An Analysis of Five Theories of Cold War Origins

Angela Reed Vaira
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Mr. Robert H. Larson
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PREFACE

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the period of the Grand Alliance of World War II and in the post-war years have been the subject of numerous discussions and studies in recent years. Historians from all points of the political spectrum have written their accounts and given their interpretations and analyses of the events of this period. Until about ten years ago, however, there was virtual agreement among the interpreters of the origins of the Cold War. Most historians held to what is now known as the traditional viewpoint. Within the last decade, as tensions seemed to ease between the two nations, dissent in the historical interpretations appeared, in a wave of revisionist accounts of the Cold War origins. Since that time, debate has been continuing. Traditional historians have gone to great lengths to prove that the breakdown of relations resulting in the Cold War can be blamed entirely on the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union. Revisionist writers have matched these efforts with work of their own to shift the guilt to the West, especially the United States and its wartime and post-war diplomatic inadequacies and blunders. Equally convincing on the surface are the arguments of the economic determinists who have tied all foreign policies of the period to economic motivations, especially United States imperialist aims. In addition, there are those who cannot be classified in the above three categories, but who
feel that the Cold War was the inevitable result of such factors as power vacuums created by the war or the emergence of competing super powers.

The purpose of the present paper is not to add to the already uncountable number of histories and interpretations of the events and diplomatic intricacies leading to the Cold War. Rather, the object is to analyse the general theories of representative historians by examining their accounts of major events of Cold War history. It is not within the scope of this study to prove one interpretation correct nor to disprove another, for this would require revision to a detailed analysis of all that happened during the late and post-war years. Neither is it the object to synthesize a personal interpretation to emerge as the absolute truth. Weaknesses and strong points in the histories examined will, however, be brought to light.

The works of five historians have been chosen as representative of the categories mentioned above. They are: Herbert Feis' *Between War and Peace* and *From Trust to Terror*, examples of the traditional viewpoint; The Cold War and its Origins by D.P. Fleming, the revisionist writer; Gabriel Kolko's *The Politics of War* and *The Limits of Power* giving us a clear picture of an economic interpretation; Louis Halle's power vacuum theory defense in *The Cold War as History*; and two works by Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* and *The Rivals*,...
which attribute the Cold War to Great Power politics. After reading these works, I selected nine points of disagreement which I felt were indicative of the differences in the interpretations. These nine points can be placed under three major headings which constitute the three sections of the paper. The first, that of basic interpretations, will present an overview of each writer's theory of Cold War history by examining his viewpoint on such questions as the starting date, the nature of the conflict and who was at fault, and the influence of domestic factors and the effect of atomic power on the formulation of policy. The second section deals with the conflicts arising in Germany, Poland, and the other East European nations during and after the war. In the final section, two major United States policies, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, are related to the historians' interpretations of events.

On none of these questions is an attempt made to cover every detail or every issue of disagreement. Keeping in mind the purpose and limited scope of this study, each issue is discussed in generalized form as it shows the traditional, revisionist, etc. point of view. As we examine each issue, we will see how the general theory held by the historian colors or shapes differing interpretations of the same set of facts and events.

BASIC INTERPRETATIONS
Nature of the Conflict and Placement of Guilt

The question of whether the Cold War was inevitable or
whether someone was to blame for bringing it about is the
major issue which distinguishes one interpretation from another.
The placement of guilt is very closely tied to the historian's
view of the conflict as either economic, political, or ideologi-
cal. For this reason, an examination of the questions of the
nature of the conflict and the placement of guilt will give
an overview of each historian's theory.

Herbert Feis viewed the Soviet Union as being an
inherently aggressive and autocratic nation which attempted
to grab as much as it could for itself. For Feis, then, the
Cold War conflict had a strictly political nature. Communist
ideology did not figure into the question significantly, since
the expansionistic traits were present throughout Russian as
well as Soviet history. Mr. Feis believed that the Cold War
resulted from the Soviets' unrelenting drive for quite selfish
and unreasonable national interests. While he did not condemn
the concept of striving for national interest per se, for by
doing so he would have condemned any nation, even his own, he
did place guilt on the Soviet Union for defining their national
interests so unreasonably. The West, then, was, by implication,
being quite fair and reasonable in their demands.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, we find D.F. Fleming
advancing the belief that the conflict was largely an ideologi-
cal one, with capitalism and the democratic way pitted against
communism. As a revisionist, Fleming laid the blame to the United
States for the cold relations with the Soviet Union. From the
birth of the Soviet state, the United States had ostracized and downgraded it as much as possible because it felt that the democratic way of life was greatly threatened by communism. Fleming went on to say that the United States was in error in believing the communist ideology to be such a threat since there was no communist threat. He stated also that the United States was wrong to take a hostile and hard-line stance against the Soviet Union. Fleming maintained that it was only American hostility which created mistrust and defensive goals in the Soviet mind. In the face of Western hostility, he continued, the Soviet Union had legitimate national security needs such as a buffer zone to defend its western border. Further showing the United States to be in the wrong, Fleming judged the American refusal to recognize the Soviet need for a buffer zone to be unreasonable and unjustifiable.

Neither Herbert Feis nor D.F. Fleming considered economic factors of importance to the conflict. Gabriel Kolko, however, saw economic considerations as the heart of the Cold War problem. According to Mr. Kolko, tensions and conflicts arose when the American picture of the ideal post-war international economic configuration did not coincide with the goals of the Soviet Union with regard to its own economic development with the aid of Eastern Europe. In Kolko's view, the United States had early in the war determined to create a post-war world economy based on liberal capitalist principles of private enterprise and free trade. The United States wanted free access
to all nations for trade and investment and desired healthy economies for export markets to be established. These ideas conflicted with the Soviet goal of rapid reconstruction of their own economy to the point of self-sufficiency, a goal which is anathema to liberal capitalist ideals of mutual interdependence and free foreign trade. Political and ideological considerations were discounted almost entirely by Kolko, who even maintained that several United States policies would have been unchanged without the existence of the Soviet Union.

Louis Halle conceived of the problems of postwar relations almost entirely as the result of a need to fill the power vacuum left by the defeat of Germany in World War II. Halle indicted neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, for he saw the conflict as an inevitable attempt by both nations to maintain the world balance of power which had been shaken by the elimination of Germany as a dominant factor. According to Halle, ideology was immaterial, for the rush to fill the power vacuum would have occurred even if the United States and the U.S.S.R. shared the same ideology. Whenever the two nations rushed to fill the same vacuum, conflict resulted, culminating in the Cold War status of relations. Halle saw the political nature of the struggle extending to the clash of national interest goals established by both parties. He differed from either Feis or Fleming, however, in that a nation should not be condemned for honestly defining its national interests as it perceives them, even though another nation
may feel them to be unjustified. One nation cannot judge for another what its interests are to be.

Similar to Halle’s viewpoint in some respects is that of Adam Ulam. Like Halle, Ulam did not charge either the United States or Russia with bringing about the Cold War single-handedly. However, Ulam saw the conflict as arising from the inevitable clashes and disagreements which resulted from the emergence of the two Great Powers after the war. As the two remaining strong nations emerged from the war and attempted to carve out their respective places in the world, confrontations were the natural result. Because these nations were destined to play the roles of super powers, neither could be condemned for their actions. Mutual suspicion and lack of communication on the same wave length were, for Ulam, also important factors in the nature and cause of the conflict. He found that the Soviets were inherently mistrustful of western capitalists and found it necessary to maintain a closed and mysterious society. This ominous mystery led to reciprocated suspicion in the minds of Americans. Because of the incomprehension by each system of the other, agreements in form only and numerous misunderstandings resulted.

Like Halle, and in accordance with his own political theory of Cold War origins, Ulam did not count ideology as an important factor in U.S. - Soviet relations. Since the conflict can be traced to the inevitable clashes resulting from the super power status of both nations, the same conflicts would
have arisen had they shared the same ideology. To be sure, during the war, while Britain was still a Great Power vying for a post-war position of major influence, she and the United States clashed often, even though they adhered to similar ideologies. When Britain lost her great power status, the possible cause of a Cold War between the United States and Britain was eliminated. Such a Cold War, however, would perhaps never have reached the dimensions of the Soviet - American one. With Britain no longer a Great Power, the U.S.S.R. and the United States were left as the only powers continually clashing in their efforts to achieve the greatest possible influence in post-war affairs. For Ulam, economic considerations had little importance of themselves, but rather played a supporting role under the heading of Great Power politics.

