	**0.333	0.165	0.181	0.150	*0.253	0.150	0.029	0.143	0.079	0.134	0.013	0.136
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	*-3.7E-5	2.0E-5	-2.9E-5	2.0E-5	-3.2E-5	2.0E-5	-2.2E-5	1.8E-5	-9.0E-6	1.8E-5	1.0E-6	1.8E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	1.00E-6	4.86E-7	**1.00E-6	4.75E-7	*9.32E-7	4.79E-7	7.12E-7	4.93E-7	6.20E-7	5.01E-7	9.1E-8	5.2E-7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	-0.010	0.005	**-0.012	0.005	**-0.014	0.005	***-0.016	0.005	**-0.012	0.005	**-0.014	0.005
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.271	0.653	0.220	0.629	0.304	0.625	0.405	0.618	0.069	0.607	0.293	0.613
Constant	-0.980	0.466	-0.459	0.441	-0.610	0.456	-0.093	0.453	-0.313	0.439	-0.338	0.447
Percentage Correct		N: 752		N: 773		N: 783		N: 802		N: 799		N: 806
Block 0:	57.1%		51.9%		51.6%		51.9%		51.1%		50.9%	
Block 1:	59.0%		58.2%		59.6%		60.5%		61.2%		60.8%	
Improvement:	1.9		6.3		8.0		8.6		10.1		9.9%	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Anocratic Paramilitaries – Corruption Perceptions Index

Paramilitaries	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	3.69E-4	2.54E-4	4.21E-4	2.72E-4	1.63E-4	3.03E-4	-7.50E-5	3.23E-4	-2.45E-4	2.65E-4	-3.53E-4	3.32E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	-1.11E-4	7.20E-5	-7.3E-5	6.8E-5	-6.6E-5	5.6E-5	-5.6E-5	5.3E-5	*-9.4E-5	5.2E-5	*-6.5E-5	3.8E-5
GDP/capita	1.18E-4	1.42E-4	1.53E-4	1.41E-4	1.18E-4	1.35E-4	4.20E-5	1.35E-4	-6.0E-6	9.9E-5	2.00E-6	1.04E-4
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	0.010	0.011	0.002	0.011	-0.004	0.011	-0.001	0.011	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.011
Corruption Perceptions Index	0.197	0.177	0.077	0.184	0.229	0.175	*0.293	0.172	0.197	0.167	0.150	0.173
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	**-1.65E-4	8.00E-5	**-1.65E-4	7.90E-5	-7.8E-5	7.3E-5	-2.6E-5	7.7E-5	3.0E-6	1.3E-5	2.0E-6	1.6E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	1.0E-6	2.0E-6	-2.34E-7	2.0E-6	-3.18E-7	2.00E-6	-4.16E-8	2.00E-6	2.0E-6	2.0E-6	2.0E-6	2.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	-0.005	0.005	-0.004	0.005	-4.90E-4	0.005	-0.002	0.006	-0.008	0.005	-0.007	0.005
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.561	0.550	0.801	0.570	0.749	0.573	0.797	0.591	0.917	0.592	0.619	0.601
Constant	-0.813	0.635	-0.596	0.639	*-1.133	0.631	*-1.257	0.657	-0.958	0.651	-0.767	0.661
Percentage Correct		N: 531		N: 529		N: 536		N: 522		N: 546		N: 536
Block 0:	53.7%		53.3%		54.5%		54.6%		56.2%		56.7%	
Block 1:	55.6%		58.4%		59.3%		57.9%		59.5%		58.6%	
Improvement:	1.9		5.1		4.8		3.3		3.3		1.9	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Anocratic Insurgencies – Corruption Perceptions Index