Herbert Feis' was obviously a true traditionalist stand; the West was in the right and the U.S.S.R. was to blame for bringing on the Cold War. The weakness in Mr. Feis' argument is the vague concept of and fine dividing line between reasonable and unreasonable national interest goals. There are two sides to each issue, and while the United States felt that its demands were justified and the Soviet's goals aggressive, the Soviet Union probably felt justified in defining national interests as they perceived them and believed the West to be unreasonable in refusing them. Can we believe Mr. Feis that the United States knew better than the Soviets what were the true needs of the U.S.S.R. at that time?
Aside from the fact that the United States could hardly have felt anything but threatened in view of the Soviet propaganda against the West and the predictions of imminent destruction of the capitalist system, Fleming's account has missed the point that it was unlikely that the Soviets would have been trusting and openly cooperative with nations which, according to their doctrine, were their natural enemies. This appears to be a weak link in Mr. Fleming's chain of beliefs.

By ignoring political and ideological factors, Kolko has severely weakened his theory. If seen only in the light of economic motivations, numerous U.S. policies make little or no sense. For example, if only economic factors matter, why did not the United States institute the European Recovery Program sooner, or why cut off loans to nations which needed them in order to rebuild in a effort to force a change in the composition of the government? Various questions such as these were left unanswered by Mr. Kolko's economic interpretation of the Cold War beginnings.

Halle and Ulam have taken historical interpretative stands with which it is difficult to find fault. By not assigning guilt, they did not fall into the trap of condemning a nation or its leaders for not being able know through foresight that which we can see twenty or so years later, only through hindsight. Nor have they attempted to play God by determining for each nation what is good, reasonable, and justified with
respect to it national interests.

Chronology

The date chosen as the actual sprouting point of the Cold War relations, and the tracing of the roots growing before this eruption should support the interpretation advanced by each historian. By assigning a specific date, the writer is naming a certain event happening at that time as the immediate cause. From this position, it is easy to assign guilt to the party responsible for that event. The position of giving only gradual renascent to the Cold War gives more latitude for interpretation of its origins. It is therefore necessary to look at the question of Cold War chronology to get a broader picture of the historical theories.

Because he conceived of the Cold War as the result of Soviet unreasonableness, Feis dated the roots of the conflict in discussions and conferences during the war. He saw the Cold War as having definitely sprouted in 1945, after victory, when it was no longer possible to postpone solutions to post-war problems. Since the Soviets would not tone down their unreasonable national-interest demands, the Allies had tried to avoid conflict during the war by leaving settlement of important questions until after victory, in hopes that the Soviet Union would then listen to reason. When victory came and the Soviet stubbornness continued, the Cold War was born. Feis' Cold War chronology was, in this way, determined by his general theory.
In line with his placement of guilt with the United States, D.F. Fleming asserted that Cold War roots grew during the period of forced ostracism following the birth of the U.S.S.R. The actual starting point for Fleming was very definite, however. It was the day Harry Truman took office, because it was with the Truman administration that the United States began a truly hard-line, anti-Soviet policy. As mentioned above, Fleming felt that Soviet defensiveness was caused by American hostility. Therefore, it would follow that the Cold War started when the United States began its hostility. Fleming maintained that Truman's hard-line stance destroyed Soviet trust and good faith and that if Roosevelt had lived longer, or if Truman had followed a Roosevelt-style soft line, the Cold War might never have started at all; a belief which very clearly places the blame on the United States.

Kolko, to support his economic interpretation, gave the Cold War a vague starting point in 1942 or 1943. Mr. Kolko asserted that the Cold War developed as the United States defined more and more sharply its economic goals and blueprints for the post-war economy. He felt that the pattern for future Soviet - American relations and economic conflicts was set by 1943, since, by the end of that year, the United States had formalized its plans to create an international economy in its own image.

In support of his power vacuum theory, Halle could not place the beginning of the Cold War any sooner than the defeat
of Germany; in other words no earlier than the creation of the power vacuum to be filled. Mid-1945, then, would seem to be the logical date for Halle to set as the commencement of the conflict. Oddly, he did not. Instead, he saw the introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1947 as the genesis of the Cold War, because this policy drew distinct lines between the camps.

According to Adam Ulam's viewpoint, the Soviet - American conflict came about gradually, as victory over Nazi Germany became increasingly apparent to the Allies. Ulam did not set a month or year within which the Cold War can be said to have begun. However, he did feel that it had begun by the time of the Yalta Conference in early 1945, since by this time, the specter of a Nazi victory had been eliminated as the unifying force in the Grand Alliance. No longer fearing defeat, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to vie for desired positions suited to their Great Power status in the post-war scheme of international relations.

Herbert Feis' picture of the gradual worsening of Soviet - American relations is based on historical evidence. Relations between the two nations did gradually worsen during the war years and in the period immediately following victory. There is no support, however, for the idea that these tensions were suddenly and significantly sharpened by Hitler's surrender. It is difficult, in addition, to find any evidence showing a sudden change for the worse in U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations which would support Fleming's argument, and he himself gave none.
While Mr. Kolko's assignment of a starting date, like those of Feis and Fleming, followed logically from his general interpretation, a Cold War beginning as early as 1942 or 1943, at a time when the members of the Grand Alliance still felt it imperative to be a solid alliance in order to defeat Hitler, is a little more difficult to accept; even assuming economic motivations for later diplomacy. It would seem that, by this, Kolko was saying that, at that time, the post-war economic considerations were more important to the United States than the defeat of Hitler. Certainly this is ridiculous.

The choice of 1947 as the beginning of the Cold War did not provide the strong support it should offer for Hallé's adherence to a theory attributing the American - Soviet conflict to attempts to fill power vacuums. By 1947, an overwhelmingly large portion of what Hallé would term "filling of power vacuums" had already taken place, with the Soviet Union in firm control of Eastern Europe, and the United States and other Western nations lined up, so to speak, against further Soviet advance. If the Cold War had not begun by 1947, it would seem that the Marshall Plan, which did not create the two opposing camps, but merely defined the lines of separation more clearly, could hardly have brought such a chilly conflict about. One must ask how Hallé viewed the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the West in the two years between 1945 and 1947, which even the most superficial study will show to be anything but warm and cordial. An answer to this question, however, is not to
be found in Halle's History.

Mr. Ulam, like Feis, saw a gradual worsening of U.S. -
Soviet relations, a view born out by history. He has not
attempted to liken the Cold War to a football game by setting
a definite "kickoff" time, and by this has viewed the Cold War
as what it was - the gradual progression of relations between
two nations. Feis, Fleming and Halle provide no factual
support for their idea that one day we had peace and the next
day we had Cold War - triggered by the surrender of the enemy,
the assumption of Harry Truman of the presidency, or the
announcement of the Marshall Plan.

Internal Factors

Domestic affairs can often have significant influence
on the foreign policy of a nation. They can perhaps justify ac-
tions otherwise unexplainable. The relative significance of
internal influence can also have a bearing on the inevitability
or individual responsibility for an event. Cold War historians
disagree on the role of American and Soviet domestic factors in
the origins of the conflict. For these reasons, an examina-
tion of the discussions of internal influences will give us more
insight into the several theories.

Herbert Feis did not assign much importance to the
possible influence of internal factors on United States policy
of this period, and considered it of even less importance to
Soviet policy formulation. This is to be expected from his
view that the Cold War was brought on by Soviet aggressiveness. In Feis’ eyes, Stalin’s power-hunger and expansionistic desires determined all of the Soviet Union’s policies. Feis could not admit to the possibility that Russian internal forces could have had any influence on the actions of the Soviet government, for this would be an admission that the villains might have had reasons other than pure aggression which, they may have felt, justified their foreign policy. Because Feis denied the justifiability of Soviet actions, he must also deny the influence of domestic factors on their policy. Since the United States’ policies were in response to Soviet bellicosity, internal forces played only a minor role. The only internal influence on American actions which Feis mentioned was the conflict which occurred within the Cabinet, between those advocating a soft line towards Russia and those demanding a tougher anti-Soviet stance. Feis felt that these intra-Cabinet squabbles created weaknesses in the United States’ bargaining position; weaknesses of which Stalin was quick to take advantage. Feis’ belief that the Soviets’ aggressiveness brought on the Cold War, and his regret that the United States did not take a much harder line against the Soviets was shown clearly by his attitude towards internal influences.

Fleming, on the other hand, used internal factors to explain and justify Soviet policies and aims. By his account, the Soviet government was under pressure from the Russian people to take revenge on the German nation as a just payment
for the misery inflicted by the Nazis. In addition, the Soviet government was motivated by the desires of its people for a strong, healthy economy and material benefits. For these reasons, the Soviets, in Fleming’s eyes, made reasonable demands for reparations and economic cooperation from Germany and the occupied East European nations. Feelings of Pan-Slavism were also important in the Soviet Union’s drive to unite the Slavic people of the East European nations. Since he did not feel that Soviet policies and goals were unreasonable, Fleming attempted to show this by his interpretation of the influence on internal factors on policy making. This attempt is found above. To further shed an unfavorable light on the United States over the Cold War issue, Fleming asserted that there was a tidal wave of public outcry and anti-Soviet publicity based on an unfounded fear of Soviet aggression early after the war ended. The effects of this outcry were twofold. On the one hand, the Russians felt threatened by the American hostility and took a defensive attitude. Mutual trust was thus lost. On the other hand, public clamor caused the American government to take a much tougher stance than even Truman had outlined, once again putting the Soviet Union on the defensive, and doing a great deal to spiral mutual mistrust.

As would be expected, the internal factors which Gabriel Kolko considered to have had influence are economic in nature. In the United States, the capitalists and the government were deeply concerned about the possibility of another
serious depression after the war, brought on by the greatly enlarged production capacity of American industry which domestic markets would not be able to absorb. To prevent this overproduction crisis, the United States embarked on a policy of creating a world liberal capitalist economy to act as export markets for American industry. In this we can see Kolko's economic interpretation quite clearly. Kolko believed that the public anti-Soviet feelings were not natural, but were whipped up by the United States government in order to assure financial support for its imperialist policies. Kolko did not see significant autonomous public outcry on Eastern European issues, etc. by the American people. On the other side of the line, the Russians were not only pressing their government for a rebuilt economy but were also demanding revenge against Germany and security from another attack from the West. These were all influences which helped shape the severe treatment imposed by the Soviet Union on her former enemies. Kolko was very careful to assure that his emphasis on the influence of internal factors followed from his overall economic interpretation of Cold War history.

The rush to fill a vacuum in which Halle believed would have taken place no matter what internal forces were at work in either nation. He, therefore, places only nominal importance on the effects of domestic affairs on the development of Cold War relations. Halle did mention that American "myths" and her black and white image of international politics had a small
influence on foreign policy. He also pointed out that the large Polish-American population helped shape the United States' stand on the Poland issue. Neither of these factors were vital enough to change the course of development of Soviet-American relations.

The influence of internal forces was especially significant to the formulation of Soviet policy during and after World War II, according to Adam Ulam. He felt that Soviet actions in East and Central Europe can be traced almost entirely to the need for Stalin to consolidate both his own personal power and that of the Soviet regime, both of which had been somewhat shaken by the hardships of the war. Stalin had to prevent internal turmoil in this manner in order to build the U.S.S.R. to a position of economic and military strength equal to its status as a Super Power in post-war affairs. To effect this consolidation of power, Stalin felt it imperative to expand westward and to exploit the economies of the Eastern European occupied areas to rebuild the Soviet domestic economy as rapidly as possible. In addition, Stalin closed the U.S.S.R. to Western access and influences. This he did partly to hold the West up as an enemy before the Russian people in order to extract from them further sacrifices of hard work; secondly, to prevent his people from viewing and coveting the material wealth of the West; and lastly, to hide the Soviet Union's weaknesses from Western eyes. By closing the Soviet Union from Western view, Stalin managed to create an aura of power.
which instilled fear and mistrust in the overestimating minds of the West. Ulam did not discuss at length internal United States factors, but did make mention of the role played by American ethnic public opinion on United States' policies with regard to the Polish question and other similar ethnically oriented issues in Europe.

We can easily see, from Ulam's discussion of Soviet domestic forces and their effects, the roots of his belief in the continuing spiral of misunderstanding, fear, and mistrust. Ulam explained that by making Russia into a closed society, Stalin increased Western hostility, and by continually repeating accusations against the United States, Stalin himself became convinced of them, just as did the Soviet people. One must question, however, how Adam Ulam could describe with such certainty the workings of the mind of Stalin, a man whom Ulam himself pictured as tight-lipped and not at all the type to openly discuss his thoughts.

Fleming's reference to the state of the Soviet economy as justification of Soviet policy are perhaps acceptable. Certainly Germany had caused appalling destruction and suffering to the Russian people, and it would have been natural and human for tremendous desires for revenge to rise from the Soviet nation. There is no denying, either, that the Soviet economy was severely in need of reconstruction, and the level of living was extremely low and in need of raising. One suspects, however, that the Soviet government strove for material well being for
its people less from a feeling of benevolence than from a fear of internal turmoil. It is difficult to believe, also, that the Soviet Union, while demanding revenge on Germany, could formulate policies towards the Slavs of Eastern Europe, most of whom had fought with Hitler against the Russians, out of a sense of ethnic affinity and Slavic unity. Indeed, the Red Army showed these alleged feelings of Pan-Slavism in most unusual ways in its rapacious march through Eastern Europe. By placing such emphasis on the power of the American public opinion to bring about a tough line policy and its effect on the Soviet Union, Fleming contradicted his earlier contention that Harry Truman's administration was entirely to blame and that Roosevelt would have been able to prevent the Cold War. By what supernatural powers would Roosevelt have been immune to the effects of this internal factor, by which Truman was so controlled? Mr. Fleming did not provide us with an answer.

Mr. Feis is less than objective in his history when he ignored the effect of American public opinion in favor of the East European ethnic groups, such as the Poles, and the anti-Soviet mistrust which was present in the Western mind. Kalko has also neglected the influence of the American public psyche on government policies and implied that the American people feel little but what the government tells or induces them to feel. This is hardly plausible stance, for the
history of United States' policy shows that the mood of the people has had influence on government decisions. Halle also denied the power of domestic affairs to affect foreign policy, and is subject to the same criticism as Kolk and Feis.

Atomic Power

From 1945 until 1949, the United States had a monopoly on atomic power. Only the U.S. had been successful in making and exploding an atomic weapon, the possession of which gave virtually ultimate power militarily. This weapon was first introduced to the world by its use against two cities in Japan in August, 1945. From that time, there was much controversy and disagreement, especially between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., over how best to handle this terrible power. These disagreements were part of the overall Cold War tensions between the two nations. In examining the five interpretations of this issue, we find it useful to consider two questions: Why was the A-bomb dropped; and did atomic power greatly influence the conduct of policy or diplomacy? Answers to these questions best point up the differences among the historians.

If one accepts Feis' traditional point of view, one finds that not only was Russia's help in the war against Japan still desired, but such aid was considered essential to defeat that nation. Therefore, it follows that the A-bomb was used against Japan solely for the purpose of bringing the Pacific war to a rapid close. At the time the decision was made to
use the A-bomb, President Truman was convinced, as were numerous military and policy advisors, that the defeat of Japan would be prolonged significantly without the use of the weapon. As long as the A-bomb was used as a weapon against Japan to save Allied lives, America cannot be placed in the wrong and this follows from Feis' general theory. Feis asserted, in addition, that the possession of this tremendous power had no effect on United States policy formulation, for the U.S. government would never have considered using the weapon again.