Insurgencies	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	1.12E-4	2.21E-4	-5.9E-5	2.34E-4	*-0.001	3.09E-4	***-0.001	3.14E-4	-1.88E-4	2.59E-4	-2.67E-4	3.03E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	-9.9E-5	1.1E-4	-1.31E-4	1.15E-4	-1.8E-5	7.2E-5	-1.3E-5	6.5E-5	2.4E-5	5.8E-5	1.6E-5	3.6E-5
GDP/capita	-2.26E-4	1.75E-4	-1.69E-4	1.76E-4	-1.37E-4	1.59E-4	-1.19E-4	1.59E-4	6.1E-5	1.10E-4	5.8E-5	1.11E-4
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	0.009	0.010	0.004	0.010	0.007	0.010	-0.004	0.010	-0.009	0.010	-0.004	0.010
Corruption Perceptions Index	0.173	0.185	0.071	0.201	0.113	0.191	0.111	0.176	-0.106	0.174	-0.114	0.183
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	1.25E-4	8.00E-5	1.23E-4	8.30E-5	*1.42E-4	7.9E-5	**1.76E-4	8.5E-5	4.0E-6	1.9E-5	3.0E-6	2.3E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	**6.0E-6	3.0E-6	**7.0E-6	3.0E-6	***7.0E-6	3.0E-6	**6.0E-6	3.0E-6	**5.0E-6	2.0E-6	**6.0E-6	3.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	-0.002	0.007	-0.002	0.007	-0.001	0.007	0.002	0.008	8.0E-5	0.007	-0.001	0.007
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.162	0.554	-0.245	0.574	-0.669	0.565	-0.797	0.585	-0.952	0.597	*-1.039	0.608
Constant	**-1.348	0.663	-0.929	0.690	-0.971	0.673	-0.836	0.658	-0.094	0.658	-0.090	0.679
Percentage Correct		N: 594		N: 563		N: 553		N: 546		N: 531		N: 527
Block 0:	69.4%		68.7%		68.4%		67.9%		67.6%		67.9%	
Block 1:	69.7%		70.5%		68.9%		69.2%		67.4%		68.3%	
Improvement:	0.3		1.8		0.5		1.3		-0.2		0.4	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Autocratic Paramilitaries – Corruption Perceptions Index

Paramilitaries	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	2.71E-4	4.85E-4	3.39E-4	0.001	9.1E-5	0.001	2.69E-4	0.001	0.001	0.001	1.49E-4	3.94E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	-0.001	0.001	**-0.002	0.001	**-0.001	5.42E-4	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
GDP/capita	***-0.001	2.20E-4	***-0.001	2.34E-4	***-0.001	2.20E-4	***-0.001	2.16E-4	***-0.001	2.28E-4	***-0.001	2.27E-4
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	0.015	0.027	0.001	0.030	0.002	0.032	-0.003	0.033	0.002	0.029	-0.004	0.034
Corruption Perceptions Index	**-0.731	0.368	-0.459	0.382	-0.458	0.421	*-0.691	0.414	**-0.856	0.404	-0.639	0.423
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	***4.04E-4	9.1E-5	***3.84E-4	9.8E-5	***3.86E-4	9.6E-5	***3.71E-4	9.5E-5	***3.8E-4	9.4E-5	***3.67E-4	9.7E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	**-9.0E-6	4.0E-6	*-7.0E-6	4.0E-6	**-8.0E-6	4.0E-6	-7.0E-6	5.0E-6	*-8.0E-6	5.0E-6	-6.0E-6	5.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	***-0.035	0.012	***-0.035	0.011	***-0.035	0.011	***-0.033	0.011	***-0.034	0.011	***-0.030	0.012
Ethnic Fractionalization	**-2.945	1.206	*-2.232	1.294	-1.630	1.410	-1.028	1.640	-0.745	1.565	-0.579	1.733
Constant	***5.873	1.441	***5.496	1.397	***4.890	1.371	***4.639	1.430	***4.395	1.437	**3.844	1.530
Percentage Correct		N: 224		N: 224		N: 223		N: 227		N: 223		N: 221
Block 0:	53.1%		51.8%		51.1%		52.0%		51.1%		51.1%	
Block 1:	83.9%		84.8%		85.2%		84.1%		84.8%		84.2%	
Improvement:	30.8		33.0		34.1		32.1		33.7		33.1	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Autocratic Insurgencies – Corruption Perceptions Index