True to form, Fleming struck the opposite pose from Feis, and maintained that the United States government knew that Japan was defeated, no longer felt a need for Soviet military assistance there, and used the A-bomb not as a weapon against Japan, but as a warning to the Soviet Union. Fleming also saw the use of the atomic bomb as a means of cheating the Soviet Union out of possible benefits it might have gained by helping to fight the war against Japan. The effect of possession of an atomic monopoly on the United States was to create a sense of euphoria, Fleming continued. Americans now began to feel overly secure and were overconfident about the outcome of what they considered the inevitable war with the Soviet Union. The United States also came to feel that, because of its superior weapon, it could dictate the course of world affairs. These beliefs all led to further distraction of trust and good faith between the Russians and Americans, making the Soviets
feel even more threatened and suspicious than ever.

Perceiving the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union as strictly an economic affair, Kolko assigned no hidden political motivations to the decision to drop the atomic bomb. On the contrary, he believed it to be simply a military tactic which was felt to be essential to the defeat of Japan. Kolko noted that at that time, Soviet help was still considered necessary for the ground war to bring about total victory at a saving of American lives. For Kolko, the main issue of the atomic power monopoly was American power. The United States was working out a world system of economic interdependence and was looking for a position of hegemony in that world system. Possession of the atomic power monopoly seemed to some to be the weapon the United States could use to attain that position. To support this, Kolko stressed that the United States did not merely keep the secret of atomic weaponry from the Russians, but also from allies such as Britain. For Kolko, this proved that maintenance of the United States monopoly was not an anti-Soviet political policy, but a means to achieve the economic dominance which had been the U.S. goal since the early forties.

Since the power vacuum would have dragged the two powers into conflict regardless of matching or unbalanced military powers, Nalle did not view the atomic monopoly as greatly affecting the formulation of policies or the course of Cold War events. He further asserted that after dropping
atomic bombs on Japan, where they were felt to be essential to save American lives, the United States never again seriously contemplated using atomic power because of moral and humanitarian inhibitions, as well as fear of the resulting chaos. The implication inherent in this last restraining factor is that use of atomic weapons would create additional gaps in the balance of power structure, an event that the United States very definitely did not desire. Here again, Halle's belief in the balance of power and power vacuum theories has lent color to his interpretation of a set of facts.

Having accepted the military imperatives explanation of the decision to drop the A-bomb, Adam Ulam further noted that even military leaders of the time were not fully aware of the capabilities of atomic weapons. For this reason, Soviet aid was considered essential for the success of the invasion which alone would defeat Japan. Ulam thus rejected the idea that the atomic bomb was dropped more against Russia than Japan. In answer to our second question, Ulam believed that the atomic power monopoly had a small but significant effect on the course of Cold War events and the formulation of policy. In a large part, this was limited because the Americans would not seriously consider using the awesome weapon it had. Still, mere possession did give something of a false sense of security to the United States, temporarily blinding her to the realities of Super Power politics and balance of power considerations.
This naivete on the part of the United States in power politics occasionally gave the U.S.S.R. the upper hand in diplomatic relations and facilitated the realization of several Soviet goals, a situation which Ulam believed may have been avoided if the United States had had its eyes open to the realities of its role as one of the two Super Powers.

The weakness in Fels' views on the atomic power question is found in the mistake he made in carrying United States purity too far by asserting that possession of an atomic power monopoly had no effect on the conduct of American foreign policy. Unless Mr. Fels has placed the rulers of the category of gods, one cannot accept their immunity from the influence of a monopoly on such a powerful weapon as atomic power, whether actually used as a diplomatic trump card or not.

As mentioned before, available evidence tends to reject Fleming's idea that the United States knew Japan was beaten before the A-bomb was dropped and it has only been within the passage of time that this has come to be realized. It is, therefore, inappropriate to assign blame to the United States policy makers for not having the foresight to see fifteen or twenty years into the future.

Contrary to Kolko's assertions, the fact that the United States withheld information about atomic weaponry from all nations does not prove that the U.S. was working for economic dominance. It proves only that the United States was unwilling to trust the secret of such destruction to
any nation.

In the above discussion, we have been concerned with discovering each historian's general theory of Cold War origins and how this theory reflects itself in the interpretations and emphasis on various mechanical points involved in a Cold War study. Now let us turn to several specific areas of United States - Soviet confrontation and examine each author's opinions on the problem and its solution (or non-solution).

CONFLICTS IN EUROPE

The issues discussed in this study are chosen with an eye to pointing up the differences among the various historical interpretations. Therefore, when discussing each of the major issues of conflict in Europe, two representative questions will be used as bases for the examination. On the German question, these issues will be Germany's post-war role, and the reparations controversy. With regard to the problem over Poland, we will use as our guidelines the questions of territorial settlement and also the determination of the nature and composition of the post-war Polish government. In the third section of this chapter, we will examine Soviet objectives in East Europe, as well as United States interests or designs there. By studying these points, one can obtain a more than adequate overview of the five interpretations of the European conflicts.
One of the major problems always faced by the victors in war is how to treat the defeated enemy. The Allies in World War II were not able to escape nor solve this problem. In discussions and conferences, the United States found itself continually at loggerheads with the Russians over proposals for handling Germany after victory. Among the numerous issues to be decided were the role Germany should play after her defeat, i.e. the point of strength to which Germany would be permitted to rebuild, and whether the Germans should pay reparations, and if so, how much should be paid and to whom? While the United States was attempting to put off a decision on the reparations issue, the Soviets were acquiring their "just repayment" by removing entire factories from their occupation zones. These actions greatly increased tensions. The historical accounts of Soviet-American disagreements over Germany's post-war role and the reparation question will give us a picture of each historian's orientation toward the issues of early Cold War history.

Feis noted that the goals of both Russia and the United States for Germany after the war could be considered identical on paper only. These were to create a weakened and harmless Germany which could no longer threaten the peace, and to de-Nazify, and democratize the German nation. It is in the
interpretation of these goals by each country that the divergencies occurred. Feis held that the United States followed the agreements almost to the letter and that they felt Germany could take its place eventually within the European community as an independent and neutral nation, forbidden, of course, from aligning itself to any power against another. Because Feis felt that the Soviets, by their unreasonable nature, could not accept such neutralism, he wrote that the Soviet Union interpreted the agreement on democratization and de-Nazification to mean total destruction of all forces such as industrialists and clerical parties which weren't or couldn't be turned into puppets of Moscow. Feis accused the Soviets of being in the wrong for they destroyed or distorted the agreements to their own advantage, because of what he implied was their inability to accept reasonable settlements. Furthermore, the Soviet Union greedily demanded a fixed sum of $10 billion to be paid to them in reparations by Germany, while at the same time looting and transporting as much industry from their zones of occupation as possible. Feis condemned the Soviets for this unjustifiable demand, and praised the West for holding out on reparations payments that would have retarded Germany's reconstruction. The definite anti-Soviet, pro-Western traditionalist views held by Feis are evident in this discussion of German problems.

As might be expected, Feis gave scant and scattered mention to problems concerning Germany, especially the
reparations controversy. He found little to say about the plans advanced by either side with regard to Germany's future. While avoiding as much as possible discussions of the reparations issue, Fleming attempted to play up the damage worked by Germany on the Soviet economy, in an effort to legitimize Stalin's demands. There is little doubt that Fleming would much prefer to ignore the conflicts over Germany as much as possible, for, try as he might, it is very difficult to show the Soviet Union in an entirely favorable light.

Germany was a key issue in Gabriel Kolko's economic interpretative writings on the Cold War. To Kolko, the United States' designs for Germany's post-war role were unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The United States wanted to rebuild an economically strong and self-supporting Germany, first, so that it would be in a position to participate in mutually beneficial trade with American business, and second, because the United States' blueprint had Germany playing the role of keystone nation in a rebuilt, liberal capitalist economy for all of Europe. The inborn Russian fear of Germany, bred by the effects of the several invasions of Russian soil by the Germans, naturally led the Soviet Union to oppose any plan which might place Germany in a position of strength from which to launch yet another attack. In pursuit of their own economic goals of rapidly rebuilding a modern and self-sufficient, industrialized nation, the Soviets felt their reparations demands both reasonable and just. American protestation that
Germany was not able to support such a financial drain in her struggle to rebuild, and that the United States would most likely end up indirectly paying Germany's reparations had no effect on the Soviet government. As Kolko pointed out, the Soviets were not concerned from where the money came, as long as they got what they needed to build their way out of the devastation left by the war.

Halle considered it the goal of both the United States and the Soviet Union to severely weaken Germany. Though permitting it to remain united, neither of the major Allies felt that Germany should ever be in a position to express its aggressive nature again by attacks on the Russian people or the United States. This aim was inherent in the unconditional surrender idea, and was a point of agreement and unity between Russia and the United States before the end of the war. Inevitably, though, Halle maintained, this goal of absolute elimination of Germany from the world power structure left the vacuum on which Halle based his theory of Cold War history. Because his theory depends entirely on this vacuum, Halle must somehow show its creation. This he has done by his interpretation of the post-war role assigned to Germany by the Allies. Halle made no mention of the reparations controversy, an omission not easily accepted in light of the importance placed on this issue by both parties at the time. This omission can, however, be explained logically in view of Halle's theory. This theory,
because of its element of inevitably connected with the existence of a vacuum, would not assign a major role to the reparations question, and perhaps Halle did not feel it important enough to the progression of the Cold War to include it in his history.

Ulam's Cold War accounts pictured neither the Soviet Union nor the United States as having exact designs on or plans for the German nation after its defeat. Contrary to occasional claims, the Russians did not have plans to create a German communist state, for their fear of German belligerence was greater than revolutionary zeal. Nor did the Western Allies have blueprints for a Germany rebuilt for use as a weapon against the Soviet Union. The only goals Russians had with regard to Germany were for revenge and repayment for damage to the Soviet economy ravaged by the German armies. Even though Soviet repayment exactions and expropriations seemed exploitative to the West, the Soviets felt they were justified. As Ulam noted, the Soviets were in the best position to know the extent of the damage done to their homeland. The West, on the other hand, found it necessary to refuse the Soviet reparations demands on the basis of sheer economic common sense. If the German people were ever to become self-supporting again, they could not afford to meet the payments, both from current wealth and from future production, proposed by the U.S.S.R. In addition, as the tide of refugees from the
Eastern zone poured into the Western zone, the necessity of feeding and supporting these people further restricted the ability to pay reparations from Western zone industrial production.

Once again, Adam Ulam has taken a moderate position, neither blaming one nation or the other, nor attempting to trace the cause to some one force, such as economics. Rather, Ulam simply stated what happened and noted that both sides felt justified in their actions and, more than likely, were from their own point of view. Ulam's belief that the Cold War conflicts were the inevitable result of the presence of two Super Powers existing within the same world political system is again demonstrated by the above discussion.

On the questions concerning Germany, Feis again failed to define the difference between justifiable and unjustifiable demands. In seeing the issue in black and white only, Feis denied the possibility of fine shades of colors between his extremes of right and wrong.

No amount of historical juggling by Fleming can erase or lessen the amount of German industrial and other wealth transported to the Soviet Union. Nor can one explain away the harsh treatment of the Germans in the Soviet occupation zone by fear of Western hostility or even, one believes, by internal desires for just revenge. Rather than examine the conflict over Germany and make a serious attempt at objectivity, Fleming has chosen to ignore, to a great extent, an important issue,
so as not to weaken his theory. In doing so, however, Fleming has accomplished that which he wished to avoid.

There is some inaccuracy in Kolkó's argument. The United States and the West did not immediately embark on a plan to create a competitive economy in their zone, which would have seemed appropriate if Kolkó's belief in an American master plan for the European economy is correct. Even in a divided Germany, reconstruction in one part begun right away would have been better than delay, but this did not occur. It only after political tensions increased between the occupying forces in Germany that the Western powers hurried to create a strong and healthy independent German nation out of their zones to counter the estimated Soviet strength in the East. By ignoring all but economic considerations, Kolkó could not have been expected to perceive this, however.

By neglecting the importance of the reparations question, Hallé has left a weak spot in his account of the Cold War. The problem of reparation payments was a major issue in wartime and post-war discussions, and can hardly be appropriately omitted from Cold War histories.

Poland

Poland presented a stumbling block to the already weak unity of the Grand Alliance. The problems of the Polish nation were the principle subject of numerous conferences, and the cause of many disagreements and tensions between the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Polish-Soviet relations had long been unfriendly at best, due to such events as the Polish attack on the newly formed Soviet Union in 1920 and the Nazi-Soviet agreement to divide Poland. The Western powers had the impossible task of satisfying both the Poles and the Soviets in their search for solutions to the post-war problems of Poland. Foremost among these questions to be decided were the establishment of boundaries for Poland, and the creation of a government to take over once the Germans had been removed. The Polish boundaries, both east and west, had not been permanent since World War I. The Nazi-Soviet Pact had given the U.S.S.R. a section of east Poland which it hoped to retain after World War II. As compensation, the Soviets suggested that Poland be given German territory as far west as the Oder-Neisse River line. Though agreement seemed to be reached for a time, problems invariably arose. Just to complicate the problem, there were two Neisse Rivers, presenting a sizable difference in territory. The determination of the nature of the government to rule Poland after the war also seemed to be agreed upon, but, in practice, differences, not apparent on paper, emerged. Let us now consider the five interpretations of these Polish issues and examine the connection to the general theories.

The traditional historian would be expected to deny the justifiability of the territorial demands advanced by
Soviet government and their puppet, the Lublin Polish government, and this is precisely the road which Herbert Feis has taken in his Cold War histories. According to Feis, these proposed boundary settlements were the product of Soviet desire to push beyond its borders as far west as possible before meeting strong, active resistance. The implication in Feis' writing was that the West could and should have been tougher with the Soviets in order to stop their advance sooner. By securing a piece of eastern Germany as compensation to Poland for the eastern territories of Poland assimilated into the Soviet empire, the Soviet government insured that its influence would far to the west even if Germany were reunited and not under Soviet control. Feis saw this expansionist desire as the basis for Soviet territorial demands with regard to Poland, and he felt that, had the West taken a tougher stance vis-a-vis the Communists, the Soviets may have backed off some in their push westward.

Feis held the Soviet Union to be in the wrong on the question of creating a government for Poland. Though the West would agree that the Soviet Union had a right to expect that the governments on its borders should be "friendly", that is, not openly hostile and belligerent, the Soviet government carried this too far, and stretched the term "friendly" to mean "puppet" and totally Moscow-oriented. This idea was unacceptable to the West. Feis also held that Stalin distorted the meaning of the agreement reached at Yalta to use the
Lublin government, which Moscow had created and organized to replace the government-in-exile in London, as the basis for the post-war Polish government. While the West had understood this agreement to allow for truly representative and freely elected government with the London government being given an equal chance to participate, the Communists felt this agreement entitled them to appoint the Lublin Poles as the post-war regime for Poland, admitting a few non-communists to minor cabinet positions, and then only if they were willing to behave according to Moscow's rules.

Because of the non-Polish ethnic makeup of the territory detached from Poland and absorbed by the Soviet Union, Fleming asserted that this boundary settlement was fair and justifiable. He also felt that the acquisition of this land partially satisfied Soviet national security needs for a boundary farther west. Since Fleming maintained that the Russians were right in their demands on Polish territory, it follows that the United States and the West were at fault for attempting to deny these demands. Furthermore, Fleming wrote that it was not wrong for the Soviet Union to encourage a government in Poland that was both friendly and and dependable, which the Lublin government naturally was. Adding to his justification of the imposition by Moscow of the government it had set up, Fleming portrayed the Lublin government as having more right to rule than the London government-in-exile. This was due to the facts that the Lublin regime contained many Polish patriots,
and that even though its support was a minority of the nation, it was a sizeable minority. Fleming further stated that the West had no historical interest or right to have a voice in Polish affairs, and was only trying to make amends for having indirectly sold Poland, along with Czechoslovakia, down river at Munich, since we had known that Hitler would turn towards Poland next.

Remaining true to his general interpretation, Kolko linked the United States' position on the Polish boundary and government issues to economic motivations. According to Kolko, the United States envisioned a strong and friendly Poland as an integrated part of the European economic community which had been planned so carefully. To retain Poland's favor, then, and to ensure its economic health, the United States attempted to arrange for territorial settlements that would not weaken Poland's chances. An example of this was the desire for Poland to keep the Lwow province even though it was not ethnically Polish, because it contained the oil supplies considered essential for this strong, pro-American Poland. The American interest in the Polish government was also for economic, not moral or political, reasons. Since the United States wanted Poland to have a liberal capitalist economy and also to permit free access for trade and investment, the Moscow-oriented Lublin government was unacceptable to the Americans. Their desire to prevent a communist take-over of Poland was not
due to ideological or democratic ideals, but because such a

take-over would obstruct free trade and capitalist investment.