Insurgencies	Base Year		1 Yr Lag		2 Yr Lag		3 Yr Lag		4 Yr Lag		5 Yr Lag	
	β	**S.E.**	**B**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**	**β**	**S.E.**
Arms Transfers, millions, 2017 USD	1.69E-4	3.90E-4	3.72E-4	3.19E-4	3.84E-4	3.07E-4	3.29E-4	3.20E-4	3.07E-4	3.04E-4	5.80E-5	3.09E-4
Economic Development Aid, millions, 2017 USD	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	4.67E-4	*0.001	4.70E-4	**0.001	3.68E-4	**0.001	2.92E-4
GDP/capita	-1.39E-4	1.41E-4	-1.33E-4	1.38E-4	-1.23E-4	1.38E-4	-1.71E-4	1.39E-4	-5.00E-5	1.41E-4	-7.30E-5	1.42E-4
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)	-0.012	0.023	-0.008	0.023	-0.015	0.023	-9.90E-5	0.022	-0.021	0.022	-0.020	0.022
Corruption Perceptions Index	***-1.238	0.370	***-1.359	0.370	***-1.408	0.362	***-1.616	0.390	***-1.797	0.416	***-1.566	0.403
Recipient State Military Expenditures, millions, 2017 USD	6.0E-6	3.7E-5	6.0E-6	3.8E-5	5.0E-6	3.7E-5	1.1E-5	3.8E-5	1.2E-5	3.4E-5	1.4E-5	3.3E-5
Recipient State Population, thousands	-2.0E-6	2.0E-6	-2.0E-6	2.0E-6	-2.0E-6	2.0E-6	-3.0E-6	2.0E-6	-2.0E-6	2.0E-6	-1.0E-6	2.0E-6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	***-0.036	0.013	***-0.036	0.013	***-0.037	0.013	***-0.042	0.013	***-0.036	0.013	***-0.035	0.013
Ethnic Fractionalization	**3.144	1.289	***3.291	1.284	***3.587	1.329	**3.063	1.268	***3.768	1.425	**3.220	1.437
Constant	*2.305	1.244	*2.319	1.259	*2.386	1.298	**3.162	1.244	**2.840	1.314	**2.703	1.296
Percentage Correct		N: 237		N: 234		N: 233		N: 235		N: 231		N: 227
Block 0:	67.1%		66.7%		66.5%		66.4%		67.5%		67.8%	
Block 1:	67.5%		67.9%		67.8%		68.5%		70.1%		70.5%	
Improvement:	0.4		1.2		1.3		2.1		2.6		2.7	

*(.10) **(.05) ***(.01)

Colombian Poverty Rates and Percentage Point Poverty Reductions – Departmental Averages

- FARC – FARC-occupied department average.
- ELN – ELN-occupied department average.
- Non: Unoccupied department average.
- State Sample: Average of sampled departmental rates.
- DANE: Colombian Department of Statistic's inferred rates.

Population Living below the Poverty Line					
Year	FARC	ELN	Non	State Sample	DANE
2002	52.075	56.3	55.31333	55.07083	49.7
2003	52.525	53.6	53.02	53.31667	48
2004	52.375	53.22	53.10667	53.2375	47.4
2005	52.125	50.56	50.22	50.9	45
2008	47.825	47.18	50.58	49.85	42
2009	47.75	42.98	49.36	48.29583	40.3
2010	43.225	40.5	47.38667	45.78333	37.2
2011	41.025	35.06	43.24667	41.525	34.1
2012	41.6	33.56	42.28667	40.65	32.7
Percentage Point Changes					
2003	0.45	-2.7	-2.29333	-1.75417	-1.7
2004	-0.15	-0.38	0.086667	-0.07917	-0.6
2005	-0.25	-2.66	-2.88667	-2.3375	-2.4
2009	-0.075	-4.2	-1.22	-1.55417	-1.7
2010	-4.525	-2.48	-1.97333	-2.5125	-3.1
2011	-2.2	-5.44	-4.14	-4.25833	-3.1
2012	0.575	-1.5	-0.96	-0.875	-1.4

Source: National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). "Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad 2012, por Departamentos."

Colombian Extreme Poverty Rates and Percentage Point Poverty Reductions – Departmental Averages

- FARC – FARC-occupied department average.
- ELN – ELN-occupied department average.
- Non: Unoccupied department average.
- State Sample: Average of sampled departmental rates.
- DANE: Colombian Department of Statistic's inferred rates.