Louis Halle portrayed Poland as an inevitably lost
cause from the outset of the war, maintaining that Poland's
only hope for territorial integrity and political independence
was the defeat of both Germany and the Soviet Union. Since
this was not the case, Halle concluded it was unavoidable
that the Soviet Union was sucked into occupation and control
of Poland. It is most likely that Stalin had no intention of
setting up a satellite nation in Poland, and Halle offered as
proof of this the fact that the Lublin government was not
organized until the last possible minute, when the Red Army
was entering Poland in pursuit of the retreating Germans. Halle
had no objections to the territory annexation, nor to the
establishment of a Moscow-controlled Polish government. These
events were the natural result of the existence of a power
vacuum to be filled. In this case, Russia could best fill it.
Halle contended that the West's opposition to Soviet control
of Poland were determined by a desire not to have the balance
of power tipped very far in favor of the U.S.S.R.

Adam Ulam did not attempt to pass judgement on the
actions of either the United States or Russia with regard
to Polish territorial settlements. To Ulam, the Soviet Union
was simply exercising its prerogative as a Great Power in
carving out a sphere of influence. Poland was especially to
be included in this sphere in order to provide a cushion against a possibly resurgent Germany. Not justifying nor denouncing this occurrence, Ulam presented it as a fait accompli to be accepted. So it was also with the Soviet imposition of its hand-picked government on the Polish people. Poland was in the Soviet sphere of influence, and thus it was to be expected that the U.S.S.R. would act as it saw fit. The Soviets had the upper hand here and the United States could have little or no effective voice in the matter. Ulam noted that the United States took an idealistic and moralistic position on the issue of the post-war Polish government, and were unsuccessful in effecting any change in the affair. The interesting implication seen here is that Ulam felt that moralism and politics do not mix in the world political reality, a view to be expected from a believer in Super Power politics such as Ulam.

On the question of Poland, Feis again has shown his traditionalist viewpoint that the Soviets were motivated by aggressiveness and that they thwarted all Western attempts to bring freedom and democracy to less fortunate nations. In his efforts to show this, however, he ignored the fact that the territory taken from Poland was more closely related ethnically to the Russians than to the Poles. Nor was Feis convincing in his argument that the Polish situation could have been changed by a tougher Western position, for, in reality, what
could the West have done to coerce the Russians in a nation to which it had no access? Mr. Fels did not elaborate on this possibility.

Fleming has certainly made an effort to support his revisionist beliefs by his account of the conflicts over Poland, but in doing so he has clutched at straws. It is true that the section detached from east Poland was not a Polish area, and that it was ethnically more closely related to the western Russian provinces. One questions, however, whether national security goal can truly justify annexation of territory from another country. Fleming's dual standard on this issue shows this justification to be somewhat forced, in an effort to explain Soviet actions in a good light, and, thereby, weakens his theory. Why should this Soviet move be condoned by Fleming, when Western defensive measures, such as the creation of NATO, which involved no boundary shifting, are condemned by him? Fleming's arguments on the Polish government do not fare any better under scrutiny. Did not the London government also contain many patriots and loyal Poles? Furthermore, Fleming's emphasis on the Lublin minority support being sizable cannot eliminate the fact that the majority of Poles were supporting some other government - the London government - and not the Moscow-sponsored Lublin Poles.

Once again, Kolko's economic interpretation has acted as his misleading light. He failed to mention Soviet
motives for actions in Poland — perhaps because they could not be shown to be economic. Kolko also ignored the influence of the opinions of the Polish-American citizens and the mysteriously strong sympathy felt by the American public in general for people who are oppressed or who live under some system less ideal than American democracy. These non-economic sentiments could not have been totally discounted by the United States government.

Kalle’s account has also ignored internal American factors and political motivations of Soviet actions. One question must be asked. If the Soviet Union had truly not wished to set up a satellite regime in Poland, would it have been so impossible for them to recall the Red Army and welcome the return of the London government-in-exile to set up an independent Poland?

Eastern Europe

The Soviet Union’s occupation and satellization of the Eastern European nations led to clashes with the United States, which was demanding free elections and unrestricted political systems for these nations, in the hopes that they would choose against communism. Representative of the five historians’ Cold War interpretations are their views on the Soviet and American objectives and motivations behind the actions taken in East Europe. We turn now to an examination of those
views.

In doing so, we again encounter Herbert Feis' picture of the fire-breathing dragon being bravely opposed by Uncle Sam on a white charger. In this picture, the Soviet Union moved into Eastern Europe simply out of aggressive desire to dominate bordering nations. There could be no acceptance of governments that were merely friendly; they had to be puppets totally controlled by Moscow. The Soviets distorted or ignored provisions of the Declaration on Liberated Europe to establish popular governments by free elections, and twisted the meaning of every action or word of the United States or Britain in order to turn them to Soviet advantage. An example of this would be the use of British hegemony in Greece as a justification for Soviet control and repression in the occupied Eastern European countries. Feis denied that this was a legitimate analogy for the Soviets to have made.

The West's interests, on the other hand, were free from blemish. According to Feis, the West's goals in East Europe were to uphold the ideals of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, which it correctly understood, and to protect the weakened nations of Eastern Europe from being subjugated by Soviet-type totalitarian regimes. In these two views, one can easily see Feis' very black-and-white philosophy of Cold War origins.

On the other hand, Fleming wrote at great lengths to
explain and legitimize the Soviet move into Eastern Europe. There was no planned aggression. The Red Army had fought most of World War II alone, and the Soviet government felt its people deserved at least the part of East Europe formerly controlled by Germany. Especially to exact a little just revenge from the former allies of the Nazis, who had fought against Russia. In addition to the desire for revenge, the Soviets were also motivated by more benevolent feelings such as Pan-Slavism, mentioned above, and by a desire to institute land and other social reforms in these feudalistic nations. Because of its weakened economy, so strained by the war, the Soviets also needed to insure that the countries of Eastern Europe would be economically oriented toward Russia, rather than toward the West. Finally, the creation of a buffer zone in East Europe was one of the U.S.S.R.'s security needs, further justifying Soviet control of that area.

Fleming felt that the West no longer had legitimate interests in East Europe, and that the West had had its chance for a dominant role there, but had mishandled, and then lost, that chance. Therefore, Fleming naturally saw all the Western policies concerning East Europe as measures planned solely to thwart the Soviet Union, adn based entirely on anti-Soviet attitudes, not on diplomatic common sense. This is, of course, to be expected from his belief in Soviet innocence and American guilt.
Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe were twofold. Security against further German attacks was felt to be important, but even more significant was the goal of economic exploitation, cooperation and favorable trade arrangements for the purpose of rebuilding their own economy. Thus wrote our exponent of the economic interpretation, Gabriel Kolko. Conflict naturally resulted, because the United States also had very definite economic designs on the East European nations. The United States wanted access to all of post-war Europe for export markets in order to prevent overproduction problems in American industry. In addition, Europe was to be integrated into the entire scheme of an international economy, based on American style ideals of laissez faire, liberal capitalism, and free trade. Naturally, since Soviet control of and communist economies in East European nations would prevent the attaining of this dream, the United States rigorously opposed such a spread of Soviet influence.

Though Halle asserted that the Soviet Union was sucked into the vacuum in Poland against its will, he wrote, in discussions of the general East European situation, that Stalin held goals of establishing a defendable security perimeter, creating a ring of dependent states adjacent to Russia's borders, and ensuring that the nations beyond were weak and harmless. Immediately, though, Halle returned to his original position, presumably in pursuit of support for his power vacuum theory. He went on to write that the Soviet
Union was drawn against its will into dominance over Eastern Europe. The Soviets were the victims of the null of the power vacuum; they could not help but rush in to fill it. United States' interest in the affairs of Eastern Europe were not, as one would expect from Halle, due to its own headlines rush into the vacuum. Rather, American idealism and democratic sympathy for the underdog or any people being swallowed by another shaped the United States stance on East European affairs.

As mentioned above, in the discussion of internal factors, Adam Ulam conceived of Soviet policies - especially concerning East Europe - as being shaped largely by Stalin's need to consolidate personal and regime power. Expansion of the Soviet empire was, for Stalin, the most effective way to retain favor. In addition, the Soviet Union had to rapidly rebuild its economy in order to retain its position as a Super Power. To do this it was necessary to exploit the raw materials, food, and industrial capacity of the defeated Europeans. One other consideration mentioned, The Russian people did not want to be left open for yet another attack by Germany. For this reason, the East European nations were to be used as a buffer zone.

As a rival Great Power, the United States automatically had an interest in the course of events in East Europe, especially since the might of the Red Army seemed at this time to be near invincible and capable of sweeping from Eastern
to Western Europe with little effort. In addition, Ulam credited the Americans with having an honest interest in democracy and self-determination for the peoples of Europe, and also a sympathy for the underdog.

Because of the inevitable friction which results between rivals in anything - be it sports, love, or politics - the conflicts which arose between the United States and the U.S.R. were natural and unavoidable as long as both were super powers vying for spheres of influence in the same world. This was as Ulam perceived it to be.

The weakness in Harbert Feis' views on the conflicts in Europe is his insistence upon and possible exaggeration of the purity of the American interests in international affairs.

Fleming was quite pointed in his use of the term 'need' in discussing Soviet goals in East Europe, rather than using such terms as 'interest' or 'demand.' One questions, however, who has determined this need. Who has said that this was any more of a need to the Soviet Union than was the American desire to see free elections and independent nations was to the United States? We have pointed out above that if the Soviets were motivated by Pan-Slavic sentiments, the Red Army certainly kept it a well guarded secret. Fleming also failed to note that the Soviets' idea of "economic orientation" was a most exploitative policy of economically raping Eastern
Europe. It is important to note the difference between words spoken and actions taken in studying history.

In Kolko's interpretation of the European conflicts, we find a new twist to his thinking. Though consistent on the point of strictly economic motivations for American actions, Kolko admitted to something other than an economic force having significant influence on Soviet policy. Why this dualism? How could Kolko assert that economic forces were absolute, on the one hand, yet admit to another, non-economic factor playing a role? Is it not possible that some American policies, just as some Soviet policies, were influenced by politics or ideology or public myths? Kolko denied this possibility throughout his works dealing with the early Cold War period.

In his account of the East European situation, Halle left some unacceptable contradictions. He stated that Stalin did not desire satellites, merely dependent nations. However, there is an indefensibly minute difference between dependency and satellite status, and Halle made no attempt to clarify that difference. One wonders which Louis Halle we are to believe on the question of East Europe. Should we continue to accept the Halle who professed a belief in the unavoidable effects of the power vacuum? Or should we now believe the man who assigns conscious motives and actions to the parties involved? It does not seem that we can credit both views, for they are
in disagreement. When a theory finds itself weakened by contradictions, that theory is in need of reexamination.

MAJOR UNITED STATES POLICY STATEMENTS

In this section of the paper, we turn to an examination of two important American foreign policy statements, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan or European Recovery Program. In each case we will discuss the historians' views on the purpose of the policy and, with regard to the Truman Doctrine, we will also discuss whether this was a long standing policy or one suddenly formulated.

The Truman Doctrine

The announcement of the Truman Doctrine, in early 1947, firmly and clearly stated United States' intentions to play a major role in world affairs. No doubt could remain in the Soviet mind that the United States would not, after all, withdraw to its continent and remain isolated as it had tried to do following World War I. The purpose behind the formulation of this doctrine is a point of disagreement among the historical interpretations. So also is the question of whether the policy of the Truman Doctrine was a long standing one or whether it was an immediate response to a crisis situation. The views of the historians color their opinions on these issues, just as with others we have previously discussed.
For Herbert Feis, the Truman Doctrine was formulated as a much needed, firm stand against communist aggression and attempted communist coups in weak nations. By early 1947, the United States felt that every indication pointed to a real threat of communist expansion. When, in February, Britain gave notice that she could no longer support such unstable, and therefore threatened, nations as Greece and Turkey, the United States believed itself to be obligated to step in and shore up these and other waggling regimes. Though the Truman Doctrine was not really a sudden or unexpected policy, according to Feis, no definite policy had been set before the crisis of British termination of support for Greece and Turkey.

Scheming and plotting carry connotations of malice and guilt. It is for this reason that Fleming held that the hard-line, anti-Soviet policy made public in the Truman Doctrine had been the long standing idea of President Truman. The crisis created in Greece by Britain's withdrawal gave Truman the opportunity he needed to provide a credible facade of immediacy to disguise the true, long term goal of this policy. The Doctrine was to be a warning to the U.S.S.R. that the United States would no longer be willing to bend to the wishes of the Soviet Union. Fleming asserted that this stance forced the Soviets to give up completely their last threads of trust and good faith.

Gabriel Kolko believed that the Truman Doctrine was, at heart, an economic policy. It was simply an elaboration
of the well-formulated and long-sought economic goals developed by the United States early in the war. The Truman Doctrine was to be used as a legitimizer for United States intervention in any nation wobbling on the fence and in danger of falling to the Communists. Such wobbling nations had to be prevented from going beyond the United States' economic sphere of control. Because the United States government could not name designations of world economic hegemony as the true reason for combatting Communism, it was glad of the crisis provided by Britain's collapse to use as an excuse to extract appropriations from Congress to carry out its goals.

The collapse of Britain, and with it the end of the Pax Britannica, created another vacuum in the world balance of power. This time, Halle wrote, it was the role of the United States to fill that vacuum. The end of Britain's stabilizing power throughout the world hastened the emergence of America from its isolationist cocoon. Halle believed that the Truman Doctrine was formulated in an honest attempt to accept the burden of world responsibility passed to it by Britain. Just as the United States had done when the U.S.S.R. had rusted to fill the European vacuum, the Soviets interpreted this policy as a threat, and accordingly assumed a defensively aggressive attitude. The United States reaction to an increased Soviet hostility only confirmed for the Russians their own fears. This spiral of action and reaction was, to Halle, the natural
aftermath of vacuum-filling. Because of the purpose Halle viewed the Truman Doctrine as having, he logically felt that it was formulated in answer to the immediate crises in Greece and Turkey, instead of being the pronouncement of a long held policy. Halle did mention, however, that the American emergence from isolation had been a long, gradual process.

A need to limit the Soviet sphere of influence and to halt the spread of communism were considered by Ulam the key purposes of the Truman Doctrine. The United States perceived a serious threat of both direct and indirect (military or political) action by the Soviet Union in an effort to increase its area of control. By permitting this expansion to continue, the United States would be giving the advantage to the U.S.S.R. in the balance of world power politics. Adam Ulam wrote that the desire to prevent this was not suddenly generated by the British announcement of withdrawal of support from Greece and Turkey, but had already been well formulated before this crisis. Because of the British collapse, however, the threat to countries such as Greece became especially clear in American minds, thus prompting the announcement of policy in the Truman Doctrine.

One would expect just such an interpretation of the Truman Doctrine from a traditional historian as Feis has written. The forces of good (the United States) rushed to the aid of the weak (Greece, Turkey, and any other nation on the
Brink of communist influence) against the forces of evil (Soviet aggression). Fels has again given us his exaggerated picture painted only in black and white.

As usual we found Fleming's views to be the opposite of Fels'. Here the dragon is Harry Truman and the Soviets represent the forces of right. Fleming attributed the Truman Doctrine solely to anti-Soviet feelings and a desire to express them to the Communists. He denied the possibility of a real threat of spreading communist influence, which was Fels' justification for the Doctrine. What is important on this issue, and Fleming seemed not to perceive it, is not so much whether or not there was actually a threat of Soviet aggression, but whether or not President Truman and other Western leaders sincerely believed there to be such a threat. Evidence of public addresses and communiques shows that such a fear did exist, and there does not seem to be evidence that the Soviets attempted in any way to relieve that fear.