Population Living in Extreme Poverty					
Year	FARC	ELN	Non	State Sample	DANE
2002	21.275	24	21.01333	21.45417	17.7
2003	22.525	19.66	18.66	19.35	15.7
2004	21.3	19.12	18.10667	18.63333	14.8
2005	22.45	16.98	16.67333	17.525	13.8
2008	22.275	19.82	22.44	21.74583	16.4
2009	20.1	15.42	20.18667	19.15417	14.4
2010	15.9	12.08	18.81333	16.87917	12.3
2011	15.25	10	15.95333	14.45417	10.6
2012	17.05	9.52	15.25333	14.21667	10.4
Percentage Point Changes					
2003	1.25	-4.34	-2.35333	-2.10417	-2
2004	-1.225	-0.54	-0.55333	-0.71667	-0.9
2005	1.15	-2.14	-1.43333	-1.10833	-1
2009	-2.175	-4.4	-2.25333	-2.59167	-2
2010	-4.2	-3.34	-1.37333	-2.275	-2.1
2011	-0.65	-2.08	-2.86	-2.425	-1.7
2012	1.8	-0.48	-0.7	-0.2375	-0.2

Source: National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). "Pobreza Monetaria y Desigualdad 2012, por Departamentos."

Peruvian Poverty Rates and Percentage Point Poverty Reductions – Regional Averages

- State: Average across all geographic regions.

Population Living below the Poverty Line							
Year	Sierra	Rural Sierra	Amazon	Rural Amazon	Coast	Rural Coast	State
2009	48.9	71.0	47.1	64.4	20.7	46.5	49.8
2010	45.2	66.7	39.8	55.5	19.8	38.3	44.2
2011	41.5	62.3	35.2	47.0	17.8	37.1	40.2
2012	38.5	58.8	32.5	46.1	16.5	31.6	37.3
2013	34.7	52.9	31.2	42.6	15.7	29.0	34.3
2014	33.8	50.4	30.4	41.5	14.3	29.2	33.3
Percentage Point Changes							
2010	-3.7	-4.3	-7.2	-9.0	-0.9	-8.2	-5.5
2011	-3.7	-4.4	-4.6	-8.5	-2.0	-1.2	-4.1
2012	-3.0	-3.5	-2.7	-0.9	-1.3	-5.5	-2.8
2013	-3.7	-5.9	-1.3	-3.6	-0.8	-2.6	-3.0
2014	-0.9	-2.5	-0.7	-1.1	-1.4	0.2	-1.1

Source: Instituto Nacional De Estadistica E Informatica (INEI). “Población en situación de pobreza extrema, ámbitos geográficos.”

Peruvian Extreme Poverty Rates and Percentage Point Poverty Reductions – Regional Averages

- State: Average across all geographic regions.

Population Living in Extreme Poverty							
Year	Sierra	Rural Sierra	Amazon	Rural Amazon	Coast	Rural Coast	State
2009	20.06	34.05	15.78	28.59	1.50	7.80	18.0
2010	15.80	27.59	12.50	21.44	1.50	6.70	14.3
2011	13.77	24.56	8.96	14.67	1.20	8.30	11.9
2012	13.27	23.98	8.21	14.19	1.10	4.90	10.9
2013	10.46	19.00	6.90	12.11	0.80	5.90	9.2
2014	9.24	16.95	6.08	10.51	0.90	9.00	8.8
Percentage Point Changes							
2010	-4.3	-6.5	-3.3	-7.1	0.0	-1.1	-3.7
2011	-2.0	-3.0	-3.5	-6.8	-0.3	1.6	-2.3
2012	-0.5	-0.6	-0.8	-0.5	-0.1	-3.4	-1.0
2013	-2.8	-5.0	-1.3	-2.1	-0.3	1.0	-1.7
2014	-1.2	-2.0	-0.8	-1.6	0.1	3.1	-0.4

Source: Instituto Nacional De Estadistica E Informatica (INEI). “Población en situación de pobreza extrema, ámbitos geográficos.”