In studying the economic viewpoint, one wonders why, if the United States' economic goals were so well formulated from 1942 on, as Kolko has maintained, it was necessary to formulate and spell out these goals again in 1947. Why would a legitimizing document be needed at this time, when actions had been taken during the previous five years that had not needed such a document? Perhaps there was something other than economics involved. Certainly, if economics were the only
consideration, it would not have been necessary for the adminis-
tration to create a façade for their economic goals and policies.
Mr. Kolko has once again left small holes in his argument.

It is interesting that of the five historians, only
Halie perceived the Truman Doctrine to have a purpose other
than limiting the spread of Soviet influence. On this point,
we have come the closest to agreement on an issue. Yet, the
reasons given for this purpose prevent the similarity or agree-
ment from going any deeper. Halie was also alone in his
belief that the Truman Doctrine was not a long-held policy.
An interesting implication here is that Western opposition to
the Soviet Union, for whatever reason, at least in the views
of these four writers, was not new by early 1947. One could
generally suppose that related Cold War attitudes were also not
new by the time of the announcement of the Truman Doctrine.

The Marshall Plan

For what purpose was the European Recovery Program
initiated? The answers given to this question are determined;
by a large extent, by the interpretation advanced by the
historian. It is obvious that if the Marshall Plan had altruistic
intentions the answer will support the traditionalist. If the
intentions were not altruistic, the revisionist view is
strengthened. Other motives can be suggested to support dif-
ferent interpretations. For this reason it is appropriate to
study the intentions attributed to the formation of the Marshall
Plan by the five historians.

By this point in the study, one could accurately surmise that Herbert Feis viewed the conception of the Marshall Plan as the salvation of Western Europe. By mid-1947, Europe was a veritable bedlam, with economic chaos, misery, and subsistence living standards widespread. Feis believed that the goal of the Marshall Plan was to deliver Europe from its suffering, and that by doing this, the United States protected Europe from communist influence only as a secondary result. The Plan was not anti-Soviet in intention or tone. For Feis, it was an attempt to create economic and, hence, political stability in an effort to secure world peace.

Feis' portrayal of the benevolent Uncle Sam was to be expected, and perhaps there was something to his belief that the Marshall Plan was largely altruistic. Even the revisionist Fleming found it impossible to deny the good intentions of the United States in the advancement of the Plan. Though he never put this admission into a direct statement, Fleming did concede in a back-handed manner the altruism of the Marshall Plan, when he asserted that, had this policy preceded the Truman Doctrine, the course of Soviet—American relations would most likely have taken a turn for the better, or at least would not have been so cold. Mr. Fleming even found it necessary to excuse Soviet (and, therefore, East European) non-participation by maintaining that after the threatening policy of the Truman Doctrine, the Soviets could not help but be suspicious of
United States' proposals and question their true purposes.

It was obvious to Gabriel Kolko that the Marshall Plan was simply a blatant example of the American designs on Europe and their hopes for international economic hegemony. The purpose of the Plan was to rebuild the economies of the capitalist countries of Europe in the image of the United States and to tie them securely to dependence on United States' exports. Kolko asserted that although the Marshall Plan did not expressly exclude East Europe and the Soviet Union, the United States knew they would not participate and were glad of it. Yet Kolko did not view the Marshall Plan as an anti-Soviet policy, this being a political motive. The Marshall Plan would have been proposed to bring about the United States dreams even if the Soviet Union had not existed.

The Marshall Plan was the logical follow up to the Truman Doctrine, if one accepts the writings of Louis Halle. The Truman Doctrine proclaimed United States' intentions to fill vacuums where they existed, or to prevent them from occurring, if possible. Halle saw the Marshall Plan as a response to the threat of imminent collapse of the Western European nations. Therefore, the goal of the E.R.P. was the reconstruction and strengthening of Europe, for its own sake, and not as a counter to the U.S.S.R. Like Kolko, Halle believed that identical, or at least similar, action would have been taken by the United States without the presence of the Soviet Union. The United
States could not permit the creation of another power vacuum, because of the chaos it would bring to the world order.

Acting as a Great Power, the United States proposed the Marshall Plan in an honest attempt to aid the stagnating economies of Europe just for the sake of rebuilding and strengthening them, naturally keeping an eye to an improved world economy. Stabilization and strengthening of the world system was viewed as part of the role of a great power by Ulam. On the other hand, Ulam did not deny that the United States felt that poverty and atrocious social conditions made the countries of Western Europe vulnerable to communist influence, and he admitted that the prevention of this was a partial purpose of the Marshall Plan. The naturally suspicious Soviet mind perceived the E.R.P. to be a threat to their sovereignty and their economic independence. Ulam also noted that the Soviet paranoia and need to maintain a closed society precluded the possibility of participation in the Marshall Plan which required disclosure of economic statistics. Who could expect the Soviet to give out freely to a nation considered their enemy, information belying their true strengths and weaknesses?

It would seem almost a corroboration of Feis' viewpoint that even his adversary, Fleming, could not avoid conceding that the United States was capable of policies with good intentions. Fleming did not find it advisable to ignore this issue as he attempted to do with the German question,
since even concession of altruism in the Marshall Plan did not bully the Soviet image, and, therefore, did little or no damage to his general theory of Soviet innocence.

The hole left by Kolko in this analysis of the Marshall Plan is approximately two years long. If, as he has written, the purpose was to aid Europe along to path to strong, liberal capitalist economies, why did the United States wait until 1947 to begin? Would it not have been much more effective to start economic recovery immediately?

On the issue of the Marshall Plan, Adam Ulam has again taken a balanced view of the world situation of the early Cold War period. Neither condemning nor condoning, Ulam portrayed a world system whose participants formulated policy on the basis of a mixture of idealism and pragmatism, realism, and myth.

One can see the reason for Soviet non-participation in all of the interpretations except for Halley's. Feis attributed it to the Soviet uncooperative nature and desire to foil the plans of the United States. Fleming laid his case on Truman Doctrine - bred suspicion. Kolko did not expect the Soviet Union to aid in furthering capitalist goals. Ulam, too, named suspicion as the reason for the Soviet refusal to join the Plan. Only in Halley was it impossible to find an explanation to follow the theory. If the Marshall Plan were proposed to prevent a power vacuum which would, in turn, prevent
chaos and disturbance of the world system, a situation damaging to the Great Powers with the most interest in the system, why would the Soviet Union refuse to help it succeed, indeed to actively agitate against the Plan?

SUMMARY and CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the above text, the five historical views presented have become crystallized and the lines between them definitely drawn. Each man's interpretation colored his views on the nine issues in early Cold War history. Herbert Feis' traditional feelings led him to the almost melodramatic portrayal of the American force of good combatting the Russian forces of evil.

On the other extreme, Fleming's revisionist outlook forced him to explain and justify Soviet actions, where it was possible, and belittling the importance of the issue where it was not.

An economic interpretation led Gabriel Kolko to ignore a number of factors, leaving a theory with numerous questions yet to be answered. Louis Halle adhered to an interesting belief in power vacuum control of world events, but found it impossible to avoid a few contradictions in his account. Adam Ulam did a thorough job of presenting the viewpoint that the Cold War resulted from the politics of the two Great Powers, letting this shape his opinions on the nine issues.

In the course of this study, numerous questions have been posed and left unanswered. Our intention in posing these questions was merely to point up weaknesses or contradictions
in the historical accounts published by the five authors. If the questions asked can be answered within the context of the general interpretation, the theory remains workable. If not, then there is serious need for more research and closer scrutiny of the evidence by the historian.

As may be discerned from the above text, the author is in closer agreement with Adam Ulam than with any of the other four historians. There will be no attempt, however, to prohibit Adam Ulam as the dispenser of all wisdom, for there are questions left unanswered by his arguments also. In any case, such an attempt would not only be unjustifiable but ridiculous. One can only be voicing an opinion unless one not only has access to all the written evidence, but also the power to enter the kinds of principals in the Cold War. Even then personal bias will enter into one's judgment. No human can eliminate the element of personal bias. Absolute objectivity is not a gift given to any man.

In conclusion, it must be stated that in the course of this study, the author, far from being converted to one theory or another, became thoroughly convinced of the idea that there can be no absolute right or wrong when dealing with historical interpretation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


